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Abstract 
China’s economy and development over decades has achieved not only its national prosperity, but 
also a significant degree of concern about corporate sustainability. As a vehicle of communication 
to society, corporate sustainability disclosures (CSD) are considered the most effective and 
efficient, facilitating the empowerment and acknowledgement of stakeholders in the quest for, 
and understanding of, sustainability. Much research has investigated the influential factors of 
CSD based on theories developed from Western standards and economy; however, very limited 
research considers the driving forces created by cultural and political influences based on the 
understanding of the perceptions of corporate sustainability among stakeholders in China. This 
study aims to explore the users’ perceptions and perceived importance of corporate sustainability 
disclosure (CSD), and to explain the driving forces of the quality of disclosure. In order to fully 
address the purpose of the study, an instrument for measuring the quality of sustainability 
disclosure was designed based on Global Reporting Index 4th generation. A survey questionnaire 
was used to collect information on the perception of CSD from the selected report user group; 
descriptive statistics, univariate analysis, as well as multivariate Ordinary Least Square 
regressions models were adopted in this study. Research modelling tested and differentiated the 
influence of Legitimacy Theory, Stakeholder Theory and Signalling Theory both separately and 
collectively. A pilot study was undertaken prior to the main study, to address the validity and 
feasibility of the application for the perception analysis. The responses from 128 registered 
financial analysts, and 238 stand-alone corporate sustainability reports issued in 2013, were 
collected for the main study.  
The main study findings indicated that the hypotheses and theoretical framework proposed can be 
partially accepted in the Chinese context, and they suggest the following: 1. Environmental 
disclosure was perceived the most important, followed by social disclosure. Economic disclosure 
was perceived the least important. 2. Category wise, ‘Energy’, ‘Water’, ‘Emissions’ and 
‘Effluents and Waste’ were perceived most important, and ‘Customer health and safety’, 
‘Customer privacy’ and ‘Compliance’ were second-most important. 3. The quality of CSD in 
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Chinese listed companies in 2013 was generally low, just more than the information simply being 
disclosed. 4. The quality and the quantity of disclosure did not vary much across corporate 
sustainability disclosure, and they need to be examined together while investigating corporate 
sustainability as a whole. 5. Well disclosed corporate sustainability information from the sample 
companies was mainly driven by government policies, as political influence played a significant 
role in affecting the quality of CSD. 6. Research hypotheses are shown to be at different 
significance levels among different types of sustainability disclosures. ‘Company location’ and 
‘company size’ are significant for almost all types of CSD. ‘Foreign ownership’ and ‘industry’ 
are highly significant in the environmental models and the combined CSD models. The overall 
correlations between predictors and criterion variables are from considerably low to moderate, 
which suggests that the hypotheses are partially accepted.     
One major implication of the study is the instrument developed from the analysis of the Chinese 
report users’ perceptions towards CSD. It helps CSD preparers and regulators to understand the 
difference in perceptions between the report users and the governing bodies, thereby increasing 
the effectiveness of the disclosures. Furthermore, Legitimacy Theory was shown to be the most 
significant in the Chinese context, followed by Stakeholder Theory and lastly, Signalling Theory. 
The study indicates that the quality of CSD from the state-owned companies was not very 
different from the non-state-owned companies, and they would be perceived highly sustainable 
even if they did not disclose. This indicates that political influence had a great impact on the 
perception of CSD. The content analyses and the regression analyses both provide valuable 
insights into the quality and practice of CSD. Consequently, this study motivates further research 
and contributes to the existing literature in this field of study in China. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Research background 
The notion of corporate sustainability in China has attracted much attention over the past 20 
years with the advent of globalisation and international trade. While governments in China have 
traditionally assumed sole responsibility for improvement on the sustainability of the living 
conditions of the population, society is increasingly calling for organisations to demonstrate 
corporate sustainability (Gao, 2009). Corporate sustainability, which is incorporated with 
triple-bottom line reporting, rather than solely related to economic responsibility, includes the 
interrelationship between environmental and social perspectives (GRI, 2013). 
According to Freeman (1984), environmental and social accounting is an approach to 
reporting a company’s activities that stresses the need for the identification of socially relevant 
behaviour, the determination of those to whom the company is accountable for its environmental 
and social performances, and the development of appropriate measures and reporting techniques. 
However, being sustainable or ecologically responsible is defined differently across cultures 
(Hofstede, 1980). In China, as part of triple-bottom line reporting, corporate environmental and 
social reporting has developed substantially since the 1990s, when the two main stock exchanges, 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) and Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) were established. Recent 
studies have indicated that investors and shareholders in China have become increasingly 
concerned about social and environmental policies. As a tool for managing public social and 
environmental image, corporate sustainability disclosures are largely perceived to be a response 
to external public pressures on corporate management (Gao, 2009). Subsequently, corporate 
sustainability through disclosure is a vehicle for corporations to report and communicates their 
economic, social and environmental performances to companies’ stakeholders, thereby reducing 
information asymmetry; further, it is assumed that such disclosure will lower companies’ capital 
costs (Li, Luo, Wang & Wu, 2013).    
China has experienced rapid economic growth since 1978, just after the nation’s economic 
reform and open-door policy were introduced (Shen, Lowe & Shu, 2009). In China, 
modernisation and globalisation of corporate management and the stock markets has provided 
help to the economy to expand 10% per annum for the four consecutive years to 2007 (Bezlova, 
2007). As the world’s largest developing country, with dramatic economic development, China 
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managed to survive the 1997 Asian financial crisis (AFC) and quickly recover from the 2008 
global financial crisis (GFC) (Guo, Marinova, & Hong, 2013). However, in tandem with the 
significant boost in its economy in the past 15 years, China has experienced severe environmental 
deterioration and raised significant social issues, which have been criticised both nationally and 
internationally. While the boost in economy has attracted investors both domestic and 
international, the growing public concern about environmental protection, work safety and the 
associated social issues has become one of the most serious problems facing Chinese companies. 
For example, serious milk powder corporate scandals in mainland China have raised extreme 
concern for companies’ social responsibility: Melamine was added into the formula of milk 
powder to boost the protein content by Sanlu Group in 2008. Infants who consumed this product 
were highly likely to develop kidney stones, or even an illness that was potentially fatal. Sanlu 
Group was one of the largest milk powder manufacturers and sellers in China over 15 continuous 
years, and it was once the biggest taxpayer. The revelation of the scandal caused the failure and 
bankruptcy of Sanlu, and, more importantly, it entirely destroyed people’s confidence in the 
Chinese milk powder supply industry. The 300,000 victims triggered considerable social pressure, 
which consequently affected thousands of workers who lost their jobs and became redistributed in 
the labour market (Noronha, Tou, Cynthia, & Guan, 2013). The society, as a result, had to bear 
this significant social cost. 
Another example that official reports and academic research have identified is that more than 
90% of rivers close to cities are heavily polluted, and the air pollution in many cities is so serious 
that it may cause health consequences (Nie, 2009). The International Energy Agency (IEA), 
which gives advice to developing countries to ensure reliable, affordable and clean energy, 
suggests that in 2013 China’s emission of greenhouse gases had exceeded those of the US. In the 
next 25 years, if this trend is not stopped, the amount of carbon dioxide from China alone will be 
twice as much or more than that which comes from all of the OECD countries (Bezlova, 2007). 
China had become the number one country in terms of total annual carbon emissions by 2013, and 
a crucial player in negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (Jost, 2013).   
Therefore, Chinese enterprises are increasingly pressured by numerous stakeholders and by 
the external public to engage in social and environmental sustainability. Despite the increasing 
attention in recent years to corporate sustainability performance, enterprises’ awareness is still at 
the infancy level, and there is very limited research evidence of completeness and comparability 
of sustainability reports in China. Diao (2013) reveals that there is significant variation among 
large companies in sustainability information disclosure. In addition, the ever-increasing Chinese 
economy, which has surpassed Japan to become the second-largest economy in the world, has a 
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completely different culture and political system than the West (Li-Hua & Lu, 2013). Chinese 
stakeholders’ perceptions of corporate sustainability have been progressively more focused and 
driven by strong public sentiment due to the definition of corporate sustainability. Studies have 
investigated Chinese enterprises using initiatives based on Western theoretical foundations, 
which indicate that environmental reporting in the listed companies is growing worldwide, with 
most companies reporting ‘material, energy, emission, effluents and waste’ types of information 
(Yuan, 2007, Peng, 2009, Niu, 2009 & Zhang, 2013). This result may provide some indication of 
which aspects are more likely to be focused on when preparing an environmental disclosure; 
however, it is of interest to the regulators, practitioners, and the users of sustainability reports to 
understand whether the report users find this information useful and it meets their perception of a 
sustainability report.  
Given this trend and the differences between cultures in voluntary sustainability reporting, it 
is significant for the researcher to examine how Chinese stakeholders perceive sustainability, and 
the level quality and type of corporate sustainability reporting in China based on the Global 
reporting initiative (GRI) framework in the listed companies. Subsequently, in this study the aims 
are to identify the drivers of the quality of corporate sustainability disclosure and corporate 
sustainability based on the report users’ perceptions in China. The study also aims to investigate 
what drives the differences in perceptions in China, and the effectiveness of different theoretical 
frameworks based on the Western economy, if there are any. Based on testing and evaluation of 
the initiatives distilled from literature and sustainability disclosure practices that match the real 
needs of the GRI, the aims are to develop an appropriate measuring instrument that is particularly 
applicable and suitable for China. 
1.2 Development of corporate sustainability in China 
The China Security and Regulation Commission (CSRC) and the State Economic and Trade 
Commission (SETC) jointly published the ‘Standards of Governance for the Listed Companies’ 
in 2002. It was the first government regulation for companies to have a clear understanding of, 
and to take a strong focus on, social responsibility. In Chapter Six of the standards, it lists 
provisions that specify that corporations should disclose certain formations to respective banks, 
debtors, employees, customers, supplies and social communities. While companies try to 
maximise shareholder value, environmental protection and public social warfare should be 
considered.  
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) and Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) have made a great 
effort to promote corporate governance initiatives in past years. Since their establishment in 1990 
and 1991, SZSE and SSE have gained recognition in the international financial market, where 
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SZSE rivals the Hong Kong Stock Exchange as Asia’s second-largest stock market, and SSE is 
already the world’s sixth-largest stock market. Ho (2013) indicates that the rapid growth of these 
markets is significantly influenced by two essential pieces of legislation: the Company Law and 
the Securities Law, enacted in 1993 and 1998. The Company Law provides the legal requirement 
for the transformation of state-owned enterprises into private or listed enterprises. The legislation 
requires companies in China to form a statutory corporate governance body and five statutory 
corporate positions, which are the shareholders, the board of directors, the board of supervisors, 
the chair of board of directors and the chief executive officer. The Securities Law provides 
authority to implement a centralised and unified regulation of the nationwide securities market in 
order to ensure companies are lawful. 
In order to conform to the two legislations, the stock exchanges in China have implemented 
guidelines for their listed corporations to take responsibility for their stakeholders. The SZSE 
issued the CSR Guidelines for Listed Companies in 2006, and the SSE issued similar guidelines, 
‘Notice on Strengthening Listed Companies of Social Responsibility’, in 2008. These guidelines 
require the listed companies to fulfil social responsibility, address interests of stakeholders, and 
commit themselves to promoting sustainable economic and social development.  
The idea of corporate sustainability is also supported by the Chinese Central Government. 
The Chinese Government emphasised the importance of corporate sustainability in its tenth 
Five-Year Plan (2001–2005), asserting that the establishment of an effective corporate 
governance system is also one of the important tasks in establishing the modern enterprises 
system. Due to this emphasis, many researchers started to believe that the listed corporations were 
being treated as part of the administrative hierarchy of the government, and the implementation of 
corporate sustainability had become a mandatory requirement for the listed companies (Xu & 
Wang, 1999, Jia & Tomasic, 2010). However, the guidelines from the stock exchanges are broad 
advocacy initiatives that do not indicate to what extent a listed company should implement its 
sustainability; nor is there any indication of what to disclose. Therefore, sustainability reporting 
remains voluntary in China.    
1.3 CSD guidelines and Global reporting initiative  
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) was formed in 1997 by the Coalition for 
Environmentally Responsible Economies in collaboration with the Tellus Institute. The initiative 
attempts to provide a sound conceptual basis for a sustainability disclosing framework, which is 
designed to improve the quality, accuracy and usefulness of corporate environmental and social 
reporting (Frost, 2007). Nowadays the emerging trend for companies is to disclose social, 
economic and environmental information concurrently in a format similar to the Triple Bottom 
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Line. Therefore, it is significant for research to work on information transparency and discussion 
on companies’ viability, strategy and operations. Not being socially responsible creates 
companies’ vulnerability to lawsuits, boycotts, and loss of reputation and brand value, which in 
turn, results in negative impacts on market acceptance, positioning and demand (Schaltegger & 
Burritt, 2005). There have been various guidelines developed by several organisations, which 
propose sustainability reporting models and frameworks. These include Dow Jones Sustainability 
Indexes (DJSI); ISO 14000 Series by the ISO; SA 8000 by Social Accountability International; 
AA1000 Accountability Ability Principles Standard 2008 by the Account Ability (AA); FTSE4 
Good Index Series by the Financial Times and London Stock Exchange Group (FTSE); and 
Global Reporting Initiative Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, third generation (G3) by the 
GRI.  
Since the conception of sustainability, the GRI rapidly became the leader among voluntary 
worldwide sustainability reporting systems based on three institutional innovations: initiating a 
multi-stakeholder process for developing reporting guidelines, institutionalising the process for 
producing successive generations of the guidelines, and creating an organisation to serve as the 
steward of the guidelines and of the process (Brown, Jong & Lessidrenska, 2007). The formation 
of and amendments to the GRI are largely dependent on its annual meeting in Amsterdam, where 
“over a thousand representatives of global business, investment capital, civil society 
organisational, professionals, and idea entrepreneurs, politicians, corporate CEOs and high-level 
members of multilateral institutions” attend (Brown et al., p.2, 2009). However, although the 
editing process involves many multi-national influences and consideration of the needs of 
different countries, the concepts from many GRI perspectives are initially based on the needs and 
circumstances of Western countries. The framing of the GRI has been considered by many studies 
as “an efficiency gain for all actors” because the foundation of the initiatives is Stakeholder 
Theory, in which it allows balancing sets of competing objectives. According to Brown et al. 
(2007), those objectives include individual and collective interests, broad consultation and 
efficient pursuit of technical objectives, and a vision of social change and attainable instrumental 
goals, as well as building a new institution and not challenging the existing institutions and power 
relations. Consequently, it is clear that the GRI is developed based on a number of corporate 
behaviour theories, including Legitimacy Theory, Institutional Theory and Stakeholder Theory 
under Political Economy Theory. 
Although compliance with the guidelines is entirely voluntary, in its 2008 survey of the 
Global Fortune 250 (G250) and the 100 largest companies measured by revenue in 22 countries 
(N100), KPMG found that there are 75% of G250 and 70% of N100 companies using these 
initiatives. In China, the GRI gains high praise as the most comprehensive guideline for social 
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reporting from both industries and academics. SZSE published the social disclosure instructions 
in 2006 based on the frame of the GRI, yet many Chinese scholars employed it to measure the 
extent and the degree of the CSD (Chu, 2007; Yuan, 2007; Nie, 2009; Peng, 2009; Xue. 2011). 
1.4 Research motivation  
From a practical point of view, China’s development over recent decades has heavily 
depended on burning coal to fuel its economic growth. While Chinese corporations have 
gradually achieved prosperity, a significant degree of concern about their corporate sustainability 
has been raised on an international basis, criticising the unprecedented environmental pollution, 
health risks and social issues in China (Zhang, 2007). As a vehicle of communication to society, 
CSD is considered the most effective and efficient way to facilitate the empowerment and 
acknowledgement of stakeholders in their quest for, and understanding of, sustainability. The 
concept of corporate sustainability was only introduced in the 1990s by multinational companies, 
but no attention was given by anyone at that time. In 2001, China had entry to the World Trade 
Organisation, and a significant number of Chinese companies became members of the global 
supply chain (Zhang, 2013). Due to compatibility in the global market and national demand, the 
Chinese President Hu Jin Tao proposed the concept of a “Harmonic Society” in 2005, which first 
set corporate sustainable problems, together with companies’ social responsibility, on top of the 
governmental agenda (Zhou, Quan and Jiang, 2012). However, the legal concept was never 
included in the Company Law in China, and China will have to wrestle with these environmental 
and social issues and solve them by emphasising the importance of corporate sustainability. 
Accountability requires a greater extent of understanding of the quality of CSD in the context of 
China. In addition, although a great number of sustainability disclosing guidelines have been 
recommended by Chinese literature, they are not strictly applicable on a global basis, especially in 
China, which is the root of the “Confucius Connect” (Ling, 2009). The degree of influences of 
corporate policies about being sustainably orientated can be significantly different between 
Western contexts and Asian countries. Hence, it is of importance and interest for researchers to 
understand the Chinese perceptions and understanding of corporate sustainability, and it provides 
evidence to build the most up-to-date and accurate instrument suitable for empirical studies of 
CSD in China.  
In addition, there has been very limited research investigating to what extent the culture in 
China influences the quality of companies’ disclosing practices and understanding of corporate 
sustainability between Western countries, especially applying Western-developed theories to 
countries that have a considerable amount of cultural influences. China has a unique feature 
within its economic background which is driven significantly by the state-government. Although 
many studies have tried to identify the differences in CSD between countries, the specific effects 
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of culture on corporate sustainability are still unknown (Diao, 2013). Furthermore, the GRI has 
been adopted widely both internationally and nationally in China. While this set of initiatives 
remains one of the most authoritative existing guidelines, the standard and frame are built and 
made based on the fundamentals and the perceptions from Western countries. Subsequently, the 
categories in GRI can be weighted differently by the Chinese users and preparers due to culture 
differences. Hence, this study seeks to fill a gap in the literature by providing up-to-date evidence 
on the quality of CSD and the understanding and perceptions of the Chinese CSD users.    
1.5 Research questions 
The main research questions of the study are as follows:    
1. What is the users’ (financial analysts) perceived importance of sustainability disclosure in 
China? 
2. To what extent do the users perceive sustainability indicators in GRI differently from what 
was intended?  
3. What is the quality of CSD in Chinese listed companies? 
4. What drives the quality of corporate sustainability disclosure in Chinese listed companies?  
5. Do the theories developed from the Western economy explain the quality of CSD in China? If 
not, which theory explains CSD in China the best, and to what degree do the selected theories 
explain the quality of CSD differently?  
The study has three objectives. The first research objective is to determine the Chinese report 
users’ perceptions towards CSD. In addition, this study seeks to identify the quality and the 
drivers of CSD. The final objective is to compare the effectiveness of the three theories developed 
from the Western economy when explaining the driving forces. 
1.6 Contribution of the study 
Chinese culture is heavily influenced by Confucianism and Taoism, and this idea of societal 
harmony has been widely considered in all companies throughout China (Lin, 2008). Under this 
circumstance, information asymmetry may exist between the Chinese companies and the report 
users. The research gap is to understand the perceptions of CSD users, as well as how they 
interpret sustainability and sustainability information disclosed. Therefore, the study aims to 
understand the users’ perceptions of corporate sustainability from within companies. 
Subsequently, it provides a more sophisticated and deeper insight into the focus of Chinese 
companies when disclosing sustainability. The results help to identify the Chinese report users’ 
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(financial analysts) perceptions. The existing research in China focuses on the report preparers’ 
perceptions rather than the users’, thus, there is only a little attention given in the literature to the 
latter group. Also, this study provides empirical evidence to both the practitioners (the industries) 
and the regulators (the government) and discusses whether achieving improved CSD should rely 
on the GRI, which has not been extensively investigated according to the literature. Since 
industries are analysed later in the study, the result of it contributes to the government in 
modifying and developing a sustainability guideline based on Chinese industrial type. In addition, 
this study provides evidence to reveal the quality and the drivers of CSD under the current report 
users’ perceptions in listed companies in China. This fills the research gap in the Chinese 
literature, where existing studies have not incorporated both the perceptions and the quality of 
disclosures.   
1.7 Organisation of the study 
This study is organised in the following manner: Chapter one introduces the research 
background and the institution background, research questions, research objectives and 
significance, as well as a brief description of GRI. Chapter two reviews existing critical 
literature in CSD, including a critical analysis of the application of GRI and a review of the 
theories adopted in CSD study. It also includes revising the key literature of the internal and 
external driving forces of the quality of CSD, and how it is different and limited in the Chinese 
context. Chapter three discusses the theoretical framework adopted in this study, in which the 
framework for the pilot study and the main body of the study are presented separately. Chapter 
four shows the research methodology. Chapter five presents the analysis of the users’ 
perceptions of CSD and the development of the research instrument. A pilot study is conducted 
and shown in this chapter. Key statistical analyses include descriptive statistics and one ample 
t-test. Chapter six examines the quality of CSD, where economic, environmental and social 
dimensions are discussed separately first, then combined to draw a result and a conclusion. 
Chapter seven is the major analysis chapter on the driving forces of CSD. Research models 
developed are examined. Key statistical analyses include descriptive statistics, univariate 
analysis (Pearson correlation test), and multivariate analysis (Ordinary least square models). For 
robustness checks, binary logistic regression models and stepwise backwards regression models 
are used. Chapter 8 is the final chapter, which concludes the study and indicates the implications 
and limitations of the study, as well as providing suggestions for future research. A diagram that 
shows the research frame of the study is shown on the next page in Figure 1.1.  
 
9 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Research framework 
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Chapter 2 
Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
    In this section the researcher reviews prior literature relevant to the major purpose of the 
study, which is to explore how Chinese report users perceived importance of corporate 
sustainability disclosure (CSD), as well as to research and examine the quality and the driving 
forces of CSD. Disclosure of sustainability issues in reports may often be considered by 
management to legitimise companies’ activities (Chauvey, Giordano-Spring, Cho & Patten, 
2015). However, due to culture differences between regions, it is difficult to determine whether 
users from a global perspective differ with respect to their intentions and perceptions of corporate 
sustainability (Chow & Chen, 2012). Nevertheless, disclosing corporate sustainability 
information has become an international trend since the 1990s, including for Chinese enterprises. 
Consequently, the literature review is limited to studies that analyse impact due to cultural change 
and the driving forces of CSD conducted in China. 
2.2 Defining the concept of corporate sustainability  
    The concept of corporate sustainability was derived from the broader concept of 
sustainability, which was shaped from political, public and academic influence (Orlitzky, Siegel 
& Waldman, 2011). However, the inconsistency of a proper definition of corporate sustainability 
has impeded the progress of understanding the antecedents and consequences of this activity 
(Orlitzky, et al., 2011). Corporate sustainability, which is also referred to as social responsibility, 
was exclusively associated with companies’ financial perspectives initially, but its essential 
objective is to maximise shareholders’ value (Friedman, 1962), from which companies will 
benefit in the long run from being sustainable. In 1963, McGuire proposed that corporate 
sustainability should also include responsibility towards the environment that should go beyond 
companies’ legal and economic obligations (McGuire, 1963). Later, in the 1990s, corporate 
sustainability was defined as a process to achieve sustainable development in societies (Hopkins, 
2004). Hopkins equates corporate sustainability with treating the stakeholders of a company or an 
organisation ethically or in a responsible manner, where he defines being ethical or responsible as 
a key manner deemed acceptable according to international norms. The Hopkins study further 
explains that sustainability includes environmental, social and economic perspectives. While 
preserving the profitability of the corporation or the integrity of the institution for stakeholders 
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from the outer and inner, companies should be considered and be provided profitability (Hopkins, 
2004). This idea was supported until 2001, when Maignan and Ferrell (2001) suggested that 
corporate sustainability should be considered as a broad concept relating to the role of business in 
society. Corporate sustainability incorporates the moral obligations that maximise the positive 
impact of the firm on its social environment and minimise the negative impact (Maignan & 
Ferrell, 2001). The concept most frequently referred to nowadays by Chinese researchers is 
Carroll’s (1979) model combined with Stakeholders Theory, where Carroll considered that 
corporate sustainability should be comprised of economic, legal, ethical and philanthropic 
obligations towards a company’s business environment. 
    The contemporary perception of sustainability on an international level was initially 
discussed by the World Commission of Environment and Development (WCED) in 1987. It is 
defined as ‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs’ (WCED, 1987, p.43). Consequently, sustainable 
development was then closely associated with environmental integrity and social equity, as well 
as corporate economic prosperity.  
2.3 Three stages of corporate sustainability development in China 
    The development of corporate sustainability in China is often considered in three stages, 
based on the policies introduced during a specific period of time. Initially, a series of corporate 
sustainability oriented policies was developed and implemented in China in the 1970s (Bai, 
Sarkis & Dou, 2015). The first stage is referred to as the end-of-pipe control stage, from 1973 to 
1992. The first national conference for the nation’s environmental protection was held in 1973, 
and the second one was held in 1983 to discuss two possible and basic policies for protecting the 
environment. Six years later, in 1989, the Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic 
of China was introduced to provide some ideas to existing firms for being green (Wang & Chen, 
2010). Until the end of 1992, China’s Agenda 21 took sustainability development into action by 
officially ending the ‘pipes’, and it set an agenda to develop technology to reduce the pollution in 
air, water and soil from industries. Nevertheless, this was the very first stage of CSD development 
in China. The stakeholders of the Chinese companies in any form did not perceive that 
sustainability might become an issue (Bai et al., 2015). 
    The second stage of corporate sustainability development in China is referred to as the 
whole-process control stage, lasting from 1993 to 2005 (Shi, Chertow & Song, 2010). During this 
period, regulators attempted to shift focus from end-of-pipe treatment to a whole-process control 
strategy of environmental protection. In 1997, the Law of Promoting Cleaner Production was 
issued by the National Environmental Protection Agency of China, in which the focus of ending 
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pipes shifted to having feasible treatment for environmental damage from industry. Since then, 
many laws have been introduced to encourage companies to take action on environmental issues 
and to control any possible wastes; however, during the second stage, there was no indication in 
law about how and what companies should report on sustainability issues that they had 
encountered.  
The final stage, from 2005 to the present, is defined as the regional control stage, in which 
regulations and policies were introduced to focus on the balance of economic development and 
environmental protection (Bai et al., 2015). In 2005, policy strategies on energy savings and 
pollution reduction were introduced. Ecological modernisation theory was the main foundation 
for the regulators to adopt when making policies. Many laws had incentives by creating subsides 
to motivate companies to be sustainable. In 2009, the stage Council set up nation-wide goals to 
reduce the intensity of the emission of carbon dioxide. A further policy on having a low-carbon 
economy was later set in March 2010, during the third session of China’s NPC. Figure 2.1 shows 
a timeline for the development of corporate sustainability and the relevant policies.      
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Figure 2.1: Timeline of corporate sustainability oriented policies in China 
Note: Adapted from Bai, Sarkis & Dou, 2015, Corporate sustainability development in China: review and analysis, p.8 
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2.4 Sustainability reporting 
    Sustainability reporting is also referred to as corporate social responsibility reporting, which 
was involved solely with social issues at the very beginning stage in the early 1960s (Lin, 2010). 
Elkington (1994) suggested that there are six stages of corporate sustainability development, 
which include ignorance, awakening, denial, guilt reduction, displacement behaviour and 
tokenism, conversion, and finally, integration. In 2003, this development was further extended 
and re-summarised by Dunphy. Dunphy, Griffiths and Benn (2003) developed more sophisticated 
concepts for each of the six stages of CSD development, which include rejection, 
non-responsiveness, compliance, efficiency, strategic proactivity, and the sustaining corporation. 
    After the emergence of Triple Bottom Line (TBL) reporting, the number of companies that 
issued corporate social sustainability disclosure increased, with different names to show different 
areas of focus. Reynolds and Yuthas (2008) explained this early stage of reporting sustainability 
as companies owing a duty to the society in which they are bonded with a social contract. The idea 
of sustainability disclosures was initially delivered from Western literature. Jones (1980) 
proposed that corporate sustainability is the notion in which “companies have an obligation to 
constituent groups in society other than stakeholders and beyond that prescribed by law or union 
contract, indicating that a stake may go beyond mere ownership” (Jones 1980, p.60). Deegan 
(2002) refers to corporate sustainability as an impact beyond the role of maximising profitability 
by a firm on the environment and society. In Europe, corporate sustainability is regarded as a 
concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business 
operations and in their interactions with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis (Chiu & Wang, 
2015).  
    In China, the notion of corporate sustainability reporting was first proposed in 2006 in the 
amendment of the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China, Article 5 of the General 
Law. Later in 2006, in the Chinese Communist Party Sixth Plenary Session, it was proposed to 
create a harmonious society with the focus of being socially responsible, particularly for business 
enterprises (Gao, 2010). As a response to the national plan, the Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange issued social reporting guidelines in 2006 and 2008 respectively, to 
create an appropriate system for corporate sustainability reporting. Although a number of policies 
were introduced after the two stock exchange markets announced their guidelines, the meaning 
and definition of corporate sustainability was not specified, neither did the guidelines provide any 
indication of how and what to report in a CSD. Therefore, the standardisation and the regulations 
of corporate sustainability in China are in great need of development (Bai et al., 2015). 
15 
 
    The concept of corporate sustainability has become much clearer in recent times; however, 
there is no agreed-upon definition of CSD, and Chinese scholars have various approaches to the 
idea of corporations being sustainable. Liu (2007) states that maximising shareholders’ value and 
financial profit should not be the only goal of making corporations sustainable, but companies 
must consider the other stakeholders’ perspectives. Lu (2002) claimed that corporate 
sustainability is the duty that a firm owes to society, to maintain its existence and gain social 
benefit while maximising shareholders’ value. Zhou (2005) explains that corporate sustainability 
should be a combined concept, including the responsibility towards economic, legitimate and 
ethical responsibilities that a firm must have. Both Western and Chinese literature indicates that 
corporate sustainability is, to some degree, directly related to shareholders’ and companies’ 
values, as well as being legitimate and ethical in order to fulfil companies’ social contracts.  
2.5 Global Reporting Initiative 
    The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) was established in 1997, initially as a joint project 
between the US Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies and the UN 
Environmental Programme (Chauvey et al., 2015). According to GRI (2013), the aim of this 
initiative is essentially to satisfy both the companies and stakeholders through disclosing 
economic, environmental and social performance. Firms that adopt GRI need to report firstly 
their strategy in the company profiles, as well as to disclose, their management approach as to 
how they address corporate sustainability practices, and lastly, indicators regarding company 
sustainability (economic, environmental and social) performance (Hahn & Luffs, 2014). GRI 
overall provides companies with specific information on how and what to report in CSD. While 
GRI provides such comprehensive sets of guidelines on CSR, it ultimately aims to enhance 
companies’ information transparency and overall accountability. This made the GRI 
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines to be the most commonly used framework internationally 
(Hahn & Luffs, 2014). The KPMG Survey into Corporate Social Responsibility (KPMG, 2008) 
examined the 250 top companies listed on the Global Fortune 500, and the 100 largest firms by 
revenue in 22 countries. The results showed that there were more than 75% of companies from the 
Global Fortune 500 and 70% of the 100 largest revenue firms that applied the GRI. On the other 
hand, GRI is also practical for firms to use as report preparers are able to self-examine their own 
level of corporate sustainability performance. The grades of A, B or C are described in much 
detail in the guidelines, and companies can show their grades in their disclosures. 
    As suggested by Brown, de Jong and Lessidrenska (2009), GRI is significant in terms of its 
broad range of stakeholder approach, as well as institutionalising multi-stakeholders on 
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reporting and accountability. However, Drori, Meyer and Hwang (2006) indicated that GRI is 
mostly presented by multinational companies on a global basis, and international accounting 
firms have a large influence on standardising the guidelines. Western multinational firms, 
therefore, helped to set the agenda on corporate sustainability reporting based on their own 
interests (Vigneau, Humphreys and Moon, 2015). It is suggested that “the guidelines’ lack of 
universal applicability creates a perceived unfairness inherent in imposing Western standards of 
social behaviour and associated reporting practices” (Adams and McNicholas, 2007, p.484). In 
addition, GRI is standardised as a business practice. As suggested by Etzion and Ferraro (2010), 
GRI has placed great emphasis on reporting its principles rather than providing detailed 
templates and metrics to be used in reports, and it is now providing guidelines on what to report 
instead of how to report.  
    Nevertheless, GRI has been a very successful institution, and the guidelines remain highly 
authoritative globally due to their context, language, concepts and assumptions (Brown et al, 
2009). It highlights the importance of corporate sustainability reporting and has led to new 
practices of corporate sustainability and responsibility (Vigneau et al, 2015). Moreover, GRI is 
highly praised in China since it is the basis of the SZX guidelines because of its 
comprehensiveness. Hopkins (2003) contends that the GRI includes some aspects of the popular 
environmental and social guidelines, such as the ISO 14000 and the Global Sullivan Principles. 
Chu (2007) claims that the creation of the GRI guidelines provides companies with prestigious 
standards in preparing their sustainability reports, and the guidelines offer stakeholders the 
opportunity to visualise the transparency of the implementation of corporate environmental and 
social responsibility. For these reasons, the GRI guidelines are used in this study to examine the 
extent of environmental and social reporting.  
2.6 Global Reporting Initiative 4th generation (G4) 
    The most up-to-date version of the GRI guidelines is called G4, which is the fourth 
generation of the guidelines, launched in May 2013 (GRI, 2013). It marked the culmination of 
two years of extensive stakeholder consultation and dialogue with hundreds of experts across 
the world from a wide variety of sectors, such as companies, civil society, labour organisations, 
academia and finance. G4 has a more appropriate and substantial set of requirements for 
corporate social and environmental information due to its multi-stakeholder engagement process, 
which ensures that the reporting standard is universal. G4 has been widely adopted since its 
launch. 
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    G4 includes 46 aspects and categories, in which there are 4, 12 and 30 categories in 
economic, environmental and social disclosure respectively. For social disclosure, there are four 
sub-categories grouped by GRI, which are labour practices and decent work, human rights, 
society and product responsibility. A summary of the categories in G4 is presented in table 2.1.  
Table 2.1: Categories and aspects in G4 
   Economic Environmental 
Aspects  Economic performance 
 Market presence 
 Indirect economic impacts 
 Procurement practices 
 Materials 
 Energy 
 Water 
 Biodiversity 
 Emissions 
 Effluents and waste 
 Products and services 
 Compliance 
 Transport 
 Overall 
 Supplier environmental assessment 
 Environmental grievance mechanisms 
 
Table 2.1: Categories and aspects in G4 (Cont’d) 
Category Social    
Sub-categories Labour 
Practices and 
decent work 
Human rights Society Product 
responsibility 
Aspects  Employment 
 Labour/ 
management 
relations 
 Occupational 
health and 
safety 
 Training and 
education 
 Diversity and 
equal 
opportunity 
 Equal 
remuneration 
for women and 
men 
 Supplier 
assessment for 
labour practices 
 Labour 
practices 
grievance 
mechanisms 
 Investment 
 Non- 
discrimination 
 Freedom of 
association and 
collective 
bargaining 
 Child labour 
 Forced or 
compulsory 
labour 
 Security 
practices 
 Indigenous 
rights 
 Assessment 
 Supplier human 
rights 
assessment 
 Human rights 
grievance 
mechanisms 
 Local 
communities 
 Anti-corruption 
 Public policy 
 Anti- 
competitive 
behaviour 
 Compliance 
 Supplier 
assessment for 
impacts on 
society 
 Grievance 
mechanisms for 
impacts on 
society 
 
 Customer 
health and 
safety 
 Product and 
service 
labelling  
 Marketing 
communication 
 Customer 
privacy 
 Compliance 
Note: Adapted from G4 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines 2013. Amsterdam: Global 
Reporting Initiatives. 
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    The economic dimension of corporate sustainability relates to the impacts from an 
organisation on the economic conditions of its stakeholders, and on economic systems at local, 
national and global levels. There are nine economic sustainability indicators included in G4. A 
summary of economic indicators is presented in table 2.2. 
Table 2.2: Global Reporting Initiative guidelines (G4) – economic indicators 
Indicators Description 
Economic 
performance 
 
EC1 Direct economic value generated and distributed  
EC2 
 
EC3 
EC4 
Financial implications and other risks and opportunities for the organisation’s 
activities due to climate change 
Coverage of the organisation’s defined benefit plan obligations 
Financial assistance received from government 
Market 
presence 
EC5 
 
EC6 
 
Indirect 
economic 
impacts 
EC7 
EC8 
 
Procurement 
practice 
EC9 
 
 
Ratios of standard entry level wage by gender compared to local minimum 
wage at significant locations of operation 
Proportion of senior management hired from the local community at 
significant locations of operation 
 
 
 
Development and impact of infrastructure investments and services 
supported 
Significant indirect economic impacts, including the extent of impacts 
 
 
Proportion of spending on local suppliers at significant locations of operation 
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    The environmental dimension of corporate sustainability concerns the impact from an 
organisation on living and non-living natural systems, such as land, air water and ecosystems. It 
includes 34 environmental disclosing items to be reported by companies, categorised into 12 
groups: material, energy, water, biodiversity, emissions, effluents and waste, products and 
services, compliance, transport, overall, supplier environmental assessment, and environmental 
grievance mechanisms. A summary of environmental indicators is presented in table 2.3. 
Table 2.3: Global Reporting Initiative guidelines (G4) – environmental indicators 
Indicators Description 
Materials  
EN1 Materials used by weight or volume 
EN2 Percentage of materials used that are recycled input materials 
  
Energy  
EN3 Direct energy consumption by primary energy source 
EN4 Indirect energy consumption by primary source 
EN5 Energy saved due to conservation and efficiency improvements 
EN6 Initiatives to provide energy-efficient or renewable energy based products 
and services, and reductions in energy requirements as a result of these 
initiatives 
EN7 Initiatives to reduce indirect energy consumption and reductions achieved 
 
Water 
 
EN8 Total water withdrawal by source 
EN9 Water sources significantly affected by withdrawal of water 
EN10 Percentage and total volume of water recycled and reused 
 
Biodiversity 
 
EN11 Location and size of land owned, leased, managed in, or adjacent to, 
protected areas and areas of high biodiversity value outside protected areas 
EN12 Description of significant impacts of activities, products, and services on 
biodiversity in protected areas and areas of high biodiversity value outside 
protected areas 
EN13 Habitats protected or restored 
EN14 
 
Emission 
Total number of IUCH red list spices and national conservation list species 
with habitats in areas affected by operations, by level of extinction risk 
EN15 Total direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions by weight 
EN16 Other relevant indirect greenhouse gas emissions by weight 
EN17 Other indirect greenhouse gas emissions 
EN18 Greenhouse gas emissions intensity 
EN19 
EN20 
EN21 
Reduction of greenhouse gas emissions 
Emission of ozone-depleting substances 
NOx, SOx, and other significant air emissions 
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Table 2.3: Global Reporting Initiative guidelines (G3) – environmental indicators (Cont’d) 
Indicators Description 
Effluents and waste 
EN22 Total water discharge by quality and destination 
EN23 Total weight of waste by type and disposal method 
EN24 Total number and volume of significant spills 
EN25 Weight of transported, imported, exported, or treated waste deemed 
hazardous under the terms of the Basel Convention Annex I, II, III, and 
VIII, and percentage of transported waste shipped internationally 
EN26 Identity, size, protected status, and biodiversity value of water bodies and 
related habitats significantly affected by the reporting organisation’s 
discharges of water and runoff 
 
Products and  
Services  
EN27 Extent of impact mitigation of environmental impacts on products and 
services 
EN28 Percentage of products sold and their packaging materials that are reclaimed 
by category 
 
Compliance  
EN29 Monetary value of significant fines and total number of non-monetary 
sanctions for non-compliance with environmental laws and regulations. 
 
Transport 
 
EN30 Significant environmental impacts of transporting products and other goods 
and materials used for the organisation’s operations, and transporting 
members of the workforce 
 
Overall 
 
EN31 
 
Supplier 
environmental 
assessment 
EN32 
EN33 
 
 
Environmental 
grievance 
mechanisms 
EN34 
Total environmental protection expenditures and investments by type 
 
 
 
 
Percentage of new suppliers that were screened using environmental criteria 
Significant actual and potential negative environmental impacts in the 
supply chain and actions taken 
 
 
 
 
Number of grievances about environmental impacts filed, addressed, and 
resolved through formal grievance mechanisms 
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    The G3 social indicators consist of four subcategories, including labour practices and decent 
work, human rights performance, society performance and product responsibility performance. 
Table 2.4 presents the summary of social indicators for the G3 index.  
Table 2.4: Global Reporting Initiative guidelines (G3) – social indicators 
Indicators Description 
Labour Practice and Decent Work 
LA1 Total workforce by employment type, employment contract, and region 
LA2 Total number and rate of employee turnover by age group, gender, and 
region 
LA3 Benefits provided to full-time employees that are not provided to temporary 
or part-time employees, by major operations 
LA4 Percentage of employees covered by collective bargaining agreements 
LA5 Minimum notice period(s) regarding operational changes, including whether 
this is specified in collective agreements 
LA6 Percentage of total workforce represented in formal joint management–
worker health and safety committees that help monitor and advise on 
occupational health and safety programs 
LA7 Rates of injury, occupational diseases, lost days, and absenteeism, and 
number of work related fatalities by region 
LA8 Education, training, counselling, prevention, and risk-control programs in 
place to assist workforce members, their families, or community members 
regarding serious diseases 
LA9 Health and safety topics covered in formal agreements with trade unions 
LA10 Average hours of training per year per employee, by employee category 
LA11 Programs for skills management and lifelong learning that support the 
continued employability of employees and assist them in managing career 
endings 
LA12 Percentage of employees receiving regular performance and career 
development reviews 
LA13 Composition of governance bodies and breakdown of employees per 
category according to gender, age group, minority group membership, and 
other indicators of diversity 
LA14 Ratio of basic salary of men to women by employee category 
 
Human Rights 
HR1 Percentage and total number of significant investment agreements that 
include human rights clauses or that have undergone human rights 
screening. 
HR2 Percentage of significant suppliers and contractors that have undergone 
screening on human rights and actions taken 
HR3 Total hours of employee training on policies and procedures concerning 
aspects of human rights that are relevant to operations, including the 
percentage of employees trained 
HR4 Total number of incidents of discrimination and actions taken 
HR5 Operations identified in which the right to exercise freedom of association 
and collective bargaining may be at significant risk, and actions taken to 
support these rights 
HR6 Operations identified as having significant risk for incidents of child labour, 
and measures taken to contribute to the elimination of child labour 
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Table 2.4: Global Reporting Initiative guidelines (G3) – social indicators (Cont’d) 
Indicators Description 
HR7 Operations identified as having significant risk for incidents of forced or 
compulsory labour, and measures to contribute to the elimination of forced 
or compulsory labour 
HR8 Percentage of security personnel trained in the organisation’s policies or 
procedures concerning aspects of human rights that are relevant to 
operations 
HR9 Total number of incidents of violations involving rights of indigenous 
people and actions taken 
 
Society Performance 
SO1 Nature, scope, and effectiveness of any programs and practices that assess 
and manage the impacts of operations on communities, including entering, 
operating, and exiting 
SO2 Percentage and total number of business units analysed for risks related to 
corruption 
SO3 Percentage of employees trained in organisation’s anti-corruption policies 
and procedures 
SO4 Actions taken in response to incidents of corruption 
SO5 Public policy positions and participation in public policy development and 
lobbying 
SO6 Total value of financial and in-kind contributions to political parties, 
politicians, and related institutions by country 
SO7 Total number of legal actions for anticompetitive behaviour, anti-trust, and 
monopoly practices and their outcomes 
SO8 Monetary value of significant fines and total number of non-monetary 
sanctions for noncompliance with laws and regulations 
 
Product Responsibility 
PR1 Life cycle stages in which health and safety impacts of products and services 
are assessed for improvement, and percentage of significant products and 
services categories subject to such procedures 
PR2 Total number of incidents of non-compliance with regulations and voluntary 
codes concerning health and safety impacts of products and services during 
their life cycle, by type of outcome 
PR3 Type of product and service information required by procedures and 
percentage of significant products and services subject to such information 
requirements 
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Table 2.4: Global Reporting Initiative guidelines (G3) – social indicators (Cont’d) 
Indicators Description 
PR4 Total number of incidents of non-compliance with regulations and voluntary 
codes concerning product and service information and labelling, by type of 
outcome 
PR5 Practices related to customer satisfaction, including results of surveys 
measuring customer satisfaction 
PR6 Programs for adherence to laws, standards, and voluntary codes related to 
marketing communications, including advertising, promotion, and 
sponsorship 
PR7 Total number of incidents of non-compliance with regulations and voluntary 
codes concerning marketing communications, including advertising, 
promotion, and sponsorship by type of outcome 
PR8 Total number of substantiated complaints regarding breaches of customer 
privacy and losses of customer data 
PR9 Monetary value of significant fines for noncompliance with laws and 
regulations concerning the provision and use of products and services 
 
2.7 Relevant theories to CSD studies 
    As a result of the significant growth of attention to corporate sustainability, a number of 
theoretical frameworks have been developed to explain CSD practices, such as Political 
Economy Theory, Stakeholder Theory, Legitimacy Theory, Institutional Theory, Agency 
Theory and Signalling Theory. They provide a theoretical foundation to explanatory CSD 
studies. However, the question of whether companies should voluntarily disclose corporate 
sustainability information is still provocative in developing countries like China (Qian, Gao and 
Tsang, 2015). According to the classical view, which is also known as the stockholder prime 
perspective, the only responsibility of a firm is maximising value for shareholders (Chiu & 
Wang, 2015), therefore any other sustainable information is irrelevant. In contrast, CSR is 
considered part of the responsibilities of a company, as it goes beyond the pure economic and 
legal dimensions (Kaspersen & Johansen, 2016). This section reviews major theories that have 
been adopted by existing studies when investigating CSD.  
2.71 Political Economy Theory 
    Political Economy Theory is the starting point to discuss theories related to CSD. 
According to Deegan (2014), Legitimacy Theory, Stakeholder Theory and Institutional Theory 
are all derived from a broader theory which has been called Political Economy Theory. The 
theory was defined by Gray et al. (1996) as the social, political and economic framework within 
which human life takes place. This perspective highlights the significance of social, political 
and economic factors which take place when investigating corporate sustainability reporting. It 
is suggested that when considering the co-influences of society, politics and the economy, 
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researchers are able to think more broadly about issues that impact on the operation of a firm, as 
well as what information is more likely disclosed (Deegan, 2014). Consequently, according to 
Political Economy Theory, CSD serves as a tool that constructs, sustains and legitimises 
economic and political arrangements, as well as institutions and ideological themes which 
contribute to the corporation’s private interest (Lin, 2010).  
2.72 Stakeholder Theory 
    Stakeholder Theory considers that corporate sustainability does not only relate to its 
shareholders/debt holders, but also any relevant stakeholders (Corderio & Tewari, 2015). 
Stakeholders are defined in the GRI as ‘entities or individuals that can reasonably be expected 
to be significantly affected by the organisation’s activities, products, and/or services; and whose 
actions can reasonably be expected to affect the ability of the organisation to successfully 
implement its strategies and achieve its objectives’ (GRI, 2013). In consideration of how 
stakeholders are defined, different opinions are shown in prior literature. From a normative 
theory perspective, the Stakeholder Theory asserts that ‘regardless of whether stakeholder 
management leads to improved financial performance, managers should manage the business 
for the benefit of all stakeholders’ (Hasnas, 1998, p.32); however, from the managerial branch 
of the theory, the more salient the stakeholder, the more efforts will be exerted in terms of 
satisfying their needs (Mitchell, Agle and Wood, 1997). Consequently, in this context, one 
major facet of Stakeholder Theory involves recognising and identifying the association between 
the behaviour of a company and its impact on company stakeholders (Rodrigue, 2014).   
2.73 Legitimacy Theory 
    Two definitions of legitimacy are often reviewed when analysing CSD. First, the legitimacy 
of an entity depends on what the society considers rather than how the entity defines itself 
(Deegan, 2002). Moreover, legitimacy exists when the value system of an entity matches with the 
value system of the larger society where it operates (Vigneau et al., 2015). 
    According to Deegan (2002), Legitimacy Theory is often considered as a system-oriented 
theory which identifies that organisations are social creations where “firms are recognised by 
performing various social actions”. This ultimately guarantees firms’ continued existence or 
operation within the society. Deegan (2002) also pointed out that social, political and economic 
issues could not be separate. Each of the issues could be significant and meaningful, and must be 
linked with another when investigated. Under this approach, the organisations are assumed to be 
influenced by their continued operations, as well as the society where they operate. In addition, 
Hu (2009) indicated that Legitimacy Theory could also be explained from the resource 
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dependence approach. Milne and Patten (2002) argued that organisations would receive more 
attention if they occupied many crucial and scarce resources. Therefore, the larger social system 
plays a significant role which determines the organisation’s utilisation of the resources as 
legitimate or not (Hu, 2009). 
    Another important term in Legitimacy Theory is social contract. Mathews (1993) stated that 
the social contracts exist between entities and individual members of society, because entities are 
entitled to utilise various resources, such as legal standing, and to hire employees. Entities’ 
continued existence would be in jeopardy once the contact is breached. Therefore, corporate 
entities should always consider operating in an acceptable and legitimate manner to comply with 
the contract.  
    A legitimacy gap can exist under two circumstances. One situation is when unknown 
information becomes known to the public. The other situation is the change in social expectations 
over time. In both cases, the status of firm’s legitimacy are difficult to justify (O’ Donovan, 2002). 
Therefore, disclosure becomes the essential tool that determines the variation of firms’ 
performance and changes in firms’ activities (Deegan, 2009; O’ Donovan, 2002). 
2.74 Signalling Theory 
    Signalling Theory was initially developed from information asymmetry theory, and it has 
been applied and used widely to explain CSD practices (Ross, 1977). According to the theory, 
companies signal corporate sustainability information to show a competitive advantage in the 
market in order to attract investments and to enhance potential reputation (Shan & Taylor, 2014). 
Rather than mandatory information, disclosing corporate sustainability information helps a 
company to show their capability of implementing, monitoring and practicing its associated 
environmental, economic and social responsibilities. This further contributes to the creation of 
corporate sustainability reputation, which builds the image of a company in a different way from 
its financial performance. Hasseldine, Salama and Toms (2005) and Thorne, Mahoney and 
Manetti (2014) both showed that positive correlations exist between the quality of CSD and 
corporate sustainability image.   
2.75 Institutional Theory 
    According to Deegan (2009), there are two main dimensions to Institutional Theory: 
isomorphism and decoupling, and both dimensions are important and relevant in terms of 
explaining voluntary CSD practices. Isomorphism is defined as “organisations that adopt 
structures or processes that are at variance with other organisations which might find that the 
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differences attract criticism” (Deegan, 2009). Dimaggio and Powell (1983) stated that there are 
three isomorphism processes: coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism. Coercive 
isomorphism indicates that organisations are using voluntary disclosure to address the “economic, 
social, environmental and ethical values and concerns” to the stakeholders who have the most 
power (Deegan, 2009). However, mimetic isomorphism was defined as organisations tending to 
imitate the institutional practices of other organisations for reasons of competitive advantages 
(Dimaggio and Powell, 1983). Explained by Dimaggio and Powell (1983), normative 
isomorphism relates to the “pressure arising from group norms to adopt particular institutional 
practices”. In essence, this pressure could arise depending on the culture and working practices 
managers developed within their workplace. The second dimension, ‘decoupling’, implies that 
managers may seem to adopt certain institutional practices and formal processes, though the 
actual organisational practices can be difficult to formalise and implement (Deegan, 2009). 
Overall, Institutional Theory explains that management will be subject to coercive, mimetic and 
normative pressures to adopt certain voluntary reporting policies. 
    In general, Institutional Theory explains why the behaviour and actions of organisations tend 
to be similar within a particular ‘organisational field’ (Deegan, 2009). Studies that focus on legal 
frameworks regarding voluntary social and environmental disclosure often adopt Institutional 
Theory on the management level. Rowe and Guthrie (2010) state that institutional process are 
important to consider when analysing public environmental management because “political 
influence is known to have some bearing on organization life” (Rowe and Guthrie, 2010). Since 
there is no evidence to define the most operative way to achieve environmental compliance, 
greater compliance with environmental legislation by organisations can be enhanced through the 
great sanctioning power of state agencies (Rowe and Guthrie, 2010). However, the research found 
that the lack of monitoring and enforcement of environmental laws and rules impedes the success 
of the central government’s environmental policy. As a result, coercive governmental 
institutional involvement emerged as the major influencing factor in corporate environmental 
reporting, and Chinese companies are disclosing environmental information mainly to alleviate 
government concerns (Liu and Anbumozhi, 2009). This concept is also explained by Song and Zu 
(2009); however, the research shows that manager’s assertion can be more business-oriented than 
morally led due to industry competitiveness. Therefore, firms’ economic incentives are the most 
important determinants of CSD from the Institutional Theory perspective. 
2.76 Agency Theory 
    According to Belkaoui and Karpik (1989), Agency Theory is becoming an explanatory model 
that focuses on monetary or wealth considerations among agents who trade in efficient markets. 
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Agency Theory states that managers disclose voluntary corporate social and environmental 
information only if it increases their welfare, particularly when the benefits of the disclosure 
outweigh the cost created by disclosing associated information (Ness and Mirza, 1991). When 
costs result in the separation of ownership and management due to the agency relationship, then 
agency costs rise (Deegan, 2009). As defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency costs 
consist of the monitoring expenditures set by the principal, the bonding expenditures by the agent 
and the residual loss, arising in any situation involving cooperative effort. Additionally, managers 
who bear agency costs often wish to be seen as acting in the best interest of the shareholders 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). One way to satisfy this situation is to issue company annual reports, 
because accounting information is a primary source indicating the agent’s behaviour towards the 
principals.   
    As defined by Chan (2003), agency costs are part of contracting costs, which also include 
transaction costs, information costs, renegotiation costs and bankruptcy costs. However, the 
concept and influence of contracting costs is not explained thoroughly in existing Chinese 
literature. Agency costs are often considered by the voluntary social and environmental reporting 
research when applying Agency Theory (Chu, 2007; Reverte, 2009). According to Chu (2007), 
the ultimate goal of issuing corporate sustainability information is to maximise firm value from 
all perspectives, including the interests of both principals (debt holders and shareholders) and 
agents. Voluntary CSD can first reduce agency costs, such as monitoring costs, bonding costs and 
residue loss, subsequently strengthening contractual relationships and minimising the costs 
associated with conflicts of interest between the parties (Chan, 2003). Besides, companies differ 
in the amount of information disclosed due to information asymmetry. Chu (2007) demonstrated 
empirically that companies with better financial performance tend to disclose more than other 
companies in China. It is shown that large firms disclose higher levels of social and 
environmental information, especially the companies with better relationships between principals 
and agents. Although social and environmental information may facilitate shareholders and debt 
holders with future predictions, the results from Chu (2007) were not shown to be consistent. 
Recently, many companies are facing the similar situations, where independent directors are set to 
deal with solely environmental and social issues (Nie, 2009). These directors are often the 
shareholders too.  
2.77 Theories related to the study 
    Research on CSD has generated different categories of literature which engage a diverse body 
of theoretical perspectives in support of voluntary sustainability disclosure. Stakeholder Theory 
offers the resolution to the conflicting expectations of different stakeholders. In contrast, Agency 
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Theory focuses on the monetary terms. It views a firm as a nexus of contract where agents act 
opportunistically, and consequently causes conflicting interests among agents and principals. 
Consequently, CSD proves useful in monitoring activities and information transparency. The 
concept of Institutional Theory is similar to Legitimacy Theory; however, it specifies how the 
expectations of society are met through institutionalising norms and rules. This creates a “positive 
organisation-society boundary” (Uadiale, 2011) because of the existence of some code of 
institutional behaviour that maintains societal expectations. Legitimacy Theory, as defined by 
Deegan (2002), is value system centred, and companies need to balance between the value system 
of organisations and of the society. Therefore, legitimacy exists at the organisational level when 
there is equivalence between the organisation and society value systems. 
    The recent Chinese literature shows how voluntary reporting information and the 
expectations of the society are met from various perspectives. Firms will most likely fulfil the 
expectations of stakeholders in order to gain long-term benefits, such as increasing firm value 
from company market performance. Li et al. (2009) and Dai & Dong (2010) applied stakeholder 
theories and concluded that voluntary social and environmental reporting generates positive 
values to a firm’s financial performance. Yuan (2007) also demonstrated how such disclosure can, 
in the long run, influence company stakeholders, which implicitly improves a firm’s activities. 
Therefore, a considerable amount of Chinese research has shown how corporate sustainability 
information influences and impacts stakeholders. In addition, Rowe & Guthrie (2010) and Song 
& Zu (2009) applied Institutional Theory and emphasised the importance of enhancing the 
Chinese legal framework and management perception on environmental disclosure. They both 
found that even though government plays a significant role in directing companies to implement 
their environmental responsibility plans, managers issuing environmental disclosures are 
essentially because of their financial pursuit which voluntary information offers (Song & Zu, 
2009). For Agency Theory, Chu (2007) employed multiple theoretical frameworks that include 
Stakeholder Theory, Efficient Market Theory and Agency Theory. Although the results that 
reflect the expense contributed to social and environmental activities increased the level of quality 
of disclosure, no relationship was defined and explanations were not relevant to issues created by 
corporate governance and agents’ contracting costs.  
 Legitimacy Theory is widely considered in Chinese literature, due to political reasons. In China, 
an inseparable relationship between the State and its firms generates important social roles for the 
state-owned firms. This enables Chinese companies, particularly the state-owned companies, to 
have a tradition of taking social and environmental responsibilities (Li, 2012). This legacy of the 
‘iron rice bowl’ concept regarding lifetime employment and welfare persists (Whiteley, Cheung 
and Quan, 2000), although it can be observed to a lesser degree in modern China. In addition, the 
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managers of the state sector are often appointed by the Communist Party; subsequently, decisions 
made by the state-owned firms are interfered in by the Party leader. As a result, the management 
level of the appointed firms would always be the Communist Party members, and they would 
naturally share their ideology with the state in favour of the communist tradition. In other words, 
their “social existence” is correspondent with the existence of the state (Song and Zu, 2010); 
therefore, legitimacy is one of the most suitable theoretical foundations to consider. 
Existing literature indicated that one testable perspective of Signalling Theory is through 
analysing the market stability of a firm (Shan & Taylor, 2014). Firms with lower market risk on 
equity are more likely to undertake a higher extent of CSR activities due to their stable pattern of 
market-share return (Rimmel & Jonall, 2013). Disclosing corporate sustainability information 
allows such companies to influence the decisions made by management, and in turn, this 
strengthens the reputation of a firm for contributing to the community. Secondly, Roberts (1992) 
suggested that disclosing CSR practices increases companies’ access to capital, as well as 
employees’ morale and productivity. A better corporate sustainability reporting is more likely to 
be viewed as a well-managed firm, and it builds a positive and responsible image for the firm to 
convey to its equity holders that it is well operated and profitable. However, results did not show 
consistency in prior studies (see Yang, 2009; Nie, 2009; Shan & Taylor, 2014). China has 
experienced transitional economy over the past 20 years. During such a period, a shift of 
corporate structure is one key factor that influences the equity holders’ response of the signal 
created by issuing corporate sustainability disclosures. Another reason, suggested by Shan & 
Taylor (2014), is that in periods of bearish equity market, firms that encounter profitability 
reductions are less likely to produce high quality CSD, because investors in these periods are 
more likely to speculate on short-term profit rather than long-term corporate sustainability 
performance. In consideration of the unique institutional background of China and the 
inconsistency in the results from the theory, Signalling Theory is the most suitable theory to be 
used in this study. 
    Stakeholder Theory is also well-adopted and widely used in existing corporate sustainability 
studies. While the term CSR in the past focused on maximising shareholders’ economic value, the 
recent literature shows a positive trend to stakeholders’ value and contracting costs-related 
activities becoming more associated, which influences CSD informational dynamics that are 
composed of different related patterns among stakeholders (Rodrigue, 2014). Due to the 
increased demand for sustainability information and the prospect that this information will 
improve financial performance and firm value, CSD is growing in importance. According to the 
definition of voluntary disclosure, superior environmentally- and socially-performing companies 
will attempt to disclose information emphasising their favourable performance in order to 
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distinguish themselves from their peers. Therefore, this effect indirectly improves firm value. 
Yuan (2007) employed Stakeholder Theory and concluded that CSD was significantly associated 
with firm value. Yuan (2007) reflected that a significant positive signalling effect can be 
generated from issuing CSD, and such an effect, although indirectly, can be observed from 
companies’ financial performance. These results are strongly echoed by Nie (2009), Li et al. 
(2009) and Dai & Dong (2010). However, Li (2006) adopted similar methods and theoretical 
frameworks as Yuan (2007), and a negative correlation was concluded between CSD and firms’ 
market performance. In addition, Niu (2009) emphasised the importance of issues and costs 
generated by corporate governance. It is stated that contracting costs are becoming significant in 
modern industries, where an increasing number of independent directors are set to solely deal 
with social and environmental problems (Niu, 2009). Ma & Zhao (2007) and Chen (2010) 
focused on corporate governance terms, and their studies examined the functions on the 
management level. Importantly, their results showed no significance from their corporate 
governance (number of independent directors) hypothesises. However, hypothesises focusing on 
the monetary terms and financial performance show positive trends.   
2.8 The influence of Chinese culture on corporate sustainability 
disclosure  
    CSD is heavily influenced by both the external and internal environmental factors of a nation. 
Hofstede (1980) defines culture as “a collective mental programming”, which has been indicated 
as a variable that significantly affects the corporate disclosure environment in a country. Diao 
(2013) suggests that companies being profitable while maintaining sustainability are directly 
influenced by an old Chinese paradox of being rich and generous. He explains that the social 
structure of China was strongly associated with the male-controlled clan system and family blood 
relationship of all types of business, in which an intense degree of ethical qualities issues would 
exist (Diao, 2013). The moral standard is heavily influenced by Confucius, who lived in the sixth 
and fifth century BC and took the view that harmonising was in the best interest of each member 
in a society. This idea proposes that wealth may not be well appreciated and meaningful if people 
do not live harmoniously, and questions the essential component of the paradox and the belief of 
the Chinese, because “moral problems and social philosophy override questions of logic, 
epistemology and metaphysics, and these are featured by a strong conservativeness and closed 
character” (Qu & Leung, 2006, p. 245). Therefore, the transparency of corporate disclosure made 
by Chinese publicly listed companies has always been an issue that significantly influences both 
the corporate sustainability reporting systems and stakeholders’ perceptions of it.  
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    The empirical studies in China into Chinese culture and corporate sustainability explore 
profits from righteousness (Yi) from Confucius. Xia, Li & Long (2009) support the idea of 
righteousness before profits, where they state that business values should be reflected by the 
fundamental value of being ethical. Concerns should all be closely related to customers’ values, 
employees’ values and shareholders’ values. Liu (2008) considered the Confucian perspective 
from three different layers, and set standards and categories in the culture that a Chinese firm may 
be adapted to.    
Table 2.5: Confucius – three different layers 
Category Value Focus 
Bottom standard Not tempted by profit Business operating, managing, 
ethical activities. No profit, no 
action.   
Medium standard Profit after righteousness* Social development through 
accumulated social capital, 
while maintaining a certain 
amount of economic benefit.   
Top standard Everything after righteousness Benefit transferred from 
corporate stakeholders. 
*righteousness describes the world where peace prevails, order abounds and the social and 
natural harmony result in material wellbeing for everyone (Liu, 2008).   
    Under a commodity economic market, culture differences have created different perceptions 
between the West and the East. Most of the Western firms value profits over righteousness, 
whereas Chinese firms, the government-owned ones in particular, consider both social welfare 
and financial profit. Profit after righteousness explains that people are kind and generous to others 
because they see profits, which is why profits exist before righteousness. Wang & Juslin (2009) 
found that the Western CSR corporate sustainability concepts do not adapt well to the Chinese 
market, because they have rarely defined the primary reason for corporate sustainability. The etic 
approach to the corporate sustainability concept does not take the Chinese reality and culture into 
consideration. The Wang & Juslin research was conducted purely based on reviewing literature 
and defining terms in differences between the West and East contexts. Under this perception, 
Wang & Juslin (2009) point out that corporate sustainability is a term that can be legitimately 
interpreted within the Chinese culture; however, Confucianism and Taoism, which emphasise the 
“cultivation of virtue and morality, as well as the core of its harmony notion” (Wang & Juslin, 
2009, p. 446), offers a better understanding of corporate sustainability in the Chinese context.    
    Overall, studies of Chinese culture linked with corporate sustainability provide insight into 
self-cultivation of virtues that may guide companies to a new way of improving their corporate 
sustainability performance. The studies also point out the differences in understanding of 
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sustainability between the West and the East. Although the previous studies may seem to be 
significant to explain the economics, they are not practical for setting standards to corporate 
disclosure activities; either cultural influence towards companies’ reporting systems was 
considered. 
2.9 Ownership structure in its influence on CSD of Chinese companies 
    Corporate governance is defined by Cadbury & Coad (1992) as the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled, which is often used to explain the differences in finance 
and the role of the market for corporate control. The divergence of corporate governance can 
further influence and determine CSD practices due to differences in political, social and 
environmental backgrounds among nations (Wang, Zhou, Lei and Fan, 2016). Aguilear, 
Williams, Conley & Ripp (2006) found differences between corporate governance in insurance 
companies in the UK and the US by examining their corporate governance and CSD activities in 
both contexts. It was found that difference in the composition of investors had a significant impact 
on the attitude of firms’ disclosing activities and practices, as well as performance strategies, as 
they could exert discrete pressure onto the firms. It was concluded by Aguilear et al (2006) that 
corporate governance, particularly the ownership structure of a firm, is crucial to a company’s 
strategy and attitude to CSD practices.  
    Existing research on ownership structure of firms in China has shown evidence that listed 
firms are generally associated with complicated indirect ownership, which is referred to as 
pyramidal ownership structure. As defined by Wang et al. (2016), this form of ownership 
structure is used as an important mechanism by the ultimate owners to separate their cash flow 
ownership from their control rights in order to receive more benefit from control rights. It was 
generally found that a significant relationship exists between the level of pyramidal ownership 
structure and the quality of information disclosure due to the need to satisfy stakeholders at 
different layers of the structure (Fan and Wong, 2002). As indicated by Fan and Wong (2002), 
CSD reporting provide signals to the stakeholders at different layers of the structure in regards to 
companies’ sustainability performance, thereby reducing the degree of information asymmetry 
between stakeholders and corporate management. However, the degree of influence of this form 
of ownership structure differs in different contexts. A large number of listed companies in China 
(around 63.15%) are controlled by the state government, either directly occupying shares of more 
than 80% or indirectly subsidising these companies (Wang et al, 2016). The state-owned 
pyramidal structure is essentially to decentralise control rights over the firms to firm management 
instead of selling shares. In comparison, privately owned firms or foreign owned firms are to 
discharge their external financing constraints by creating internal capital markets (Fan and Wong, 
2002). Empirical evidence was provided by Li and Zhang (2010) that state-owned firms adopted a 
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completely different attitude to foreign owned or privately owned firms, and significant 
differences in the strategies and attitudes of disclosing corporate sustainability were shown 
among different types of ownership structure. Government-owned companies may often set out to 
fulfil a range of social objectives rather than maximise profits due to political interference, 
whereas foreign owned and privately owned companies are more motivated to disclose 
sustainability information by mandatory regulations (Wang et al, 2016). Consequently, 
ownership structure is one of the most important factors to consider when studying CSD in China.       
2.10 Content analysis in Chinese CSD empirical studies  
    Content analysis is widely used in many Chinese CSD accounting research studies (Chen, 
2010). It is suggested by Smith (2011) that content analysis is used to reveal the considerable 
potential and valid inferences from text for analysing reports, representations and narratives used 
to communicate the outcomes of accounting activates. A number of studies have used content 
analysis to investigate the narrative part of annual reporting in order to determining the level of 
CSD, such as Chen (2010), Ling (2009) and Zhang (2013). Since corporate sustainability 
activities and information are often reported in the chairman’s statement or president’s letter or 
announcement, these sections are often to be focused on to obtain corporate sustainability 
information. Subsequently, information related to a particular research instrument is collected for 
further analysis. However, content analysis procedures that restrict themselves to manifest 
content alone would be of very limited value; hence, it is argued that the attributions expressed are 
the true beliefs or fair adjustment from researchers, as they involve subjectivity in analysis (Smith, 
2010). In this situation, studies showed that an independent person or a group for checking 
content analysis has been essential to a study (Li, Luo, Wang & Wu, 2013; Nie, 2009; Zhang, 
2013).  
2.11 The external driving forces of corporate sustainability disclosure  
2.111 The external driving forces from stakeholders  
    Stakeholders of a company include shareholders, debtors, employees, customers, suppliers, 
social communities and the government (Deegan, 2009). Freeman (1984) defines a stakeholder as 
any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the firm’s objectives. 
Nie (2009) indicated that the stakeholder approach emphasises the importance of investing in 
relationships with those who have a stake in the firm. Management will subsequently formulate 
and implement strategies to manage the potential demands of the more powerful stakeholder 
groups.  
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    Cui (2009) investigated corporate social reports from 346 listed companies in their 2008 
annual reports. She found that when companies feel pressure from the public media, they are 
more likely to disclose a higher extent of social information. Yu & Cheng (2010) stated that 
companies underline mostly the interest of employees and shareholders while paying relatively 
less attention to the interest of competitors and community. Interests addressed from state-owned 
companies are very similar to private-owned companies, where government and community are 
considered to be the most important. Foreign companies, however, address government and 
community exclusively, and consider shareholder, employee and consumer to be the most 
important parties.  
2.112 The external driving force from regulation and standards 
    In order to survive in society, a company must put effort into its public image and not breach 
the social contract. Much research has indicated that companies disclosing sustainable 
information are to fulfil what the laws and regulations require in China (Nie, 2009; Li, 2006). 
Although the standards are still advocacy guidelines and do not provide any specific indication of 
what to disclose, they play vital roles in encouraging the listed companies to pay excessive 
attention to sustainability reporting. Shen & Jin (2006) used the KLD400 social index and found 
significant improvement in terms of the quantity of social and environmental information in 
annual reports from the announcement of the Standards of Governance for the Listed Companies 
in 2002 to 2005.  
    Following Shen & Jin (2006), Ling (2009) suggested that the guidelines provided from SZSE 
and SSE have a significant positive relationship to the quantity of corporate social and 
environmental disclosure. This study adopted the GRI as an instrument to examine the extent of 
CSED of listed companies. Ling stated that regulations and guidelines provide significant 
guidance to companies’ CSED, particularly the environmentally and socially sensitive industries, 
such as mining, manufacturing and chemical companies (Ling, 2009). The industrial associations 
made guidelines, and paid close attention to those companies when reporting, and especially to 
the types of information that should be included in disclosure throughout 2005 to 2008. This piece 
of research used the dichotomous index method to attain a score for CSED under the G3, but the 
author believed that although the GRI is adjusted to be most suitable and applicable 
internationally, it has bias when measuring disclosures in China.     
    Bu, Liu, Wagner & Yu (2013) tested the pollution haven hypothesis by examining the 
relationship between environmental regulation and foreign investment with consideration of the 
role of corporate social responsibility. The study uses a conditional logit model, which is 
grounded in microeconomic utility and profit maximisation, to estimate the location choice of 
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multinationals in China. Samples were selected on multinationals’ location choices that were 
sourced from the Fortune Global 500 Company investment database from 1998 to 2007. The full 
sample was 217 multinational companies. The authors supported the pollution haven hypothesis, 
that less stringent environmental regulation makes investing in China more attractive for 
multinationals. However, the multinational companies with higher social responsibility are less 
likely to be attracted by weak environmental regulation.  
2.113 The external driving force from environment and society backgrounds 
    Grey, Owen & Adam (1996) pointed out that politics and social influences have significant 
impacts on the information disclosed by companies. Information included is influenced by the 
social and economic background in which a company resides. Chinese researcher Chen (2010) 
examined the external environment with samples from 2003 to 2005 involving listed companies 
in food and beverage sections. The author applied content analysis to annual reports from 372 
companies, and concluded that factors such as marketing development and the degree of 
companies’ corporate governance have a significant positive influence on the quality of 
information disclosed.  
    Taylor & Shan’s (2007) study is based on a sample of the largest H-share and Red-chip 
companies that are considered to be leaders amongst Chinese-controlled companies in attracting 
local and international equity. Both qualitative and quantitative scores have been considered in 
this study, and firm size, media attention, Beta risk and charitable donation are the independent 
variables. The study indicated that the voluntary CSED in annual reports is limited, and it means 
that government encouragement to corporate boards and management to voluntarily disclose a 
greater range and quality of CSED is not effective in China. The authors also suggested that 
Legitimacy Theory is less effective than Stakeholder Theory as an explanation of the quantity and 
quality of CSED in the Chinese context. The study used both Legitimacy Theory and Stakeholder 
Theory to identify the determinants of CSED. The conclusion points to a need for regulations to 
enforce mandatory CSED disclosure, and suggests that government financial incentives should be 
tied to requirements for CSED.   
2.12 The internal driving forces of corporate sustainability disclosure  
2.121 The impact of firm performance on corporate sustainability disclosure 
    Shareholders are the primary stakeholders of companies, who are closely related with firm 
profitability. Using this approach, companies with outstanding performance need to show their 
contribution to social and community welfare and provide quality disclosure of their 
sustainability activities. However, the existing literature shows mixed evidence. Gray & 
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Bebbington (2007) pointed out that the mixed results may be affected by the differences in 
cultural and institutional factors among nations. China has unique cultural and institutional 
features that influence significant managerial incentives to report corporate sustainability. The 
concept of allocating the majority of profits to shareholders may still be dominant in Chinese 
companies. Zu & Song (2009) used a questionnaire and tested whether Chinese companies 
prioritise stakeholders’ value. This study confirms that Chinese management perceives that 
corporate sustainability activities are an economic aim for a company, where the profit is 
considered before deciding the level and quality of CSD. This includes management decisions on 
whether or not to issue CSD, and how much information to disclose.  
    Peng (2009) identified that larger firms are more likely to disclose better-quality information, 
and demonstrated that companies are more active in responding to sustainability information 
when facing negative news from public media. This study attempted to find the determinants of 
corporate social and environmental disclosure in annual reports and stand-alone reports, and how 
these relate to firms’ performance. Subsequently, driving forces were focused on by testing 100 
companies that had the most sales revenue in 2008. GRI was used in the research, and it was 
combined with the SZSE guidelines. The author concludes that the level of corporate social 
information was significantly higher for the state-owned companies, indicating that the relevant 
regulatory bodies promoting social responsibility information disclosure have a significant effect. 
    Following Peng (2009), Zhang (2013) measured the type and the extent of corporate 
environmental and social reporting across the Chinese mining, electricity and chemical industries’ 
annual reports. Companies’ financial performance was also taken into account to indicate the 
level of CSED. Larger and more profitable companies were found to be more likely to disclosure 
better CSED information. Interestingly, the author indicated that all three industries demonstrate 
similar patterns in their disclosing manner and information disclosed. This posits that companies 
that are included in the sensitive industries are more likely to disclose similar information.  
2.122 The impact of corporate ownership on corporate sustainability disclosure  
    Li, Luo, Wang & Wu (2013) examined the effect of firm performance corporate social 
responsibility disclosure in terms of disclosure frequency and quality among Chinese listed firms 
and the possible mediating effect of corporate ownership on the relationship between firm 
performance and CSR disclosure. This study consisted of 1574 non-financial listed firms, and 
used the 2009 Blue Book of Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting by A-Share Listed Firms. 
The authors posit that shareholder primacy is dominant in the decision of Chinese firms to 
disclose CSD. State ownership creates more attention on the stakeholders of state-owned 
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companies, and it influences the CSD behaviour of those firms. Li et al. (2013) shows that when a 
firm performs well, it is more likely to issue CSD, proving a higher level of disclosure. 
    While the type and level of control interventions for each industry are suggested to take 
separate measures, economic behaviour of corporate sustainability information causes more 
environmental impact, thus creates a higher degree of attention from the government and 
environmental protection group (Bowen, 2000). Kou, Yeh and Yu (2012) examined the 
information quality of corporate environmental disclosure in Chinese companies, and particularly 
looked at whether environmentally sensitive and ownership patterns are factors influencing the 
content and level of environmental disclosure. Kou et al. (2012) applied the content analysis 
method and used the Expert Assessment System for CSR China Honor Roll as a coding table. The 
authors had 529 research samples from 2008 and 2009 environmental responsibility reports from 
the China Corporate Responsibility website. The samples were categories of environmentally 
sensitive enterprises, privately-owned and government-owned enterprises. Interestingly, 41.4% 
of the sample companies failed to provide CSR activities listed in the Expert Assessment System, 
and the authors explained that the Chinese government and the media did not have more CSR 
reports and discussion until 2008. This means that CSD in China is still at an early stage of 
reporting, and most of the sample companies did not engage in CSR activities but are required to 
disclose sustainability information in order to meet regulations by external pressure. The authors 
also suggested that the sample companies had no idea about how and what to disclose.   
2.13 Summary 
    The literature review indicates, first, that a proper concept of corporate sustainability has yet 
to be clearly understood; a certain definition was neither delivered by Western or Chinese studies. 
However, corporate sustainability, according to keystone literature, has been shown to be a 
combination of environmental, social and economic aspects (please see Freidman, 1962; Hopkin, 
1993; Deegan, 2002). Subsequently, it is essential for researchers to consider all three 
perspectives when analysing corporate sustainability. In addition, Chinese culture is heavily 
influenced by Confucianism and Taoism, and this idea of societal harmony has been widely 
considered in all companies throughout China (Lin, 2008). Subsequently, the feasibility of using 
theories developed based on Western economies has been left with a question mark. Taylor & 
Shan (2007) point out that some theories are more effective, but some are not as useful when 
explaining CSD in China. Additionally, this culture effect may create issues affecting companies’ 
decisions when reporting, particularly when information transparency is badly affected by 
Chinese conservatism. Under this circumstance, information asymmetry may exist between the 
Chinese companies and the report users. The research gap here is to understand the perceptions of 
CSD users, as well as how they interpret sustainability and sustainability information disclosed. 
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Since there are cultural differences in ideas of corporate sustainability, the understanding from the 
West and the East is different. Subsequently, it is not practical or significant to adopt standards 
directly from the Western context (Taylor & Shan, 2007).  
    Studies reviewed regarding the external driving forces suggest that the Chinese disclosing 
system is under stakeholder primacy, where the government and community are deemed to be the 
most important (Gao, 2009). This means that disclosure users are the most focused group when 
the CSD reports are prepared. Regulation, standards, environmental and social background are 
also significant influencers of a company’s CSD. However, the existing studies examined only 
social disclosure, environmental disclosure, or social and environment disclosure. None of the 
studies considered the sustainable economic aspect, combined with the environmental and social 
perspective. 
    Internal forces that drive CSD in China were reviewed, including performance factors and 
corporate capital structure. A number of guidelines have been used by previous studies, such as 
the Expert Assessment System for CSR China Honour Roll, the SZSE, the Chinese Corporate 
Governance Guidelines, the KLD 400 social index and the GRI. Similarly to the studies of 
external driving forces, internal forces research does not cover the sustainable economic aspect.  
    This review of the literature highlights the increasing concerns from the stakeholders on 
corporate sustainability disclosure, and the influences of misunderstanding of the disclosure 
users’ perceptions, which creates bias when investing in the driving forces of CSD. The existing 
literature has only been based on the Western understanding of corporate sustainability and 
international standards. This disregards the influence of Chinese culture and the Chinese 
government when analysing CSD. In addition, the GRI still remains highly praised and 
authoritative in Chinese corporate sustainability reporting, however, it is important to note that 
Western multinational firms are helping set the agenda on reporting based on their own interests. 
Consequently, adopting the GRI directly as a research instrument is not suitable for investigating 
CSD in the Chinese context. The literature review also emphasised the theoretical frameworks 
used in the existing studies, and indicated that there is a gap for adopting a combined theoretical 
framework of Stakeholder Theory, Legitimacy Theory and Signalling Theory investigating the 
driving forces of CSD, with the understanding of the perceptions of the disclosure users. The 
effectiveness of each theory selected is also measured and compared. In addition, the studies in 
China focus on the tests of quantitative measure, but qualitative measures based on the GRI have 
not been thoroughly considered. The GRI is the most authoritative set of standards and guidelines 
in China, because the government incorporated these guidelines in creating the SZSE and SSE 
social and environmental guidelines. However, in order to understand the Chinese users’ 
understanding of GRI, a new instrument that considers the perceived importance of CSD users in 
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China for measuring the quality of CSD will be designed based on the GRI. This study is designed 
to overcome the shortcomings of the existing Chinese literature on corporate sustainability 
reporting 
    In conclusion, this review has identified gaps, methodology and inconsistencies in results 
caused by under-estimation of the influences by perceptions in the literature. These are 
considered to design a study of corporate sustainability disclosure in China based on a sound 
theoretical framework and research methodology.          
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Chapter 3 
Theoretical framework and research hypotheses 
3.1 Introduction 
    In this chapter, the researcher describes Legitimacy Theory, Stakeholder Theory, Signalling 
Theory and the correspondent theoretical frameworks relevant to the study. The researcher 
commences by describing the theoretical understanding and the process of developing the 
instrument from the analysis of the users’ perceived importance of corporate sustainability 
disclosure (CSD). The instrument will be used later in the research to examine the quality of CSD 
in the Chinese context based on the CSD users’ perceptions. Therefore, this chapter details the 
theoretical foundation for developing the research instrument, and presents the theoretical 
framework of the hypotheses related to the purpose of the study.  
Overall, this chapter includes the process of developing the research instrument based on 
Signalling Theory. Legitimacy Theory, Stakeholder Theory and Signalling Theory were 
considered by the researcher as the foundation for developing the research hypotheses and the 
control variable. An overview is provided at the end of this chapter. 
3.2 Developing the instrument 
    Signalling Theory starts with the premise that information asymmetry typically exists in a 
capital market. Under this assumption, information obtained from the management level is much 
more accurate and reliable than information obtained from the market (Shan & Taylor, 2014). 
Therefore, investors seek information transparency through corporate sustainability information; 
without it, they cannot respond quickly enough to make rational decisions about the most 
effective investment (Shan & Taylor, 2014). As a result, market resources are not allocated 
efficiently. Signalling Theory delivers the most reliable and valuable information to investors, 
because it suggests that companies disclose information that is unknown by the market (Yang, 
2011). Companies with sound performance will deliver their positive image to the public and be 
distinguished examples among their peers. However, if investors do not receive this information 
because a company chooses not to disclose negative images, the market value of a company may 
decrease in the long run.  
Signalling Theory has been getting attention in corporate disclosure studies in recent years, 
because it assumes that people send and explain signals to reduce information asymmetry (Lin, 
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2010). Companies that disclose non-financial information signal their willingness to 
communicate with their stakeholders about sustainability issues, and companies produce 
stand-alone reports when the benefit of providing such disclosure outweighs the related costs. Lin 
(2010) suggested that sustainability disclosure should be considered with signals of companies’ 
sustainable performance as well as profitability to stakeholders of a company.  
This theory is important for testing the perception of CSD in China because ordinary 
companies in China are not willing to disclose voluntary information (Shan & Taylor, 2014); 
therefore, every single indicator is considered important to disclose. However, companies who 
choose not to disclose may exert significant pressure from the public, the government and 
industrial associations. Consequently, based on the theoretical assumptions from this theory, all 
the indicators from GRI will be perceived to be important for CSD users. The users of CSD, in 
general, include a broad range of company stakeholders, such as socially conscious customers, 
employees, NGOs, regulators, investors, financial analysts etc. (Cordeiro & Tewari, 2015). In this 
study, financial analysts were particularly focused on representing CSD users. 
The research assumes that understanding the users’ perceived importance of CSD is 
important. If users perceive a strong and significant relationship between sustainability reports 
and long-term corporate performance, they will use data in these reports to predict the long-term 
survival of companies. Consequently, CSD improves the transparency and accuracy of the 
reports. Therefore, in order to answer research question two, the question is divided into three 
parts: 
Question 2a: What is the users’ perceived importance of environmental disclosure, and to 
what extent do users perceive the environmental indicators in GRI differently from what 
GRI intended? 
To answer this question, statistical data needs to show whether there is a difference between the 
users’ perceived importance of environmental disclosure and what was intended by GRI.  
Question 2b: What is the users’ perceived importance of economic disclosure, and to what 
extent do users perceive the economic indicators in GRI differently from what GRI 
intended? 
To answer this question, statistical data needs to show whether there is a difference between the 
users’ perceived importance of economic disclosure and what was intended by GRI.  
Question 2c: What is the users’ perceived importance of social disclosure, and to what extent 
do users perceive the sustainable social indicators by GRI differently from what GRI 
intended? 
To answer this question, statistical data needs to show whether there is a difference between the 
users’ perceived importance of social disclosure and what was intended by GRI.  
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3.3 Theoretical framework for the main study - Legitimacy Theory 
    Legitimacy Theory has long been thought to be explanatory when investigating the quality of 
corporate suitability (Chauvey, Giordano-Spring, Cho & Pattern, 2015). Guo (2009) conducted a 
review of the theoretical framework and Chinese regulations for explaining corporate 
sustainability, and concluded that Legitimacy Theory is one of the most dominating perspectives 
applied in the Chinese context. Legitimacy is defined by Deegan (2002) as a generalised 
perception and assumption in which the activities of an entity are desirable, proper and 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions. He 
considered that companies continually seeking to ensure that their activities are perceived by 
outside parties as legitimate, where social creations are recognised only by performing various 
social actions and reported through disclosure. Legitimacy, therefore, is considered to be the most 
fundamental concept on which an organisation is dependent for survival within a society. Thus, 
organisations are assumed to be influenced by their continuing operations and the society where 
they operate.  
Many prior studies on corporate disclosure have shown evidence of companies voluntarily 
disclosing information in annual reports as a strategy to manage their legitimacy (Hutchings & 
Taylor, 2000; Taylor & Shan, 2007; Zhang, 2013). Legitimacy Theory assumes that economic, 
environmental and social information are closely bonded with each other, and in response to 
corporate sustainability factors and the information, legitimises management and its activities 
(Cho, Michelon, Pattern & Roberts, 2015). Companies attempt to establish coexistence between 
their social value and the society in the short-run, but different communities have various 
definitions of legitimate corporate behaviour (Zhang, 2013). Much research has investigated the 
management’s motivations to disclose voluntary information and the results varied across 
different nations and culture (Chiu & Wang, 2015).  
Legitimacy Theory is significant and relevant for the research to apply in the Chinese 
context, because there is an inseparable relationship between the state government and companies 
that create important social roles for the stated-owned firm (Zhang, 2013). Often, the ideology of 
the ‘iron rice bowl’ enables the state-owned companies to provide for the stakeholders’ welfare, 
with tools such as lifetime employment; however, a lesser degree of disclosure on such activities 
has been observed in China (Zu & Song, 2010).   
3.31 Industry Type (IND) 
    In China, industries with different environmental and social sensitivity are regulated and 
regarded by the public differently. For example, sensitive industries are often supervised and 
monitored by industrial associations, and are more likely to face media exposure and political 
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pressure from the government. Under Legitimacy Theory, environmental and socially sensitive 
industries are more likely to lose legitimacy that will threaten their social existence (Deegan, 
2002). Previous researchers have built solid foundations and concepts for this hypothesis (Yuan, 
2007, Zhang 2013). Therefore, in this study the research assumes that companies within 
environmentally and socially sensitive sectors will be more likely to produce better quality CSD. 
Companies’ industrial type is shown on the CSRC website, which was used as the database to 
obtain information for this variable.     
H1a: the quality of corporate economic disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese 
listed companies is positively related to industry type. 
H1b: the quality of corporate social disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese listed 
companies is positively related to industry type. 
H1c: the quality of corporate environmental disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese 
listed companies is positively related to industry type. 
H1d: the quality of corporate sustainability disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese 
listed companies is positively related to industry type. 
3.32 Company Location (AREA) 
    Regional economic development in China has long been imbalanced. The level of economic 
development in China’s eastern coastal areas has been much higher than in the central and 
western regions. Companies’ disclosing manners and systems are strongly influenced by their 
duty to fulfil obligations for political and financial objectives. Under Legitimacy Theory, 
companies have to comply with what society requires and expects, in order to survive. 
Subsequently, there is a difference in the quality of disclosure among regions in China. Wang 
(2007) examined the degree of influence across different regions in China. He pointed out that 
companies located in economically developed areas with higher market orientation were more 
likely to have complete and mature reporting manners and systems. This is because these 
companies are required to provide better information transparency in order to remain competitive 
in the market.   
Previous researchers considered that company location should be set as a dummy variable 
(Ling, 2009; Yang, 2011), where a company is given a score of 1 if it is located in an 
economically developed region; otherwise the score is 0. The list of cities that are defined as 
within economically developed regions is available from the CSRC website. Therefore, in this 
hypothesis, company location is set as a dummy variable.  
H2a: the quality of corporate economic disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese 
listed companies is positively related to company location.  
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H2b: the quality of corporate social disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese listed 
companies is positively related to company location.  
H2c: the quality of corporate environmental disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese 
listed companies is positively related to company location.  
H2d: the quality of corporate sustainability disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese 
listed companies is positively related to company location. 
3.33 Firm age (AGE) 
    Organisations’ societal existence depends on the acceptance of the society where they 
operate. As the organisations can be influenced by, and have influence on, the society, legitimacy 
is assumed as an important resource determining their survival (Deegan, 2002). Older companies 
with longer societal existence may have more legitimacy. According to Yang (2009), these older 
companies usually have longer performance experience and histories, and are mature. 
Subsequently, organisations’ reputations and involvement in social responsibility may become 
ingrained (Kong, 1996). As a company operates for longer, it will need to be more communicative 
with the outside community. Communication provides companies with wide social networks, 
affecting their public image (Yang, 2009). In sensitive industries, the public and the media can be 
quickly alerted if a mature company reduces the extent of its social activities. Consequently, such 
negative social image will result in company regulations and political pressure from the outside to 
encourage disclosing social responsibility and practices (Yuan, 2007). CSD reporting is a way 
that management can actively overcome this pressure from the public. The longer a company has 
been listed on the stock exchange, the more likely the company is to disclose sustainability 
information. Other studies have found positive significant correlation between company age and 
the extent of CSD (Roberts, 1992; Yang, 2009). The following hypotheses are tested to determine 
the relationship between company age and the quality of CSD. In order to be consistent with 
previous research, the number of years a company has been listed is considered a proxy for this 
variable. 
H3a: the quality of corporate economic disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese listed 
companies is positively related to firm age. 
H3b: the quality of corporate social disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese listed 
companies is positively related to firm age. 
H3c: the quality of corporate environmental disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese 
listed companies is positively related to firm age. 
H3d: the quality of corporate sustainability disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese 
listed companies is positively related to firm age. 
45 
 
3.4 Stakeholder Theory 
    Stakeholder Theory defines the stakeholder as any group or individual who can affect or is 
affected by the achievement of an organisational goal (Deegan, 2009). Deegan defined 
stakeholders as investors, creditors, employees, analyst advisers, business contacts, customers, 
suppliers, public interest groups, the government and the community. These people bear the risks 
of a firm and pay a price for the business’ activity, and they have a degree of ownership of a firm. 
Thus, a corporation should be socially responsible for all its stakeholders instead of shareholders 
only.  
Since stakeholders may be interested in different forms of information, a firm should provide 
sustainable information to meet the different purposes of stakeholders (Klettner, Clarke and 
Boersma, 2014). CSD helps stakeholders to make financial and investment decisions. The 
disclosure enables stakeholders to understand the firms’ performance towards environmental 
objectives, from which the stakeholders are able to perceive corporate growth and profitability 
(Garegnani, Merlotti and Russo, 2015). The dynamics of stakeholders’ influence on corporate 
decisions were discussed in chapter two. Roberts (1992) concluded that a majority of corporate 
managers need to meet the demands of the stakeholders in order to achieve the objective of a firm. 
Therefore, as the level of stakeholder power increases, the importance of meeting stakeholder 
demands increases (Roberts, 1992).  
The stakeholder model is an important concept in Stakeholder Theory when applied to 
corporate sustainability. It consists of three dimensions: stakeholder power, strategic posture, and 
economic performance (Ullmann, 1985). Stakeholder power refers to the degree that a firm is 
responsive to the intensity of stakeholder demands (Ullmann, 1985). Stakeholder power to 
influence corporate management is often viewed as a function of the stakeholder’s degree of 
control over resources required by the corporation. Strategic posture concerns how active the 
response of an entity’s key decision maker is regarding social activity. Roberts (1992) described 
economic performance as entities’ “past and current economic performance”, which directly 
affects the financial capability of a company’s sustainability program. Therefore, the intensity of 
sustainability and disclosure of a firm are closely related to the levels of stakeholder power, 
strategic posture and economic performance. 
Recently in China, firm value was considered to be linked with stakeholders, and there have 
been increasing concerns with stakeholder value since the 1980s. Stakeholder Theory is also often 
applied when analysing the relationships between the levels of voluntary social and 
environmental disclosure and financial performance (Li et al, 2009; Dai & Dong, 2010). 
According to Chu (2007), one of the effective ways to ensure firm value maximisation is to 
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increase the future return. This can be satisfied firstly by issuing voluntary social and 
environmental responsibility disclosure (Chu, 2007). Chu (2007) stated that if voluntary social 
and environmental information creates significant positive value for a company, there will be a 
direct influence on the company’s market performance. Sustainability information is used mostly 
by external investors and stakeholders, such as the government, customers, employees etc. (Li, 
2006). Therefore, a firm’s higher level of corporate sustainability creates positive value for 
stakeholders and builds a sound public image. On one hand, reporting sustainability information 
will decrease firm value because of associated costs for issuing CSD (Yuan, 2007); however, 
from the stakeholders’ perspective in China, when companies fulfil their social and 
environmental responsibilities, they can improve their future earnings. Therefore, firm value can 
be added in a number of ways, such as being supported by the government; reducing 
corresponding expenses like tax; gaining trust from customers and public; raising company 
consumer products market share, etc. (Chu, 2007; Yuan, 2007). 
3.41 Government ownership (GOWN) 
    The ownership structure in the Chinese stock exchange market creates different investor 
categories, including state investors, legal-person investors, foreign investors and domestic public 
investors. According to Stakeholder Theory, ownership structure is expected to lead to changes of 
stakeholder power in relation to each ownership category’s impact on companies’ decisions on 
disclosure. China has a unique institutional background where the majority (60%) of the listed 
companies are, or are at least partially, owned by the government (Li, et al., 2013). According to 
stakeholder power, differences in ownership structures and concentrations may influence 
stakeholder–company relationship towards quality disclosure. With a much higher degree of 
impact from political interference on company behaviours, corporate activities from state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) are always expected to lead to a greater effort by management to meet 
expectations from the government. As the largest shareholder of SOEs, the government has 
incentives to produce wealth and obtain social stability by improving corporate sustainability. 
Concentrated state-ownership provides significant incentives for higher level managers (CEOs) 
to obtain non-financial targets related to government policies and objectives (Li, et al., 2013). In 
addition, state-owned companies have different goals from other types of companies. 
Traditionally in China under the Danwei system, SOEs are bound with responsibilities to their 
employees to provide safety nets and social protection, such as lifetime employment. This may 
not maximise shareholders’ value, but it provides a great degree of social welfare to employees. 
Subsequently, the objectives for SOEs, in comparison with other types of ownership, are to 
achieve profit, and deliver a higher degree and quality of information about distinct social aims 
47 
 
and communications to stakeholders (Li et al., 2013). The hypotheses for GOWN are listed 
below. 
H4a: the quality of corporate economic disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese 
listed companies is positively related to government ownership. 
H4b: the quality of corporate social disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese listed 
companies is positively related to government ownership. 
H4c: the quality of corporate environmental disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese 
listed companies is positively related to government ownership. 
H4d: the quality of corporate sustainability disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese 
listed companies is positively related to government ownership. 
To be consistent with previous research (Nie, 2009; Li et al., 2013), this research has made the 
percentage of shares held by the state government a proxy for this hypothesis. 
3.42 Legal-person ownership (LOWN) 
    Legal-person shareholders have more experience with industry knowledge and management 
skills, and are likely to be economically orientated towards profit maximisation. From the 
perspective of corporate governance of a listed company’s, legal-person shareholders can monitor 
management more effectively than other types of shareholders because of their participation on 
the board of directors and presence in regular business operations (Diao, 2013). Since 
legal-person ownership plays a positive role in improving corporate governance and the 
alignment of interest between mangers and shareholders, it is expected that legal-person 
ownership will have a positive influence on the quality of CSD. In order to be consistent with the 
previous research (Diao, 2013) the presence of legal-person shareholders on a company’s board is 
considered in this study as a dummy variable. 
H5a: the quality of corporate economic disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese 
listed companies is positively related to legal-person ownership. 
H5b: the quality of corporate social disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese listed 
companies is positively related to legal-person ownership. 
H5c: the quality of corporate environmental disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese 
listed companies is positively related to legal-person ownership. 
H5d: the quality of corporate sustainability disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese 
listed companies is positively related to legal-person ownership. 
3.43 Foreign ownership (FOWN) 
    Foreign joint ventures in the Chinese stock exchanges are more politically visible and subject 
to more public scrutiny in China. Political costs may potentially be reduced if companies with 
foreign ownership are shown to be politically visible and transparent. Taylor & Shan (2007) 
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found that foreign companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange had higher quality 
disclosure in terms of strategy and goals in the voluntary information. Subsequently, by providing 
better information quality and transparency, foreign companies were good corporate citizens in 
the market in China. To be consistent with previous studies (Li et al., 2013; Diao, 2013), the 
percentage of shares held by foreign companies is considered in this study. 
H6a: the quality of corporate economic disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese 
listed companies is positively related to foreign ownership. 
H6b: the quality of corporate social disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese listed 
companies is positively related to foreign ownership. 
H6c: the quality of corporate environmental disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese 
listed companies is positively related to foreign ownership. 
H6d: the quality of corporate sustainability disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese 
listed companies is positively related to foreign ownership. 
3.5 Signalling Theory 
    The explanation of CSD regarding its perception through Signalling Theory was discussed at 
the beginning of the chapter. In addition to the previous explanation, the extent of companies’ 
sustainability disclosure is often referred to as signal observability in this theory, and it measures 
the validity of the signals. Existing researchers have found positive correlation between 
sustainability management of a company and performance on corporate sustainability practices 
(Kou, Yu and Chang, 2013). Other researchers have indicated a positive relationship between 
sustainability management and signal observability (Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen and Hughes, 
2004). Signal observability refers to whether a signal is easy to capture and interpret for the 
receivers; therefore, higher signal observability suggests a higher degree of information 
transparency, which effectively reduces companies’ financial costs, thereby achieving higher 
business performance. Therefore, the sets of hypotheses in subsections 3.51 and 3.52 are 
developed in consideration of the relationship between the level of CSD measured by quality and 
firms’ intentions of making positive signals. 
3.51 Performance (PERF) 
    According to Signalling Theory, companies that make voluntary disclosure are to be 
distinguished from companies with a relatively lower level of performance. In this context, CSD 
delivers a positive signal to the market, and can attract investors in order to increase firm value 
(Yang, 2009; Cordeiro & Tewari, 2015). Disclosing companies are more likely to gain benefits 
from this implementation and create a virtuous cycle for both sustainability reporting and 
financial performance. In addition, companies providing positive news may facilitate investors’ 
decision-making processes, and encourage them to build trust for management. In return, this will 
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reflect on management’s compensation because a substantial increase in profit is shown to the 
shareholders, and so managers are more likely to disclose voluntary social information. Several 
researchers have shown that financial performance was positively associated with the level of 
CSD. For example, Yuan (2007) and Nie (2009) both found that companies that performed better 
financially, in terms of the returns to shareholders, were more likely to have a higher level of 
sustainability disclosure. Peng (2009) adopted return on equity as a proxy, and suggested that 
companies were sometimes willing to disclose their intention to be sustainable and socially 
responsible; however, financially well performing companies provided more information for their 
actions conducted for sustainability. Hence, it is not only in response to the society; more 
profitable companies will be more likely to disclose sustainability information.  
H7a: the quality of corporate economic disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese 
listed companies is positively related to financial performance. 
H7b: the quality of corporate social disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese listed 
companies is positively related to financial performance. 
H7c: the quality of corporate environmental disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese 
listed companies is positively related to financial performance. 
H7d: the quality of corporate environmental disclosure in the stand-alone reports of 
Chinese listed companies is positively related to financial performance. 
Consistent with previous research, the research in this study uses return on equity (ROE) to 
represent profitability. 
3.52 Corporate sustainability expenditure (CSE) 
    CSD is a voluntary form of disclosure, regarding how companies obtain and distribute profits 
in terms of economic, social and environmental impacts. It is argued that profit-based intentions 
for sustainability activities are not ethical, because companies undertake sustainability activities 
to be beneficial for society, expecting nothing in return (Lys, Naughton & Wang, 2012). This idea 
does not contribute to firm value in the short-run, but management’s decisions for sustainable 
investment in a firm strongly impact the association between the level of corporate sustainability 
activities and firm performance (Lys et al., 2012). Corporate sustainability spending has been 
indicated as a type of expenditure that is considered by companies who wish to have a strong 
financial performance in return. The result of such expenditure on sustainability signals 
information about the future prospects of a firm, and it has been suggested as a direct determinant 
of the level of CSD. China has promulgated a few charity-related laws and policies that directly 
guarantee the development of charities. A company with higher sustainable expenditure, in this 
case, making charitable donations towards the corporate social aspect, is more likely to generate a 
better quality of CSD (Nie, 2009). Consequently, CSD signals that the company has performed 
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well both financially and sustainably. Therefore, in this study the research assumes that 
companies with higher corporate sustainability expenditure (CSE) will be more likely to provide a 
better quality of sustainability information. To be consistent with previous research, the 
researcher has chosen the proxy for this variable to be charitable donations. Data for this variable 
is available from annual reports.   
H8a: the quality of corporate economic disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese 
listed companies is positively related to charitable donations. 
H8b: the quality of corporate social disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese listed 
companies is positively related to charitable donations. 
H8c: the quality of corporate environmental disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese 
listed companies is positively related to charitable donations. 
H8d: the quality of corporate sustainability disclosures in the stand-alone reports of 
Chinese listed companies is positively related to charitable donations. 
3.6 Control variables 
    There are two control variables in this study: firm size and leverage set. These variables are 
set as control variables because there is potential collinearity with the other independent 
variables. This is detected in later data analysis. However, these variables are significant to the 
dependent variables, and they are set control variables. 
3.61 Firm Size (SIZE) 
    According to Legitimacy Theory, large companies face greater public exposure for their 
economic, social and environmental performance, and are subsequently subject to higher external 
interference (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). Firm size will influence management’s decision to 
voluntarily provide CSD in order to reduce or avoid political cost. Therefore, larger firms are 
more likely to adopt accounting policies to reduce political costs, such as producing higher 
quality CSD. Large companies are also expected to comply with and fulfil social contracts. One 
of the most effective ways that they can present is to report corporate sustainability through 
annual reports. Under Legitimacy Theory, larger firms are assumed to have more incentive to 
produce better quality CSD. 
H9a: the quality of corporate economic disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese 
listed companies is positively related to firm size. 
H9b: the quality of corporate social disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese listed 
companies is positively related to firm size. 
H9c: the quality of corporate environmental disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese 
listed companies is positively related to firm size. 
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H9d: the quality of corporate sustainability disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese 
listed companies is positively related to firm size. 
To be consistent with the previous research, this research measures firm size by total assets. A 
transformation of the natural logarithm of total assets is considered in order to satisfy the 
assumption of normality. 
3.62 Leverage (LEV) 
    Leverage ratio represents a company’s ability to meet financial obligations, and can capture 
the importance of creditors as stakeholders in a firm’s wealth (Ma & Zhao, 2009). Because 
creditors and financial institutions may share potential liabilities, they may demand information 
in order to meet their debt obligations. Potentially, there can be conflicts between disclosing 
social information and incentives of management. From the shareholders’ perspective, disclosure 
of corporate sustainability information may be perceived as a confession of guilt, so that 
managers are reluctant to issue CSD in order to maintain their own value (Ma & Zhao, 2009). 
According to Christopher & Filipovic (2008) and Ma & Zhao (2009), the higher the leverage, the 
more likely the company is to disclose social information. This also implies that if creditors are 
concerned with social responsibility activities, the company will be more likely to disclose 
corporate sustainability information. Therefore, the following hypothesis will be tested to 
determine the relationship between leverage and the quality of CSD. In order to be consistent with 
previous research, the research proxy for this variable is debt to equity ratio. 
H10a: the quality of corporate economic disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese 
listed companies is positively related to leverage. 
H10b: the quality of corporate social disclosure in the stand-alone reports of Chinese listed 
companies is positively related to leverage. 
H10c: the quality of corporate environmental disclosure in the stand alone reports of 
Chinese listed companies is positively related to leverage. 
H10d: the quality of corporate sustainability disclosure in the stand-along reports of 
Chinese listed companies is positively related to leverage.
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3.7 Summary  
From assessing Legitimacy Theory, Stakeholder Theory, Signalling Theory and reviewing the 
literature, ten testable hypotheses, including two control variables, have been formulated to test 
voluntary reporting on CSD. The independent variables related to the ten hypotheses are: firm 
size, industry type, firm age, company location, government ownership, legal-person ownership, 
foreign ownership, financial performance, corporate sustainable expenditure, and firm size and 
leverage, where firm size and leverage are control variables. Figure 3.1 summarises the 
hypotheses and relationships among variables. 
Figure 3.1: The hypothesised drivers of CSD 
bility disclosures 
Stakeholder theory 
Government ownership 
(GOWN): +% of 
government-holding shares 
Legal-person ownership 
(LOWN): +legal-person 
share-holding rate 
Foreign ownership (FOWN): 
+% of shares held by foreign 
investors 
Signalling effect theory 
Performance (PERF): +ROE 
Corporate sustainable expenditure (CSE): +economic sustainable 
expenditure/+charitable donation/+environmental expenditure 
Legitimacy theory 
Industry type (IND): 
+dummy/environmentally or socially 
sensitive 
Location (AREA): +dummy/located in 
economically developed area 
Firm age (AGE): +number of years 
listed 
[Control variables] 
Firm size (SIZE): +total asset 
Leverage (LEV): +debt to equity ratio 
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Chapter 4 
Research methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
    In this chapter, the researcher outlines the procedures and analyses used in this study. Sample 
selection, data collection, research instruments, coding methods, research design, tests of 
reliability and validity, statistical analyses and tests of robustness are described.   
4.2 Sample selection and data collection for the research instrument 
    As discussed in the previous chapters, the research instrument was built based on GRI and 
report users’ perceived importance of CSD. A questionnaire based on GRI was created prior to 
building the instrument. For recruiting report users who are financial analysts, the samples were 
solicited from the listed securities organisations provided by CSRC (http://www.csrc.gov.cn). 
There were 114 companies registered on CSRC, and 200 designed questionnaires were sent out to 
the managers of these registered security companies in China by email. Each manager was asked 
to provide five responses for the surveys, and then send them back. The response rate was 64.5%, 
with 129 responses that were statistically significant. 
    The rationale for choosing financial analysts was that corporate sustainability information has 
always been a useful input for financial analysts to evaluate and to predict firm value, which 
consists of a number of financial factors influencing companies’ performances, such as sales, 
costs, operational efficiency, financing and litigation risk (Dhaliwal, Radhakrishnan, Tsang & 
Yang, 2012). A better corporate sustainability reputation captured by financial analysts will 
improve companies’ brand value and reputation, which in turn significantly enhances the appeal 
of firm products to consumers (Brown & Dacin, 1997), and leads to increased sales (Dhaliwal, et 
al., 2012). According to a survey of 400 mainstream fund managers and financial analysts in 
Europe, conducted by Deloitte in 2003, approximately 80% of the respondents indicated that CSD 
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had positive impacts on companies’ market value due to the influence from financial analysts. 
Hence, it is clear that financial analysts’ use of CSD is a vital resource that significantly 
influences investors’ decision-making processes. In addition, Lin (2010) suggested that financial 
analysts are experts who assess corporate policies and performance on various issues of 
sustainability in China, and that financial analysts are considered to be the prime CSD users who 
influence other investors extensively. Therefore, because this study solely considers the users’ 
perceptions, financial analysts were the primary respondents to the survey questionnaire. 
4.3 Sample selection and data collection for corporate sustainability 
disclosure 
    According to the Shenzhen Stock Information Co., Ltd (CNinfo) database, there were 2467 
listed Chinese companies in both the SZSE and SSE markets in 2013. The year of 2013 is selected 
due to two reasons: first, the users’ perceived importance of CSD was measured in 2013 to 2014. 
In order to match the validity, companies’ 2013 corporate sustainability stand-alone reports were 
selected. Stand-alone reports were reports that are not part of any request set or any document set, 
i.e. the report should not be spawned from any other process, such as it is not included in annual 
report. Also, 2013 is the most up-to-date data available from the data source.  
Companies were categorised into 21 industries by CSRC, and 1231 stand-alone corporate 
sustainability reports were issued in 2013. However, 1107 companies listed in the Chinese stock 
exchange markets are in the manufacturing industry, and this makes up two thirds of the entire 
population. In this study, the HeXun Social Responsibility Ranking was used because better data 
quality could be obtained in higher ranked firm. The ranking also mix the industry category, 
thereby reducing sampling bias due to the large proportion of manufacturing companies. A 
sample of the top 238 listed companies in HeXun was selected due to the statistical significance 
for 10 predictor variables, where it satisfies N = 50 + 8K (K is the number of predictor variables) 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). Sample stand-alone sustainability reports from these companies in 
2013 were used as the source of information to obtain the quality of CSD. Therefore, a sample 
company for this study had to satisfy the following: 
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1. must be listed in 2013 
2. must have disclosed a stand-alone and annual report in 2013 
3. must be listed in the HeXun Social Responsibility Ranking. 
    Data collection for the quality of CSD for this study involved gathering data from stand-alone 
reports. It is indicated in Zhang (2013) that most of the listed companies were reluctant to disclose 
corporate environmental and social information in annual reports if they had already issued 
stand-alone sustainability reports during a financial year. Consequently, corporate sustainability 
stand-alone reports are adopted in this study to examine the quality of disclosure. With regard to 
the predictor variables, data was collected from annual reports because these were either available 
in financial reports or companies’ profiles in annual reports. Both types of report were accessed 
from the CNinfo Database. This database provided comprehensive data that corresponds with the 
information announced in the Chinese stock exchange markets. There are both domestic and 
foreign companies listed on the stock exchange markets in China. The foreign companies may 
issue English and Chinese annual reports; however, the domestic companies issue Chinese annual 
reports only. In addition, the English annual reports are not available in the CNinfo database – 
they can only be obtained from companies’ webpages. Hence, due to data availability, 
accessibility and completeness, Chinese annual reports for the year 2013 were used as the main 
source. Stand-alone reports were also collected because the companies that issue these reports 
may include very limited sustainability information in their annual reports (Zhang, 2013), and 
they were also available in the CNinfo database. 
4.4 Research design  
    This study was divided into two main parts. The first part was to build a research instrument 
in order to answer the research questions in the study. Research question one involves research on 
report users’ perceptions of sustainability disclosure in China. To investigate this topic, the 
researcher built a new research instrument based on the report users’ perceived importance of the 
listed items on the GRI, which was developed from sound theoretical and empirical foundations. 
The perception of corporate sustainability refers to how the reports users considered, expected 
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and understood corporate sustainability. In order to answer this question, questionnaires for 
weighting the perceived importance of listed items in the GRI were sent out to the CSD users, (i.e. 
to financial analysts), which included open-ended questions at the end of the questionnaire. Then, 
the responses from the questionnaires were used to resolve research question 1, and part of 
research question 2. When the responses were collected, descriptive statistics and one sample 
t-test were used to examine whether the report users perceived the indicators in GRI differently 
from what was intended by GRI. Research question 2 was answered in this analysis. Research 
question 2 asked ‘to what extent do the users perceive sustainability indicators in GRI differently 
from what was intended?’ The answer could be either that the users’ perceived importance of 
CSD was the same as it was intended by GRI, or that they were different. The difference in results 
would have an influence on the coding method of this study. If the report user perceived the 
importance of CSD differently from what was intended by GRI, the quality of CSD would be 
coded in terms of the CSD perceptions index – the research instrument, representing the report 
users’ perceived importance of CSD in China; otherwise the quality was coded by the 
‘importance’/score of the listed items in GRI (G4). 
    The second part of the design included the analysis of the stand-alone CSD reports, and the 
analysis of the relationships between the driving forces. There were two coding methods for the 
dependent variables – the quality of CSD by CSD perceptions index and the quality of CSD by 
GRI. Since the quality of CSD was coded by the researcher in two methods, the difference 
between the users’ perceived importance of CSD and what was intended by GRI could be 
compared and determined from an empirical level, thereby fully addressing research question 2. 
After scoring the quality of CSD, the researcher tested the hypotheses’ variables for the 
relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variables, in order to answer 
research questions 3 and 4. Since the hypotheses were developed based on three theories, the 
research models, which were introduced in this chapter, were designed to test against the quality 
of economic, social, environmental disclosure and overall CSD. The models were compared and 
analysed to determine their explanatory power of CSD in the context of China. The result 
answered research question 5.  
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    To analyse the quality and driving forces of CSD in China, stand-alone reports constituted the 
main primary source. The stand-alone reports of the sample companies during the financial period 
of 2013 (from 1 January to 31 December in China) were used to extract the sustainability 
disclosure, because this was the most recent period available. Some companies disclosed 
corporate sustainability information in both stand-alone reports and annual reports. However, 
typically if a company issued a stand-alone report, there was very limited information about 
sustainability in its annual report (Nie, 2009; Zhang, 2013). Therefore, in order to obtain the best 
data quality, the researcher used stand-alone reports to test the quality of CSD. Since the 
stand-alone reports from the sample companies were in Chinese, this required the use of GRI in 
Chinese, in order to accurately examine the quality of CSD.   
Information for independent variables extracted from the annual reports was: industry type, 
company location, firm age, government ownership, legal-person ownership, foreign ownership, 
return on equity, corporate sustainability expenditure, total assets and leverage. 
4.5 Research method for developing the instrument 
    As discussed in the previous section, the first part of the study involved the development of 
a research instrument based on GRI and the Chinese report users’ perceived importance of CSD. 
Therefore, with respect to developing the instrument, the following subsections report the 
survey design, test of reliability and validity, pilot study, and the statistical analysis for making 
the instrument.   
4.51 Survey design 
    With respect to the development of the research instrument for measuring the quality of CSD, 
survey questions were chosen to collect the report users’ perceived importance of different forms 
of corporate sustainability. Billing & Halstead (2005) suggested that one of the best ways to 
obtain information about beliefs, behaviours, views and perceptions of individuals in the business 
world is to ask questions with closed ends. This survey method is cost-effective, valid, easy and 
time-efficient. The survey method also adds benefit to reliability by providing higher consistency 
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than the interview method because data to be collected will be more measureable (Lin, 2010). 
Therefore, the survey was selected for this study to formulate the instrument. 
    The survey measurement included questions based on the Likert scale, which is one of the 
three most commonly adopted scales for addressing attitudinal dimensions (Brace, 2004). A 
five-point scale was adopted because it provides sufficient discrimination for most purposes and 
can be easily understood by respondents (Brace, 2004). Subsequently, this study employed this 
scale to indicate the degree to which the respondents agreed or disagreed, or found items 
important or not important. In order to measure the GRI, respondents were asked to write a 
number from 1 to 5 (1 for least important/completely disagree, 5 for most important/completely 
agree). The second part of the survey involved an open-ended question, where the respondents 
were encouraged to write anything that they thought should be added to sustainability guidelines 
or standards.  
Since the survey was designed based on the structure of Global Reporting Initiatives G4, there 
were 11 questions about environmental disclosure, 4 questions about economic disclosure and 
28 questions about social disclosure. For each type of disclosure, there was an open-ended 
question. The questionnaire had a total of 47 questions. See Appendices B, C and D for the 
survey design.     
4.52 Tests of reliability and validity 
    Tests and reliability and validity were conducted to ensure the results were accurate and 
reliable for answering the research questions, and to consistently measure the constructs of the 
study. Cronbach’s alpha was used to determine the reliability of the instrument, whereas a pilot 
study was undertaken to ensure the validity (Lin, 2010). 
4.53 Pilot study 
    A pilot study is often referred to by researchers as a mini version of a full-scale study, as well 
as being the pre-testing of a particular research instrument for a questionnaire (Saunders, Lewis & 
Thornhill, 2003). Since this study was largely relying on the questionnaire to design an instrument, 
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the pilot study was considered to be a crucial element to test the validity of the research design. 
Although conducting a pilot study may not guarantee success in the main study, it increases the 
likelihood and fulfills a range of important functions, as well as providing valuable insights 
before undertaking the full-scale study (Saunders, et al., 2003). Therefore, in the pilot study, the 
questionnaires were sent to 30 financial analysts to ensure that there was no ambiguity and 
confusion in the questions, thereby obtaining an acceptable level of validity. When the responses 
came back from the respondents, statistical analysis was employed to test the significant items 
from GRI and whether they were perceived differently by the report users from what was 
intended by GRI in the pilot study. The email sent to the financial analysts is shown in Appendix 
B, and the questionnaires designed for the pilot study are shown in Appendices C, D and E.            
    The rationale for a sample of 30 was that, according to the central limit theorem, a sample of 
30 is sufficient to draw numeric conclusions. The central limit theorem considers that only the 
mean of a sufficiently large number of independent random variables, each with finite mean and 
variance, will be approximately normally distributed (Chakrapani, 2011). The theorem states that 
a sample number of 30 can converge to normality, and this statement has been empirically tested 
with profound implications for business and social research. Because the central limit theorem is 
based on purely random samples, they are not subject to coverage, non-response, and 
non-sampling errors (Chakrapani, 2011). Hence, a sample of 30 in the pilot study was statistically 
significant, because it showed that the t-test values were close to the z-scores based on the normal 
curve.  
4.54 Data analysis for the research instrument 
    There were two main statistical analyses used in the process of developing the instrument: 
descriptive statistics and one sample t-test. The data was analysed using Statistical Progress for 
Social and Science (SPSS). Descriptive statistics were adopted first to show the frequencies and 
the percentages of the scores given by the financial analysts in the survey questionnaire. This was 
to provide an overview of how important the indicators were as perceived by the report users. The 
second part of the analysis involved the use of one sample t-test model, where the default value 
was set to ‘4’ because all indicators were intended to be ‘important’ by GRI. Thus, the indicators 
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with higher mean values of 4 were perceived as more important, and vice versa. The p value of an 
indicator showed its statistical significance, and it determined whether it was perceived as more 
important than what was intended by GRI statistically. The indicators were regarded as ‘different’ 
only when their p values showed significance at 0.1 level at least. If indicators were statistically 
different from the importance perceived by the users and what was intended by GRI, the 
coefficient from the t-test was used as the indicators’ CSD perceptions index. This factor showed 
how much it was perceived as more or less important than what was intended by GRI. The 
research instrument, CSD perceptions index, was developed based on the results from this 
analysis.  
4.6 Instrument and coding methods 
    Content analysis was employed for coding the dependent variables, where quality of CSD 
was measured with scores ranging from poor (1) to excellent (5) (Nelson, Banks & Fisher, 2003). 
An independent person with experience using content analysis was asked to recheck the sample of 
annual reports and stand-alone reports. This was essential because it overcame the weakness of 
content analysis conducted by a single researcher when coding (Krippendorff, 2004). As the 
reports were in Chinese, this independent person had to be a fluent Chinese language speaker. 
    The G4 corporate sustainability initiatives included a number of subcategories. In order to 
satisfy the research objective, the study did not investigate the subcategories in detail, because it 
was to focus on the quality of economic, environmental and social disclosure. Thus, scores were 
given solely to economic, environmental and social aspects overall. 
4.7 Dependent variables 
There were eight dependent variables for this study, as follows:  
 corporate economic discourse index (CEco)  
 corporate environmental disclosure index (CEn) 
 corporate social disclosure index (CSo) 
 overall corporate sustainability disclosure index (CSD) 
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 weighted corporate economic disclosure index (WEco)  
 weighted corporate environmental disclosure index (WEn)  
 weighted corporate social disclosure (WSo)  
 weighted corporate sustainability disclosure (WCSD). 
The weighted dependent variables are the quality of sustainability disclosure measured by 
users’ perceived importance, whereas the other index was purely measured by GRI. In order 
to satisfy the research objective, CEco was measured by the quality of economic disclosure 
and CEnv was measured by the quality of environmental disclosure. The proxy for CSo is the 
quality of social disclosure, and CSD is the overall quality of all three types of disclosure. 
These variables were measured initially by GRI, but the weighted index was measured by the 
instrument designed based on the users’ perceived importance. The variables were classified 
because it made a better comparison between disclosure quality by GRI and by report users’ 
perception. Data for the dependent variables was collected based on G4 and the weighted and 
adjusted G4 guidelines – the instrument designed for this study.  
The dependent variables, which are the quality of CSD, for this studies were examined 
through content analysis of stand-along corporate sustainability reports using the instrument 
developed and G4. In the analysis, sustainability reports were examined by the researcher 
from item to item of the instrument. For the coding method, the researcher used an ordinal 
scale. According to Nelson, Banks & Fisher (2003), the quality of 
economic/social/environmental disclosure is measured by the presentation of an item listed 
in the coding instrument. If an item was present, it is further scored on an ordinal scale based 
on the perceived quality of the disclosures, with scores ranging from poor (1) to excellent (5) 
(see Appendix A). If not, a score of 0 was given. The scoring of quality for economic, social 
and environmental disclosure was subsequently the dependent variable for this study.  
4.8 Data analysis for CSD 
    Descriptive statistics were adopted to first explore the data collected, and frequencies and 
percentages of occurrence were provided to summarise and analyse the intensity of sustainability 
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disclosure. Second, univariate analysis and correlation analysis were used to test the relationship 
between each independent variable and the dependent variable. The third step involved the 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) multi-regressions model to identify the contribution to the 
significance of each added independent variable, and to determine the key influential 
characteristics. Prior to using the regression model, the research had to test the assumptions in 
order to ascertain if they were true, for example normality and multicollinearity. A regression 
model was considered to provide more robust results, because it examined the combined 
influence of all variables to explain their relationships with corporate environmental disclosure 
and social disclosure, and how each variable influenced disclosure (Coakes, Steed & Ong, 2010). 
According to Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black (1995), the multi-regression model evaluates the 
predictive power of explanatory variables objectively, while improving the prediction of 
dependent variables. Thus, it demonstrates statistical significance as to how each independent 
variable affects the extent of corporate environmental and social disclosure. Another reason for 
choosing this method was that the majority of independent variables were either ratio or 
continuous variables, whereas the dependent variables were additive and non-continuous 
(Mendenhall, Reinmuth, Beaver & Duhan, 1988).  
    This study examined the quality of CSD, and compared the driving forces derived from three 
theories that have been developed under the Western economy – Legitimacy Theory, Stakeholder 
Theory and Signalling Theory different. Subsequently, the influential factors derived from 
integrated theories, Legitimacy Theory, Stakeholder Theory and Signalling Theory were run. The 
factors were then compared based on their quality as examined by GRI and the research 
instrument based on report users’ perceptions. Since CSD includes economic, environmental and 
social perspectives, each disclosure was tested by both the GRI model and the CSD perceptions 
index model; therefore, overall, there were 8 models in this study. After running OLS regressions, 
the models were compared in order to obtain the differences created by different models. The 
sample consisted of the listed companies in China from various industrial types, which were 
expected to behave in the same manner according to Legitimacy Theory, Stakeholder Theory and 
Signalling Theory. The models to be tested are shown in table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1: Research hypotheses 
Economic aspect Social aspect Environmental 
aspect 
Corporate 
sustainability 
disclosure 
Definition Expected 
association 
Theory 
foundation 
H1a: industry type H1b: industry type H1c: industry type H1d: industry type Whether a company is in a high profile 
industry 
+ Legitimacy 
Theory 
H2a: company 
location 
H2b: company 
location 
H2c: company 
location 
H2d: company location Whether a company is located in an 
economically developed area 
+ Legitimacy 
Theory 
H3a: firm age H3b: firm age H3c: firm age H3d: firm age Years a company has been listed + Legitimacy 
Theory 
H4a: government 
ownership 
H4b: government 
ownership 
H4c: government 
ownership 
H4d: government 
ownership 
Percentage of shares owned by the 
government 
+ Stakeholder 
Theory 
H5a: legal-person 
ownership 
H5b: legal-person 
ownership 
H5c: legal-person 
ownership 
H5d: legal-person 
ownership 
Whether the legal person of a 
company is a board member 
+ Stakeholder 
Theory 
H6a: foreign 
ownership 
H6b: foreign 
ownership 
H6c: foreign 
ownership 
H6d: foreign ownership Percentage of shares owned by foreign 
companies 
+ Stakeholder 
Theory 
H7a: performance H7b: performance H7c: performance H7d: performance ROE + Signalling 
Theory 
H8a: charitable 
donation 
H8b: charitable 
donation 
H8c: charitable 
donation 
H8d: charitable donation Donations made to charities + Signalling 
Theory 
H9a: firm size 
(control variable) 
H9b: firm size 
(control variable) 
H9c: firm size 
(control variable) 
H9d: firm size (control 
variable) 
Total assets + Legitimacy 
Theory 
H10a: leverage 
(control variable) 
H10b: leverage 
(control variable) 
H10c: leverage 
(control variable) 
H10d: leverage (control 
variable) 
Debt to equity ratio + Stakeholder 
Theory 
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Model 1 CEco = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼+ 𝛽𝛽7𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹+𝛽𝛽8𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽10𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 
Model 2 CSoc = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼+ 𝛽𝛽7𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹+𝛽𝛽8𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽10𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 
Model 3 CEnv = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼+ 𝛽𝛽7𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹+𝛽𝛽8𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽10𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 
Model 4 CSD = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼+ 𝛽𝛽7𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹+𝛽𝛽8𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽10𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 
Model 5 WCEco = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼+ 𝛽𝛽7𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹+𝛽𝛽8𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽10𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 
Model 6 WCSoc = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼+ 𝛽𝛽7𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹+𝛽𝛽8𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽10𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 
Model 7 WCEnv = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼+ 𝛽𝛽7𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹+𝛽𝛽8𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽10𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 
Model 8 WCSD = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼+ 𝛽𝛽7𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹+𝛽𝛽8𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽10𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 
 
CEco Corporate economic disclosure index by GRI 
CSoc Corporate social disclosure index by GRI 
CEvnc Corporate environmental disclosure index by GRI 
CSD Overall corporate sustainability disclosure index by GRI 
WCEco Corporate economic disclosure index by weighted index 
WCSoc Corporate social disclosure index by CSD perceptions index 
WCEvnc Corporate environmental disclosure index by CSD perceptions index 
WCSD Overall corporate sustainability disclosure index by CSD perceptions 
index 
CSD A parameter from the research instrument based on report users’ perceived 
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perceptions 
index 
importance of sustainability disclosure 
IND Whether a company is environmentally/socially sensitive (dummy) 
AREA Whether a company is located in an economically developed area 
(dummy) 
AGE Years a company has been listed 
GOWN Percentage of shares held by the state-government 
LOWN Whether the legal person of a company is a board member 
FOWN Percentage of shares held by foreign investor(s) 
PERF Return on equity 
CSE Charitable donation 
SIZE Total assets 
LEV Debt to equity ratio 
𝛽𝛽0 is a constant value 
𝛽𝛽n represents the coefficient of predictive values 
ei is a residual value 
4.9 Summary 
    The research methodology has been elaborated on in this chapter. This included the process 
of data selection and data collection, the development of the research instrument, coding 
methods, research design, tests of reliability and validity, statistical analyses, and tests of 
robustness. The analysis of report users’ perceived importance of CSD was conducted first in 
order to develop the research instrument. For analysing the quality of CSD, both bivariate and 
multivariate analyses were used in the study to address the correspondent research questions 
using the SPSS program. The development of the instrument will be described in the following 
chapter, through the analysis of the report users’ perceived importance of CSD in comparison 
with what was intended by GRI. 
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Chapter 5 
Analysis of the users’ perception of CSD and instrument 
development 
5.1 Introduction 
    This section shows the analyses that answer research questions 1 and 2. Corporate 
sustainability includes environmental, economic and social aspects, and each aspect was 
examined independently. This chapter describes the development of the research instrument 
through analysis of the users’ perceived importance of CSD. Tests of reliability and validity are 
shown first, followed by results from descriptive statistic and one sample t-test. The research 
instrument is developed at the end of the chapter.   
5.2 Pilot study 
    Validity refers to the accuracy of the data. This measurement shows the extent to which the 
survey information is relevant to the conclusion that the researchers are expecting (Diao, 2013). 
There are a few measurements of validity: first, content validity, which represents how well the 
items on the research instrument representing the knowledge are being tested. Another 
measurement is face validity, which measures the structure and build of the survey, such as the 
length of the questionnaire (Mat Roni, 2014).  
In this study, a pilot study was conducted before the survey for the full study. The pilot study 
tested three sustainability aspects, which were corporate environmental, economic and social 
disclosures. The results of this study were based on a smaller questionnaire designed using the 
GRI guidelines. Statistical analyses for the pilot study included descriptive statistics and one 
sample t-test. The questionnaire for the pilot study can be found in Appendices C, D and E. The 
full results for the statistical analyses are shown in Appendix G, including descriptive statistics 
and the t-test for all three sustainability perspectives. Differences in the results between the two 
tests were not shown to be significant. 
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    The results from the t-test in the pilot study showed that, for the environmental indicators, 
responses to “water”, “emissions”, “effluents and waste”, “compliance”, “transportation” and 
“environmental grievance mechanisms” were different, and these categories were regarded as 
more important than was intended in the GRI guidelines. Under the economics heading, all four 
indicators, “economic performance”, “indirect economic impact”, “procurement practices” and 
“market presence” are statistically different, and they were regarded as less important than what 
was intended by GRI. For social indicators, “labour practice” and “society” ranked as less 
important, whereas “product responsibility” was rated the most important.  
Table 5.1: Significant categories from the t-test in the pilot study 
Category t Sig. (2-tailed) Type of CSD 
Water 3.016 0.005*** Environmental 
Emissions 2.175 0.037** Environmental 
Effluents and waste 2.385 0.023** Environmental 
Compliance 2.098 0.044** Environmental 
Transportation -3.384 0.002*** Environmental 
Environmental 
grievance 
mechanisms 
-3.699 0.001*** Environmental 
Economic 
performance 
-3.066 0.004*** Economic 
Market presence -2.978 0.005*** Economic 
Indirect economic 
impacts 
-5.167 0.000*** Economic 
Procurement 
practices 
-6.018 0.000*** Economic 
Labour practice -1.963 0.058* Social 
Society -3.016 0.005*** Social 
Note: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 
    Regarding the question of the users’ perceived importance of environmental reporting in 
China, table 5.1 shows that “Water”, “Emissions”, “Effluents and waste”, “Compliance”, 
“Transportation” and “Environmental grievance mechanisms” are statistically significant; in 
particular, “water”, “emissions”, “effluents and waste” and “compliance” were perceived as more 
important by the pilot study respondents, whereas “transportation” and “environmental grievance 
mechanisms” were perceived as less important. 
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    In relation to the users’ perceived importance of economic reporting, Table 5.1 from the t-test 
later showed that all indicators were not significant, and their importance rank below the test 
value by GRI; therefore, the economic indicators are different from the GRI guidelines, and they 
are much less important in CSD in the Chinese context.  
    For social indicators, the t-test indicated that “labour practice” and “society” are less 
important in China than what GRI intended. “Product responsibility” should be focused on when 
disclosing sustainability. However, due to the small sample size of this study, this is only an 
indication that what is perceived as important by GRI may not be considered so important by 
Chinese report users; and what is perceived to be important by Chinese report users may not be as 
important to users from other countries with different cultural backgrounds.    
    At the end of the questionnaire, some respondents suggested having specific social categories 
instead of “labour practice and decent work”, “human rights”, “society” and “product 
responsibility” due to the broad nature of these concepts. No amendment was made to the 
questionnaire for environmental and economic disclosure. Therefore, in the full-scale study, the 
questionnaire was extended in order to reduce the ambiguity, and to fully address the perceived 
importance of CSD from the report users’ perspectives. The refined and extended questionnaire 
for the full study are shown in Appendices C, D and F for environmental, social and economic 
disclosure, respectively. Overall, the pilot study provides a brief indication of users’ perceived 
importance of corporate sustainability disclosure in China, with a small sample size. Importantly, 
the pilot study ensured the validity of the questionnaire which was later used to develop the 
research instrument for the main study. Consequently, the assessment and assurance of content 
validity was satisfied. 
5.3 Instrument reliability 
    Studies that involve a survey must consider the reliability and validity of data collected from 
respondents, because reliability and validity ensure the results are accurate and reliable for 
answering the research questions (Lin, 2010). Reliability measures whether the data collecting 
process is dependable, predictable and consistent It ensures the responses from participants of the 
69 
 
survey are reliable. The higher the consistency of answers over time, the more reliable the data is. 
According to Yi (2008), one of the most common measurements for reliability is Cronbach’s 
alpha, which tests how well a set of variables measures a single and one-dimensional latent 
construct. For social accounting research, when α is greater than or equal to 0.7, the obtained 
data provides higher reliability; data reliability is moderate when α is smaller than and equal to 
0.35; and when α is smaller than 0.35, the data is of lower reliability, which suggests an 
amendment of the survey (Diao, 2013). A reliability test for this study was conducted by SPSS, 
and the alpha value from the pilot study and the full survey were both over 0.9, which satisfied 
the requirement for internal consistency.   
5.4 Descriptive statistics 
    This section describes the results of descriptive statistics for the full study of the analysis of 
the users’ perceived importance of CSD. As CSD includes three aspects, each aspect was 
analysed separately first, and the integrated perception of CSD was discussed.   
5.41 Environmental indicators  
    Table 5.2 shows descriptive statistics of the perceived importance of environmental 
disclosure indicators. The respondents were asked to rate the importance of the disclosure items. 
There were 5 levels in the answers they had chosen. The highest was 5 (the most important) and 
the lowest was 1 (the least important). All items were major environmental performance 
indicators suggested by GRI guidelines.  
    The results reveal that, of the 13 indicators, 4 were rated “most important” and the remaining 
8 were rated “important”. “Water” had the highest number of “most important” responses, being 
chosen by 74 respondents (57.4%). This was followed by “Emissions” and “Effluents and 
Waste”, from 73 respondents (56.6%) for both indicators. “Compliance” also had a mode of 
“most important”, to a lesser extent, with a score of 59 (45.7%). Therefore, it is evident that the 
reports users consider these indicators to be more important than the others. For other indicators, 
most of the responses were “important”. However, it is worth noting that “Biodiversity”, 
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“Transportation” and “Environmental grievance” had 2 (1.6%), 1 (0.8%) and 3 (2.3%) responses 
marked as “least important”, respectively. In opposition, “Effluents and Waste”, “Products and 
services” and “Compliance” had no response in the “least important” and “not important” 
categories.  
    In the open-ended question, two respondents included two suggestions for CSD 
environmental guidelines. The first response stated “Waste of raw material in operation caused by 
technology issues”, and the second response said that “An overview of how a company affects the 
environment throughout a year, including the level of risk and any potential affect when there is a 
severe incident or natural disaster”. These responses need to be considered when doing further 
CSD analysis. 
    In summary, the results in descriptive statistics show that these 12 environmental indicators 
should be included in a sustainability report or environmental reporting. “Water”, “Emissions”, 
“Effluents and waste” and “Compliance” should be of more weight when examining 
environmental disclosure, because they were considered more important than the other indicators. 
Nevertheless, the means of the tested indicators will be used in further weighted analyses. 
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Table 5.2: Frequency of environmental indicators (sample size N = 129) 
 Least 
IMP 
Not  
IMP 
Neutral IMP Most 
IMP 
Mode 
Material usage  0 4 (3.1%) 20 (15.5%) 64 (49.6%) 41 (31.8%) IMP 
Energy 0 1 (0.8%) 20 (15.5%) 60 (46.5%) 48 (37.2%) IMP 
Water 0 1 (0.8%) 6 (4.7%) 48 (37.2%) 74 (57.4%) Most 
IMP 
Biodiversity 2 (1.6%) 4 (3.1%) 14 (10.9%) 70 (54.3%) 39 (30.2%) IMP 
Emissions 0  3 (2.3%) 8 (6.2%) 45 (34.9%) 73 (56.6%) Most 
IMP 
Effluents and 
Waste 
0 0 11 (8.5%) 45 (34.9%) 73 (56.6%) Most 
IMP 
Products and 
services 
0 0 23 (17.8%) 75 (58.1%) 31 (24%) IMP 
Compliance 0 0 14 (10.9%) 56 (43.4%) 59 (45.7%) Most 
IMP 
Transportation 1 (0.8%) 6 (4.7%) 30 (23.3%) 59 (45.7%) 33 (25.6%) IMP 
Environmental 
overall 
sustainability 
0 2 (1.6%) 24 (18.6%) 66 (51.2%) 37 (28.7%) IMP 
Supplier 
environmental 
assessment 
0 4 (3.1%) 19 (14.7%) 66 (51.2%) 40 (31%) IMP 
Environmental 
grievance 
3 (2.3%) 2 (1.6%) 21 (16.3%) 64 (49.6%) 39 (30.2%) IMP 
Q13: Waste of raw material in operation caused by technology defaults; an overview of how a 
company affects the environment throughout a year, including the level of risk and any potential 
affect when there is a severe incident or natural disaster.  
Note: IMP = important
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5.42 Economic indicators  
    Table 5.3 presents the descriptive statistics of the economic indicators. The results overall 
show that the mode for the indicators is “important”. While the majority of the responses were 
“important”, a considerable proportion of the respondents considered the economic indicators 
“neutral”. 
Table 5.3” Frequency of economic indicators (sample size N = 129) 
 Least 
IMP 
Not  
IMP 
Neutral IMP Most 
IMP 
Mode 
Economic 
performance 
2 (1.6%) 1 (0.8%) 26 (20.2%) 74 (57.4%) 26 (20.2%)  IMP 
Market 
presence 
0 2 (3.9%) 31 (24%) 69 (53.5%) 24 (18.6%) IMP 
Indirect 
economic 
impacts 
0 6 (4.7%) 41 (31.8%) 69 (53.5%) 13 (10.1%) IMP 
Procurement 
practices 
0 12 (9.3%) 39 (30.2%) 61 (47.3%) 17 (13.2%) IMP  
Q5: CPI of employees within a company; accumulated unemployment   
Note: IMP = important 
    “Economic performance” obtained the highest score for “most important”, chosen by 26 
respondents (20.2%). It also had the most “important” responses. However, 26 (20.2%), 1 (0.8%) 
and 2 (1.6%) respondents chose “neutral”, “not important” and “least important” respectively, 
which may suggest that the mean for this indicator is below what was intended by GRI. For other 
indicators, although 69 (53.5%), 69 (53.5%) and 61 (47.3%) responses were obtained for “market 
presence”, “indirect economic impacts” and “procurement practices”, there are large percentages 
in the not-so-important categories.  
    There were two responses for Q5, which was an open-ended question on economic 
sustainability. The report users responded that they would like to see a Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) of the employees within a company and the accumulated unemployment in companies’ 
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sustainability reports. It is important to see that financial analysts are linking the financial 
perspective with corporate sustainability when examining CSD.  
    Overall, the result suggests that all of the economic indicators may be included in 
sustainability reports, but the weight of these indicators must be reconsidered, because almost half 
of the respondents considered them less than important. Companies may also need to consider 
including a CPI of their employees, as well as unemployment data, in their sustainability reports. 
5.43 Social indicators – labour practice and decent work 
    Corporate social disclosure is a major focus in sustainability reporting outlined in GRI. There 
are four main categories of social indicators – labour practice and decent work, human rights, 
society, and product responsibility. Each category consists of a series of indicators, and all four 
categories were examined.  
    Table 5.4 shows the results of the responses from the users’ most desired labour practice and 
decent work indicators. Overall, the modes are “important”, which means the majority of 
respondents chose “important”. However, it is worth noting that “occupational health and safety” 
and “equal remuneration for women and men” had 49 and 39 responses for “most important”, 
which is over 30% (38% and 30.2% respectively). In contrast, “employment” and “diversity and 
equal opportunity” had 40 and 41 responses in “neutral” – over 30% of the total responses – 
meaning that respondents did not care so much about these indicators.  
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Table 5.4: Frequency of social indicators – labour practice and decent work (sample size N = 
129) 
 Least 
IMP 
Not  
IMP 
Neutral IMP Most 
IMP 
Mode 
Employment 0 1 (0.8%) 40 (31%) 64 (49.6%) 24 (18.6%) IMP 
Labour/manag
ement 
relationship 
0 2 (1.6%) 27 (20.9%) 64 (49.6%) 36 (27.9%) IMP 
Occupational 
health and 
safety 
0 3 (2.3%) 15 (11.6%) 62 (48.1%) 49 (38%) IMP 
Training and 
education 
0 4 (3.1%) 27 (20.9%) 65 (50.4%) 33 (25.6%) IMP 
Diversity and 
equal 
opportunity 
1(0.8%) 6 (4.7%) 41 (31.8%) 49 (38%) 32 (24.8%) IMP 
Equal 
remuneration 
for women and 
men 
2(1.6%) 6 (4.7%) 29 (22.5%) 53 (41.1%) 39 (30.2%) IMP 
Q7: Sexism 
Note: IMP = important 
    In the open-ended question (Q7), one respondent wrote “sexism”. Although the GRI 
guidelines include an item about sexism (equal remuneration for women and men), this suggests 
that companies may consider focusing more on gender in their sustainability reports. 
5.44 Social indicators – human rights 
    There are 10 indicators in the human rights category, and the results for this part of the 
questionnaire are shown in table 5.5. Similarly, to the previous category, the modes for human 
rights indicators are also “important”, which means the majority had chosen “important”. 
    For “most important”, the top rated indicator is “security practice” (51 responses, 39.5%), 
followed by “child labour” (49 responses, 38%) and “forced compulsory labour” (43 responses, 
33.3%). These indicators obtained over 30% more than the “important” answers, and have higher 
mean values. Significantly, in contrast, all of the indicators were rated “least important” and “not 
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important” by at least one respondent. “Supplier human rights assessment” obtained the highest 
percentage (3 responses, 2.3%) for “least important”, and the second-highest percentage for “not 
important” (8 responses, 6.2%). It is followed by “non-discrimination” with 2 responses (1.6%) 
for “least important”. For “not important”, “assessment” obtained the most responses (9 
responses, 7%), followed by “supplier human rights” and “human rights grievance mechanisms” 
(both had 8 responses, 6.2%). 
    As the results show, human rights indicators are likely to be perceived as considerably less 
important than other aspects, due to the large proportion of responses in the not-so-important 
categories. There were no responses to the open-ended question. 
Table 5.5: Frequency of social indicators – human rights (sample size N = 129) 
 Least 
IMP 
Not  
IMP 
Neutral IMP Most 
IMP 
Mode 
Investment 1 (0.8%) 4 (3.1%) 35 
(27.1%) 
70 
(54.3%) 
19 
(14.7%) 
IMP 
Non- 
discrimination 
2 (1.6%) 4 (3.1%) 38 
(29.5%) 
54 
(41.9%) 
31 (24%) IMP 
Freedom of 
association and 
collective 
bargaining 
1 (0.8%) 6 (4.7%) 30 
(23.3%) 
71 (55%) 21 
(16.3%) 
IMP 
Child labour 1 (0.8%) 4 (3.1%) 18 (14%) 57 
(44.2%) 
49 (38%) IMP 
Forced or 
compulsory 
labour 
1 (0.8%) 2 (1.6%) 23 
(17.8%) 
60 
(46.5%) 
43 
(33.3%) 
IMP 
Security 
practice 
1 (0.8%) 4 (3.1%) 20 
(15.5%) 
53 
(41.1%) 
51 
(39.5%) 
IMP 
Indigenous 
rights  
1 (0.8%) 5 (3.9%) 34 
(26.4%) 
66 
(51.2%) 
23 
(17.8%) 
IMP 
Assessment 1 (0.8%) 9 (7%) 33 
(25.6%) 
60 
(46.5%) 
26 
(20.2%) 
IMP 
Supplier human 
rights 
assessment 
3 (2.3%) 8 (6.2%) 45 
(34.9%) 
52 
(40.3%) 
21 
(16.3%) 
IMP 
Human rights 1 (0.8%) 8 (6.2%) 32 65 23 IMP 
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grievance 
mechanisms 
(24.8%) (50.4%) (17.8%) 
Q11: Nil 
Note: IMP = important 
5.45 Social indicators – society 
    In the society category, “compliance” obtained the most responses for “most important” (40 
responses, 31%), and significantly, it has no responses for “least important” or “not important”. 
“Anti-corruption” also had 39 responses, which is above 30%, for “most important”.  
    For the “neutral” ranking, “public policy” and “supplier assessment for impact on society” 
have the most responses, both 41 (31.8%). This result is followed by “anti-competitive 
behaviour” and “local community”, with 36 (27.9%) and 35 (27.1%) respectively. There are also 
responses in “not important”, where “supplier assessment for impact on society” obtained the 
most responses (7, 5.4%). “Grievance mechanism for impacts on society”, “local community”, 
and “public policy” each have 1 response in “least important”.  
    Overall, the modes of social indicators are “important”; however, as the statistics suggest, 
more than half of the responses are “neutral”, “not important” or “least important”. This may 
suggest that this category is perceived as less important. Nevertheless, “compliance” is shown to 
be the most important among the other indicators in this category. 
Table 5.6: Frequency of social indicators – society (sample size N = 129) 
 Least 
IMP 
Not  
IMP 
Neutral IMP Most 
IMP 
Mode 
Local 
community 
1 (0.8%) 5 (3.9%) 35 (27.1%) 71 (55%) 17 (13.2%) IMP 
Anti-corruption 0 4 (3.1%) 27 (20.9%) 59 (45.7%) 39 (30.2%) IMP 
Public policy 1 (0.8%) 4 (3.1%) 41 (31.8%) 56 (43.4%) 27 (20.9%) IMP 
Anti-competitive 
behaviour 
0 2 (1.6%) 36 (27.9%) 66 (51.2%) 25 (19.4%) IMP 
Compliance 0 0 19 (14.7%) 70 (54.3%) 40 (31%) IMP 
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Supplier 
assessment for 
impacts on 
society 
0 7 (5.4%) 41 (31.8%) 63 (48.8%) 18 (14%) IMP 
Grievance 
mechanism for 
impacts on 
society 
1(0.8%) 1(0.8%) 28(21.7%) 65(50.4%) 34(26.4%) IMP 
Q8: Nil 
Note: IMP = important 
5.46 Social indicators – product responsibility 
    Product responsibility is the last sub-category in the social category. There are 5 indicators in 
total. Overall, “customer health and safety” has the most responses for “most important”, and 
“marketing communication” has the most responses for “not important”. It is worth noting that 
the mode for “customer health and safety” is “most important”, whereas modes for the other 
indicators are “important”.  
Table 5.7: Frequency of social indicators –pProduct responsibility (sample size N = 129) 
 Least 
IMP 
Not  
IMP 
Neutral IMP Most 
IMP 
Mode 
Customer health 
and safety 
1 
(0.8%) 
2 
(1.6%) 
9 (7%) 55 
(42.6%) 
62 
(48.1%) 
Most 
important 
Product and 
service labelling 
1 
(0.8%) 
2 
(1.6%) 
22 
(17.1%) 
65 
(50.4%) 
39 
(30.2%) 
Important 
Marketing 
communications 
1 
(0.8%) 
5 
(3.9%) 
33 
(25.6%) 
66 
(51.2%) 
24 
(18.6%) 
Important 
Customer privacy 1 
(0.8%) 
1 
(0.8%) 
11 (8.5%) 60 
(46.5%) 
56 
(43.4%) 
Important 
Compliance 0 1 
(0.8%) 
13 
(10.1%) 
68 
(52.7%) 
47 
(36.4%) 
Important 
Q6: Nil 
Note: IMP = important 
    For “most important”, 62 responses (48.1%) were obtained for “customer health and safety”, 
followed by “customer privacy” (56 responses, 43.4%) and “compliance” (47 responses, 36.4%).  
For “important”, “product and service labelling”, “marketing communications” and 
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“compliance” obtained scores over 50% - 50.4% (65), 51.2% (66) and 52.7% (68) respectively. 
Importantly, “marketing communications” had the most responses for both “neutral” (33 
responses, 25.6%) and “not important” (5 responses, 3.9%). All indicators except “compliance” 
had 1 response for “least important”. 
    In summary, all four categories of social aspects are important in sustainability reports; 
however, the weighting for each category definitely needs consideration in application, because 
the categories are not equally important. 
5.5 One sample t-test 
    A t-test is used to determine if there is any significant difference between two sets of scores. 
One sample t-test is considered when only a single sample of the participants and the questions is 
used to determine whether the mean of the population from which the sample is drawn in the same 
as the hypothesised mean (Coake, 2010). In this study, one sample t-test was adopted because the 
mean values drawn from the users’ perceived importance of each type of sustainability disclosure 
were compared with the level of importance intended by GRI.   
    As discussed in chapter 4, one sample t-test was used to answer research question two, which 
is ‘to what extent do the users perceive sustainability indicators in GRI differently from what was 
intended?’ This question was later divided into three parts, as CSD includes three different 
perspectives. Therefore, research question 2 is broken down into the following questions, which 
were answered partially in this section: 
Question 2a: What is the users’ perceived importance of environmental disclosure, and to what 
extent do users perceive the environmental indicators in GRI differently from what GRI intended? 
Question 2b: What is the users’ perceived importance of economic disclosure, and to what extent 
do users perceive the social indicators in GRI differently from what GRI intended? 
Question 2c: What is the users’ perceived importance of social disclosure, and to what extent do 
users perceive the sustainable economic indicators by GRI differently from what GRI intended? 
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5.51 Environmental indicators 
Table 5.8: T-test for environmental indicators (sample size N = 129) 
 Mean Std. Deviation t Sig. (2-tailed) 
Material usage  4.1 0.769 1.488 0.139 
Energy 4.2 0.722 3.170 0.002*** 
Water 4.51 0.626 9.276 0.000*** 
Biodiversity 4.09 0.820 1.181 0.240 
Emissions 4.46 0.718 7.233 0.000*** 
Effluents and 
Waste 
4.48 0.651 8.389 0.000*** 
Products and 
services 
4.06 0.647 1.089 0.278 
Compliance 4.35 0.669 5.922 0.000*** 
Transportation 3.91 0.861 -1.227 0.222 
Environmental 
overall 
sustainability 
4.07 0.731 1.084 0.280 
Supplier 
environmental 
assessment 
4.10 0.759 1.509 0.134 
Environmental 
grievance 
4.04 0.861 0.512 0.610 
Note: t-test at 95% confidence interval; ***Significant at 0.01 level. 
    Table 5.8 presents the results from the t-test for environmental indicators, and partially 
answers research questions 1 and 2. Evidently, there are 5 indicators that are statistically 
significant at 0.01 level: “Energy”, “Water”, “Emissions”, “Effluents and waste” and 
“Compliance”. The results suggest that these indicators are perceived differently from what was 
intended by GRI. “Water” presents the highest mean value of 4.51. The t-statistic is 9.276 and the 
p-value is 0.000, meaning that the result is significant, and it is perceived as more important than 
what was intended by GRI. This result is followed by “Effluents and waste”, “Emissions”, 
“Compliance” and “Energy”, with mean values of 4.48, 4.46, 4.35 and 4.2, respectively. As their 
mean values are greater than the t-test value of 4 (the level intended by GRI), the null hypotheses 
for these indicators are rejected. These results further suggest that, when measuring and analysing 
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sustainability reports in China, the weight and importance of the items included in these questions 
must be reconsidered. 
        For “Emissions”, “Effluents and waste” and “Compliance”, the results were consistent 
with the recent trend of carbon offsets and the serious carbon emissions in many major cities in 
China, which gradually gained significant international attention during the data collection 
period. Carbon offset refers to a monetary investment that abates greenhouse gas emission or 
sequesters carbon from the atmosphere that is used to compensate for greenhouse gas emission 
from companies’ own activities. To combat severe air pollution, Beijing recently had 
“APEC-blue” sky, because the government temporarily shut down the industrial area in Hebei. In 
order to achieve long-term performance, reporting ‘Emissions’ are important to reflect firm value. 
    In summary, the results for “Energy”, “Water”, “Emissions” “Effluents and waste” and 
“Compliance” showed that the users’ perceived importance of CSD was different from what was 
intended by GRI. On the contrary, there were statistical differences in “Material usage”, 
“Biodiversity”, “Products and services”, “Transportation”, “Environmental overall 
sustainability”, “Supplier environmental assessment” and “Environmental grievance”. 
5.52 Economic indicators 
Table 5.9: T-test for economic indicators (sample size N = 129) 
 Mean Std. Deviation t Sig. (2-tailed) 
Economic 
performance 
3.94 0.758 -0.929 0.354 
Market presence 3.87 0.754 -1.985 0.049** 
Indirect 
economic 
impacts 
3.69 0.716 -4.920 0.000*** 
Procurement 
practices 
3.64 0.827 -4.896 0.000*** 
Note: t-test at 95% confidence interval; **Significant at 0.05 level; ***Significant at 0.01 level. 
    Table 5.9 shows the results of the t-test for economic indicators. “Indirect economic impacts” 
and “Procurement practices” are statistically significant at 0.01 level, and “Market presence” is 
significant at 0.05 level. Interestingly, the mean values for all 4 indicators are below the test value 
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of 4, suggesting that the perceptions of economic indicators were not as important as they were 
intended to be in the GRI guidelines.  
    “Market presence” and “Procurement practices” are significant at 0.01 level, with mean 
values of 3.69 and 3.64, respectively. Their t-stat and p-value are both evidential, showing these 
are statistically significant. “Market presence” has a t-stat of -1.985 and p-value of 0.049, which 
means that it is also significant.  
    In summary, the users considered the economic indicators less important. Since the results are 
statistically significant, this shows that all indicators for economic disclosure were perceived 
differently by the users from what was intended by GRI. 
5.53 Social indicators 
5.531 Labour practice and decent work 
    Table 5.10 shows the results of the t-test for social indicators in the sub-category of labour 
practice and decent work. Overall, there are 3 indicators shown to be statistically significant, 
among the total 6. 
Table 5.10: T-test for social indicators – labour practice and decent work (sample size N = 129) 
 Mean Std. Deviation t Sig. (2-tailed) 
Employment 3.86 0.715 -2.216 0.028** 
Labour/management 
relationship 
4.04 0.744 0.592 0.555 
Occupational health 
and safety 
4.22 0.739 3.335 0.001*** 
Training and 
education 
3.98 0.770 -0.229 0.820 
Diversity and equal 
opportunity 
3.81 0.891 -2.373 0.019** 
Equal remuneration 
for women and men 
3.94 0.925 -0.762 0.448 
Note: t-test at 95% confidence interval; **Significant at 0.05 level; ***Significant at 0.01 level. 
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    The results shown in Table 5.10 reveal that “Occupational health and safety”, “Diversity and 
equal opportunity” and “Employment” reject the null hypotheses. “Occupational health and 
safety” had an average of 4.22, indicating that the report users perceived this indicator as more 
important. The t-stat and p-value are 3.335 and 0.001, showing that this indicator is statistically 
significant. Therefore, “Occupational health and safety” is more important than what was 
intended by GRI.  
    In contrast, “Diversity and equal opportunity” and “Employment” had mean values less than 
their t-test value, meaning that they are less important. The t-stats and p-values for these 
indicators are -2.373, 0.019, and -2.216, 0.028, respectively. This suggests that “Diversity and 
equal opportunity” and “Employment” are statistically significant at 0.05 level, and they were 
perceived as less important. The other indicators, “Labour/management relationship”, “Training 
and education” and “Equal remuneration for women and men”, are not statistically significant due 
to their p-values greater than 0.1.  
    In summary, “Occupational health and safety”, “Diversity and equal opportunity” and 
“Employment” are significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.05 levels respectively, and they were perceived 
differently by the users from what was intended by GRI.  
5.532 Human rights 
    As shown in table 5.11, there are 10 indicators in Human rights, and 9 indicators are 
statistically significant at either 0.05 level or 0.01 level. However, the mean values show that 
some indicators are important, while the others are not so important.  
    In regards to indicators that were perceived as important by the report users, “Child labour”, 
“Security practice” and “Forced or compulsory labour” obtained higher mean values than the 
t-test value of 4. “Child labour” and “Security practice” are statistically significant at 0.05 level, 
with t-stats and p-values of 2.113, 0.037 and 2.067, 0.041, respectively. The mean values for both 
indicators are identical at 4.16, which indicates that they are perceived as more important than 
intended by GRI. In contrast, “Forced or compulsory labour” is not statistically significant. 
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Table 5.11: T-test for social indicators – human rights (sample size N = 129) 
 Mean Std. Deviation t Sig. (2-tailed) 
Investment 3.79 0.757 -3.140 0.002*** 
Non-discrimination 3.84 0.882 -2.096 0.038** 
Freedom of 
association and 
collective 
bargaining 
3.81 0.788 -2.681 0.008*** 
Child labour 4.16 0.833 2.113 0.037** 
Forced or 
compulsory labour 
4.10 0.799 1.433 0.154 
Security practice 4.16 0.852 2.067 0.041** 
Indigenous rights  3.81 0.798 -2.648 0.009*** 
Assessment 3.78 0.875 -2.819 0.006*** 
Supplier human 
rights assessment 
3.62 0.912 -4.732 0.000*** 
Human rights 
grievance 
mechanisms 
3.78 0.838 -2.941 0.004*** 
Note: t-test at 95% confidence interval; **Significant at 0.05 level; ***Significant at 0.01 level.  
    In contrast, the remaining 7 indicators have less perceived importance than what was intended 
by GRI, as their mean values are below the t-test value, and they are significant at 0.05 and 0.01 
levels. “Supplier human rights assessment” has the lowest mean, showing it is the indicator of 
least concern to the report users. The mean value is 3.62, and the t-stat and p-value are -4.732 and 
0.000, showing the significance level is at 0.01. This is followed by “Human rights grievance 
mechanisms”, “Assessment” and “Investment”, with mean values and t-stats of 3.78 and -2.941, 
3.78 and -2.819, and -3.140 and -3.140 respectively. The significance levels for these indicators 
are 0.01. Lastly, “Indigenous rights”, “Freedom of association and collective bargaining” and 
“Non-discrimination” have slightly higher mean values of 3.81, 3.81 and 3.84. All 3 indicators 
are statistically significant at 0.01, 0.01 and 0.05 levels. 
    In summary, “Child labour” and “Security practice” are perceived as more important by the 
users, which is shown by their statistical significance. “Supplier human rights assessment”, 
“Human rights grievance mechanisms”, “Assessment”, “Investment”, “Indigenous rights”, 
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“Freedom of association and collective bargaining” and “Non-discrimination” are perceived as 
less important by the report users than was intended by GRI.  
5.533 Society 
Table 5.12: T-test for social indicators – society (sample size N = 129) 
 Mean Std. Deviation t Sig. (2-tailed) 
Local 
community 
3.76 0.758 -3.601 0.000*** 
Anti-corruption 4.03 0.800 0.440 0.662 
Public policy 3.81 0.830 -2.652 0.009*** 
Anti-competitive 
behaviour 
3.88 0.725 -1.822 0.071* 
Compliance 4.16 0.659 2.806 0.006*** 
Supplier 
assessment for 
impacts on 
society 
3.71 0.773 -4.217 0.000*** 
Grievance 
mechanism for 
impacts on 
society 
4.01 0.765 0.115 0.909 
Note: t-test at 95% confidence interval; *Significant at 0.1 level; ***Significant at 0.01 level.  
    In the society category, there are 5 indicators that are statistically significant. In particular, the 
mean value of “Compliance”, at 4.16, is greater than the t-test value. The t-stat and p-value are 
2.806 and 0.006, so “Compliance” is perceived as more important than was intended by GRI. 
Although “Anti-corruption” and “Grievance mechanism for impacts on society” are more than 
“important”, they are not statistically significant. 
    In contrast, the mean values of “Supplier assessment for impact on society”, “Public policy”, 
“Local community” and “Anti-competitive behaviour” are below the t-test value of 4, scoring 
3.71, 3.81, 3.76 and 3.88 respectively, and their p-values are significant at 0.1 and 0.01 levels. 
This suggests that these indicators are perceived as less important than was intended by GRI.  
    Overall, “Compliance”, “Supplier assessment for impact on society”, “Public policy”, “Local 
community” and “Anti-competitive behaviour” were perceived differently by the users. 
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“Compliance” was perceived as more important than GRI intended, whereas the other significant 
indicators were perceived important to a much lesser extent.  
5.534 Product responsibility 
    In this category, most of the statistically significant indicators were perceived as more 
important than intended by GRI, except “Marketing communication”. Table 5.13 presents the 
results of the t-test for product responsibility, which is the last category under social 
sustainability. 
    “Customer health and safety” obtained the highest mean, 4.36, of the 5 indicators, with t-stat 
and p-values of 5.415 and 0.000. “Customer privacy” and “Compliance” also showed high mean 
values of 4.31 and 4.25. They were both at 0.01 significance level, hence, they were perceived 
differently by the users. In comparison, “Marketing communications” had a mean of 3.83, and its 
was perceived important to a lesser extent. Due to its p-value of 0.017, this indicator also showed 
statistical significance. Although the mean for “Product and service labelling” is more than 4, the 
p-value for this indicator is not statistically significant. 
Table 5.13: T-test table for social indicators – product responsibility (sample size N = 129) 
 Mean Std. Deviation t Sig. (2-tailed) 
Customer health 
and safety 
4.36 0.748 5.415 0.000*** 
Product and 
service labelling 
4.08 0.777 1.134 0.259 
Marketing 
communications 
3.83 0.802 -2.416 0.017** 
Customer privacy 4.31 0.727 4.846 0.000*** 
Compliance 4.25 0.662 4.257 0.000*** 
Note: t-test at 95% confidence interval; **Significant at 0.05 level; ***Significant at 0.01 level.  
    In summary, the mean value for “Marketing communications” is less than 4, whereas the 
other indicators are greater than 4. Most of the indicators are shown to be statistically significant, 
except for “Product and service labelling”.   
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5.6 Research instrument 
    The mean values of the environmental, economic and social sustainability indicators were 
used to develop the research instrument to be suitable and appropriate to investigate CSD in the 
Chinese context. Existing studies also considered the mean value as a tool representing the 
difference in weight of the importance of CSD items (Taylor and Shan, 2007; Taylor and Shan, 
2010; Hutomo, 1998). As the results showed in the previous sections, there were some indicators 
perceived differently from what was intended by GRI, whereas the importance of the other 
indicators did not change. Consequently, the weight of importance of sustainability indicators 
changes only for the ones that are statistically significant. If indicators are perceived the same as 
was intended by GRI, the weighted importance is 4, which is the same as the t-test value. The 
weight of importance was also referred to as the CSD perceptions index (CSDPI) in this study, 
which represents the research instrument. Table 5.14 shows CSDPI for the environmental 
indicators, and table 5.15 and table 5.16 show CSDPI for economic and social disclosure, 
respectively. The full version of the instrument adopted in the study is presented in Appendix H.  
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Table 5.14: CSD perceptions index - environmental disclosure 
Environmental indicators CSD perceptions index (Mean) 
Material usage  4 
Energy 4.2 
Water 4.51 
Biodiversity 4 
Emissions 4.46 
Effluents and Waste 4.48 
Products and services 4 
Compliance 4.35 
Transportation 4 
Environmental overall sustainability 4 
Supplier environmental assessment 4 
Environmental grievance 4 
Waste by technology defaults  4 
Impacts on environment overview 4 
Table 5.15: CSD perceptions index - economic disclosure 
Economic indicators CSD perceptions index (Mean) 
Economic performance 4 
Market presence 3.87 
Indirect economic impacts 3.69 
Procurement practices 3.64 
CPI of employees 4 
Accumulated unemployment 4 
Table 5.16: CSD perceptions index - social disclosure  
Labour practice (social) indicators CSD perceptions index (Mean) 
Employment 3.86 
Labour/management relationship 4 
Occupational health and safety 4.22 
Training and education 4 
Diversity and equal opportunity 3.81 
Equal remuneration for women and men 4 
Sexism 4 
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Table 5.16: CSD perceptions index - social disclosure (Cont’d) 
Human rights (social) indicators CSD perceptions index (Mean) 
Investment 3.79 
Non-discrimination 3.84 
Freedom of association and collective 
bargaining 
3.81 
Child labour 4.16 
Forced or compulsory labour 4 
Security practice 4.16 
Indigenous rights  3.81 
Assessment 3.78 
Supplier human rights assessment 3.62 
Human rights grievance mechanisms 3.78 
Table 5.16: CSD perceptions index - social disclosure (Cont’d) 
Society (social) indicators CSD perceptions index (Mean) 
Local community 3.76 
Anti-corruption 4 
Public policy 3.81 
Anti-competitive behaviour 3.88 
Compliance 4.16 
Supplier assessment for impacts on society 3.71 
Grievance mechanism for impacts on society 4 
Table 5.16: CSD perceptions index - social disclosure (Cont’d) 
Product responsibility (social) indicators CSD perceptions index (Mean) 
Customer health and safety 4.36 
Product and service labelling 4 
Marketing communications 3.83 
Customer privacy 4.31 
Compliance 4.25 
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5.7 Findings and discussion 
    The purpose of this section is essentially to answer research questions 1 and 2, showing users’ 
perceived importance of CSD in china, and the extent to which this differs from what was 
intended by GRI. The results are from descriptive statistics and one-sample t-test, based on 129 
responses to the questionnaire designed using GRI guidelines from financial analysts.  
    For environmental indicators, as shown in descriptive statistics, “Water”, “Emissions”, 
“Effluents and Waste” and “Compliance” were perceived as more important than the other 
indicators. These results are partially correspondent with those of the t-test, in which “Energy” is 
shown as statistically significant. Since the mean values for these indicators are above 4, they are 
perceived as more important than intended by GRI. In the open-ended questions, responses 
included “waste of raw material” and “an overview of impact on environment of a company”. So, 
later in the study, these two additional indicators from the open-ended questions must be 
included.  
    For economic indicators, “Procurement practices”, “indirect economic impacts” and “Market 
presence” are perceived as less important than what was intended by GRI. Overall, the mean 
values for economic performance are below “important” (4). The reason for this is partially that 
information regarding economic perspectives is included in annual reports. If users were 
interested in this form of information, they would read annual reports instead of CSD. Also, “CPI 
from employees” and “unemployment” were indicated in the open-ended questions, which were 
included as a part of the instrument, and they were considered “important” when examining 
companies’ CSD.  
    Regarding social disclosure, “occupational health and safety”, “child labour”, “security 
practice”, “compliance in society”, “customer health and safety”, “customer privacy” and 
“compliance in product responsibility” were perceived as more important than intended by GRI, 
where their CSDPI result was greater than 4. A number of indicators showed less importance, 
including “employment”, “diversity and equal opportunity”, “investment”, “non-discrimination”, 
“freedom of association and collective bargaining”, “indigenous rights”, “assessment”, “supplier 
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human rights assessment”, “human rights grievance mechanisms”, “local community”, “public 
policy”, “anti-competitive behaviour”, “supplier assessment for impacts on society” and 
“marketing communications”. The rest of the categories did not show statistical significance in 
the t-test, therefore they remain as ‘4’ in CSDPI.   
    According to the results from the descriptive statistics and t-test, it is apparent that there are 
moderate differences among economic disclosure, environmental disclosure and social 
disclosure. In particular, categories within each main aspect were also different statistically, or 
through visualisation of the descriptive statistics results. Environmental disclosure was perceived 
as most important among the three aspects, followed by social disclosure and, lastly, economic 
disclosure. Looking more closely, categories that were perceived as more important were often 
the most publicly concerning issues, such as energy, water, emission, effluents and waste in 
environmental disclosure in China. Information regarding these indicators was included in the 
12th Five Years Sustainability Plan announced by the Chinese government, in which companies 
were encouraged to disclose use of material, energy consumption and general environmental 
performance. Although adherence to the plan is on a voluntary basis, many users wanted to see 
information regarding these areas being included in sustainability reports. With regard to social 
disclosure, the changes among the categories were not as significant as they were in 
environmental disclosure, where no category was perceived as “not important”. The weight of 
each social category was considerably mild, and the average was approximately ‘4’. This 
indicates that the Chinese report users did not perceive social disclosure as important as 
environmental disclosure, due to external reasons such as government policy and public or media 
concerns. However, it is notable that “production responsibility” indicators generally received 
high attention. Production responsibility is another area of concern in China, due to recent severe 
food product faults and the milk powder scandal in the community. Economic disclosure was 
perceived as least important in comparison with the other two types of disclosure. As discussed 
previously, this was primarily because economic information could be fully obtained from 
companies’ annual reports. The purpose of economic disclosure, as indicated in GRI, is to show 
information that is less frequently reported, but often desired by readers of sustainability reports. 
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An organisation may be financially viable, but this may have been achieved by creating 
significant externalities that impact other stakeholders. Therefore, information included in 
economic disclosure presents a measurement of the economic outcomes of a company and the 
effect and relevance of these outcomes on a broad range of stakeholders. Nevertheless, as this 
information can still be obtained from annual reports, the users might find it less important, in 
comparison with the other two types of disclosure. The analysis of report users’ perceived 
importance of CSD in China, as well as the research instrument, was fundamentally conducted to 
answer research question 1, and partially research question 2, revealing what the users’ perceived 
importance of CSD was, and to what extent it was different from their importance in GRI. 
Research question 2 was further answered in the multiple regression models, where the models 
developed based on GRI and CSDPI were compared to determine their differences by employing 
empirical data. 
5.8 Summary 
    This chapter outlines the process of the pilot study to ensure the feasibility of conducting the 
main study. It also shows the analysis of the Chinese reports users’ perceived importance of CSD 
through descriptive statistics and one sample t-test. The results were further used, analysed and 
discussed for the development of the research instrument. From the next chapter onward, this 
thesis will focus on the analyses of CSD using the research instrument developed in this chapter 
and the list items from GRI (G4). 
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Chapter 6 
Corporate sustainability disclosure analyses 
6.1 Introduction 
    In this chapter, the researcher presents the CSD analyses using the methodology outlined in 
Chapter 4. Because CSD incorporates three perspectives, the quality of economic, 
environmental and social disclosure is examined separately. The combined CSD reports that 
include all three aspects are also examined. The quality of disclosure was measured firstly by 
the GRI, and by the CSDPI, which was based on the instrument discussed in the previous 
chapter. In this chapter, an overview of CSD is presented first, followed by the individual 
analyses of economic, environmental and social disclosure. The disclosures are also compared 
with the weighted quality, using the users’ perceived importance.   
6.2 Quality of corporate sustainability disclosure 
    The results from the descriptive statistics of the quality of CSD are shown in table 6.1. 
There were 238 sample Chinese listed companies considered in this analysis, and their 
stand-alone corporate sustainability reports were viewed and examined. Information from the 
stand-alone reports is generally more comprehensive than other sources of sustainability 
disclosure, because many companies had sections for specific sustainability indicators. In data 
collection, the researcher found that in order to make their reports reader-friendly, a minority of 
16% of sample companies stated that they followed the GRI as a guideline. Table 6.1 shows the 
key figures from examining the quality and the current status quo of CSD in Chinese listed 
companies.  
    In general, the results from table 6.1 show that the quality of CSD in Chinese listed 
companies was low in all types of disclosure, and disclosure of better quality was not 
necessarily perceived important by the users. In essence, higher values in the CSDPI did not 
lead to better quality of CSD. As indicated in the chapter four, stand-alone reports were 
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examined based on an ordinal scale from 0 to 5, where 5, in brief, means to have comprehensive 
sections that show items in all dimensions and in a given frame, and 0 means these sections 
were omitted. The average CSD per indicator was 0.55 for GRI and 0.52 for CSDPI. Both 
figures showed the inadequacy of the quality of CSD, because the mean value for the quality of 
an item barely passed the score for simply being disclosed. The range for GRI shows the 
minimum and maximum scores, which ranged from 0 to 229, out of the full score by GRI of 
445. The top score in quality was 51.46%, suggesting once again that the quality of CSD in 
Chinese listed companies was still low in 2013. Indicators for the CSDPI indicated the report 
users’ perceived importance, and additional responses collected from the questionnaire were 
also used. The range of values for CSDPI is similar to the range for GRI, from 0 to 921.91, 
where the amount for quality was 51.4%, out of the full score of 100%. In comparison, the 
quality of CSD for CSDPI was lower than it was for GRI. Therefore, this shows that the 
companies disclosed limited information of the users’ desire. Since there was not enough 
information that was perceived important by the users, the quality for CSDPI was slightly lower 
than it was for GRI. 
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics for corporate sustainability disclosure for Chinese listed 
companies (N = 238) 
 Economic 
disclosure 
Environmental 
disclosure 
Social 
disclosure 
Sustainability 
disclosure 
CSDPI 3.89 4.22 3.97 4.03 
mean by GRI 0.905 0.43 0.50 0.55 
mean by GRI and 
additional indicators  
0.78 0.46 0.50 0.52 
range by GRI 0 – 33 0 – 92 0 - 107 0 – 229 
full score by GRI 50 160 235 445 
range by CSDPI 0 – 128.37 0 – 388.24 0 – 424.79 0 – 921.91 
full score by CSDPI 194.5 675.2 932.95 1793.35 
non-disclosing 
companies in % 
0.4 30.3 0.4 0 
disclosing companies in 
% 
99.6 69.7 99.6 100 
total number of GRI 
indicators 
10 32 47 89 
number of additional 2 2 1 5 
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indicators from report 
users 
Note: Mean values were measured per indicator 
6.3 Economic sustainability disclosure analyses    
6.31 Economic disclosure by categories 
    The GRI defines and classifies economic indicators into 4 categories: “economic 
performance”, “market presence”, “indirect economic impact”, and “procurement practice”. In 
the previous chapter, 2 additional indicators were suggested by report users: CPI from 
employees and accumulated unemployment. Thus, there were 6 categories in total. Table 6.2 
shows the quality of economic disclosures in 2013 for the 238 Chinese listed companies. The 
figures contained in the table were raw data, and the scores were examined before applying 
CSDPI. In addition, the scores were in ordinal scale from 0 to 5. A statement of objective for 
ordinal scale is shown in Appendix A, and the research instrument is presented in Appendix H.   
    The results from table 6.2 show that “indirect economic impact” was the best-disclosed 
category among the 5, with an average quality per indicator of 1.84. There are two indicators 
included in this category: Eco8 and Eco9. Eco8 required companies to report “development and 
impact of infrastructure investments and services provided primarily for public benefit through 
commercial, in-kind, or pro bono engagement”. It is also the second-best disclosed indicator, 
with an average quality of 2.53. Eco9 required companies to report “understanding and 
describing significant indirect economic impacts, including extent of impacts”, and has a mean 
value of 1.15. The third disclosed category was “economic performance”, which included 4 
indicators. Notably, Eco1 had the highest mean value, 3.14, of the 12 economic indicators, and 
it increased the mean value for the entire category significantly, to 0.95. This indicator required 
companies to report “direct economic value generated and distributed, including revenue, 
operating costs, employee compensation, donations and other community investments, retained 
earnings and payments to capital providers and government”. The rest of the “economic 
performance” indicators were generally not disclosed well; Eco2, Eco3 and Eco4 obtained mean 
values of 0.39, 0.17 and 0.09, respectively. “Market presence”, “procurement practice” and 
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“additional economic indicators” were also disclosed inadequately, with an average quality 
score of 0.45, 0.23 and 0.16 respectively.  
    Importantly, the research found that higher average quality of disclosure was not thought to 
be important by report users. “Indirect economic impact”, was the best-disclosed category, but it 
obtained only 3.69 for users’ perceived importance, which was the one of the lowest scores in 
economic categories. Although the quality from this category is relatively sound, the users did 
not perceive this category as “important”. Furthermore, the additional indicators that the users 
suggested to add onto the research instrument only had a mean of 0.16. Consequently, economic 
information that was perceived as less important by the report users generally had a higher 
quality of disclosure, which indicates that there is a potential inverse relationship between the 
users’ perceived importance of CSD and the actual quality of CSD.     
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Table 6.2: Economic disclosure in Chinese listed companies by categories (N = 238) 
Category CSD 
perceptions 
index 
No. of 
reporting 
companies  
No. of 
non-reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 1 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 2 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 3 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 4 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 5 
reporting 
companies 
Mean per 
company 
(per 
indicator) 
Range 
Eco1 4 224 14 11 45 73 47 48 3.14 0 – 5 
Eco2 4 51 187 24 17 6 3 1 0.39 0 – 5 
Eco3 4 19 219 6 8 3 0 2 0.17 0 – 5 
Eco4 4 14 224 8 4 2 0 0 0.09 0 – 3  
Economic Performance 0.95 0 – 15 
Eco5 3.87 36 202 17 13 5 1 0 0.26 0 – 4  
Eco6 3.87 47 191 21 15 8 3 0 0.37 0 – 4  
Eco7 3.87 67 171 13 23 20 5 6 0.71 0 – 5  
Market Presence 0.45 0 – 11 
Eco8 3.69 193 45 15 51 56 37 34 2.53 0 – 5 
Eco9 3.69 133 105 45 48 30 7 3 1.15 0 – 5 
Indirect Economic impact 1.84 0 – 10  
Eco10 3.69 34 204 22 6 4 1 1 0.23 0 – 5 
Procurement Practice 0.23 0 – 5 
AQn1 4 2 236 0 2 0 0 0 0.02 0 – 2  
AQn2 4 31 207 12 7 6 4 2 0.29 0 – 5 
Additional economic indicators 0.16 0 – 5  
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Table 6.3: Ranking of economic indicators  
Rank Economic indicators Total score by CSDPI Total score by GRI Mean by CSDPI per 
company 
% firms disclosed 
1 WEco1 2992 748 12.57 94.12 
2 WEco8 2225.07 603 9.35 81.09 
3 WEco9 1011.06 274 4.25 55.88 
4 WEco7 654.03 169 2.75 28.15 
5 WEco2 372 93 1.56 21.43 
6 WEco6 336.69 87 1.41 19.75 
7 AQn2 280 N/P 1.18 13.03 
8 WEco5 239.94 62 1.01 15.13 
9 WEco10 200.20 55 0.84 14.29 
10 WEco3 372 41 1.56 7.98 
11 WEco4 88 22 0.37 5.88 
12 AQn1 16 N/P 0.07 0.84 
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6.32 Best reported indicators in economic disclosure 
    The ranking order of the 12 economic indicators is presented in table 6.3, and is measured 
by an indicator’s total score by CSDPI or mean by CSDPI, so “WEco” presents weighted 
economic indicators. The total score by GRI and percentage of firms’ disclosure are also shown 
in table 6.3. As seen from the table, WEco1 was the best-reported indicator, with an average 
weighted quality of 12.57. Due to the broad definition and relevance of WEco1 to economic 
performance, many companies disclosed ample information about it, as most of the information 
could already be viewed in company annual reports. WEco1 also attained 94.12% of disclosed 
firms. This, again, shows how common it was for companies to report on WEco1. WEco8 and 
WEco9, with average weighed quality values of 9.35 and 4.25, were the second- and third-best 
disclosed indicators. It is noted that these indicators are from the indirect economic impacts 
category and are related to government economic policies at a macro level. The reason could be 
that companies voluntarily report this type of information under engagement and 
encouragement from the government and associated industrial authorities. This can also be 
explained by Stakeholder Theory in terms of the dimension of stakeholder power. Eco7 and 
Eco2 are from the market presence and economic performance categories, with average 
weighed quality values of 2.75 and 1.56 respectively, and a weaker mean than the previous three 
indicators. Eco7 describes “procedures for local hiring and proportion of senior management 
hired from the local community at significant locations of operation”, whereas Eco2 requires 
firms to report “financial implications and other risks and opportunities for the organisation’s 
activities due to climate change”.  
    Interestingly, additional indicators AQn1 and AQn2 ranked fairly low, at 12th and 7th 
respectively. The mean for AQn2, which is about accumulated unemployment, was 1.12, and 
only 13.03% companies disclosed this information. The quality for AQn1, CPI from employees, 
was even less – only 0.84% of companies disclosed.   
    In summary, three general trends were shown in this section: first, indicators with high 
disclosure quality are usually defined broadly, and companies might disclose these in their 
annual reports; second, there is a positive relationship between disclosure quality and 
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engagement and policies from the government at a macro, basic level; lastly, the additional 
indicators in the economic section obtained considerably low scores.  
6.4 Environmental sustainability disclosure analyses 
6.41 Environmental disclosure by categories 
    Eleven categories were defined in GRI for environmental disclosure, which comprised 32 
environmental performance indicators. According to the responses from the questionnaire 
analysed in the previous chapter, many report users suggested that there should be separate 
categories for “emissions” and “effluents and waste”, whereas in GRI these are one category. 
Therefore, this study used a total of 13 environmental categories, including “material usage”, 
“energy”, “water”, “biodiversity”, “emissions”, “effluents and waste”, “products and services”, 
“compliance”, “transportation”, “environmental overall”, “supplier environmental assessment”, 
“environmental grievance” and “additional environmental indicators”. For the additional 
indicators, “waste by technological defaults” and “impacts on environment overall” were 
included in the instrument as one category to represent a group that was perceived to be 
important by the report users.  
    Table 6.4 shows the results of the quality of environmental disclosure by categories. The 
highest quality is determined by the average quality of disclosure per indicator, due to the 
different numbers of indicators that were included in the categories. As the table shows, 
“environmental overall” scored the highest average quality of 1.3 per indicator. This category 
suggests that companies report “total environmental protection expenditures and investments by 
type”, which includes any spending on environmental protection. Companies that disclosed this 
indicator were not necessarily high profile, and many sample firms presented information about 
their policies and future plan to maintain environmental sustainability, as well as spending 
associated to these activities. In addition, the second-highest indicator was “additional 
environmental indicators”, which had a mean of 0.91. Notably, one indicator included in this 
category, AQn4, which is about “impacts on environment overall”, significantly raised the mean 
value for all categories, with an average quality of 1.81. This indicator was rather broad, 
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because it required companies only to disclose an overall environmental impact. Therefore, 
when the coding was undertaken, many companies obtained a quality score of 1 or 2, which 
eventually increased the mean for this indicator. The third-best disclosed indicator was “energy”, 
with a mean of 0.85, followed by “products and services” and “emissions”. 
    Similarly to the trend presented in the previous economic disclosure, the more importantly 
perceived categories by report users generally had lower quality. “Water” had the highest 
CSDPI, but its average quality was 10th among the total 13 categories. “Effluents and waste” 
also showed a relatively low mean value compared with its CSDPI. In contrast, “environmental 
overall”, with its CSDPI of 4, obtained the highest quality score. Therefore, in general for 
environmental categories, there was an inverse relationship between the average quality of 
environmental disclosure and the users’ perceived importance.    
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Table 6.4: Environmental disclosure in Chinese listed companies by categories (N = 238)  
Category CSDPI No. of 
reporting 
companies  
No. of 
non-reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 1 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 2 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 3 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 4 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 5 
reporting 
companies 
Mean (per 
company/per 
indicator) 
Range 
EN1 4 33 205 13 9 5 2 4 0.31 0 – 5  
EN2 4 28 210 6 14 4 4 0 0.26 0 – 4  
Materials 0.29 0 – 9  
EN3 4.2 72 166 16 29 12 9 6 0.74 0 – 5 
EN4 4.2 69 169 15 29 12 9 4 0.69 0 – 5 
EN5 4.2 103 135 26 37 26 6 8 1.02 0 – 5 
EN6 4.2 91 147 31 26 21 9 4 0.85 0 – 5 
EN7 4.2 102 136 34 37 15 10 6 0.94 0 – 5 
Energy 0.85 0 – 25  
EN8 4.51 26 212 10 3 7 3 3 0.27 0 – 5 
EN9 4.51 7 231 2 3 1 1 0 0.06 0 – 4  
EN10 4.51 32 206 7 7 12 3 3 0.35 0 – 5 
Water 0.23 0 – 10  
EN11 4 14 224 5 3 4 0 2 0.14 0 – 5 
EN12 4 14 224 5 7 0 1 1 0.12 0 – 5 
EN13 4 8 230 2 3 2 0 1 0.08 0 – 5 
EN14 4 16 222 4 6 3 2 1 0.16 0 – 5 
EN15 4 4 234 0 3 0 0 1 0.05 0 – 5 
Table 6.4: Environmental disclosure in Chinese listed companies by categories (N = 238) (Cont’d) 
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Category CSDPI No. of 
reporting 
companies  
No. of 
non-reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 1 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 2 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 3 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 4 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 5 
reporting 
companies 
Mean per 
company 
(per 
indicator) 
Range 
Biodiversity   0.11 0 – 20  
EN16 4.46 64 174 16 21 11 8 8 0.68 0 – 5 
EN17 4.46 66 172 20 20 11 8 7 0.67 0 – 5 
EN18 4.46 96 142 37 27 16 10 6 0.88 0 – 5 
EN19 4.46 30 208 8 10 8 2 2 0.29 0 – 5 
EN20 4.46 40 198 13 12 10 3 2 0.37 0 – 5 
Emissions 0.58 0 – 25  
EN21 4.48 61 177 23 15 11 4 8 0.60 0 – 5 
EN22 4.48 54 184 16 17 10 6 5 0.54 0 – 5 
EN23 4.48 6 232 1 1 2 2 0 0.07 0 – 4  
EN24 4.48 2 236 0 1 1 0 0 0.02 0 – 3  
EN25 4.48 4 234 0 0 0 1 3 0.08 0 – 5 
Effluents and Waste 0.26 0 – 16  
EN26 4 93 145 26 27 17 12 11 0.98 0 – 5 
EN27 4 60 178 21 21 11 3 3 0.54 0 – 5 
Products and services 0.76 0 – 10  
EN28 4.35 6 232 1 2 2 0 1 0.07 0 – 5 
Table 6.4: Environmental disclosure in Chinese listed companies by categories (N = 238) (Cont’d) 
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Category CSDPI No. of 
reporting 
companies  
No. of 
non-reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 1 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 2 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 3 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 4 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 5 
reporting 
companies 
Mean per 
company 
(per 
indicator) 
Range 
Compliance 0.07 0 – 5 
EN29 4 19 219 0 10 3 1 5 0.24 0 – 5 
Transport 0.24 0 – 5 
EN30  4 110 128 14 37 29 15 15 1.30 0 – 5 
Overall 1.30 0 – 5 
EN31 4 39 199 16 12 6 2 3 0.34 0 – 5 
Supplier environmental assessment 0.34 0 – 5 
EN32 4 9 229 5 4 0 0 0 0.05 0 – 2  
Environmental grievance 0.05 0 – 2 
AQn3 4 11 227 7 3 0 1 0 0.07 0 – 4  
AQn4 4 166 72 33 61 30 24 18 1.81 0 – 5 
Additional environmental indicators 0.91 0 – 8  
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6.42 Best-reported indicators in environmental disclosure  
    Table 6.5 shows the ranking order of the indicators for environmental disclosure. There 
were 34 indicators in total, including two additional indicators suggested by report users.  The 
rank was measured by total score for CSDPI or mean values for CSDPI. This is because both 
the users’ perceived importance and the disclosure quality had to be taken into consideration. 
‘WEn’ means weighted environmental indicators.  
    As seen from table 6.5, AQn4 showed the highest average quality of environmental 
disclosure. AQn4 is additional indicator 4, in which companies needed to disclose “an overview 
of environmental impact” that occurred in 2013. It had a total score of 1724 and an average of 
7.24. A total of 69.75% of the sample companies disclosed information for this indictor. The 
reason could be the broad definition of this indicator. AQn4 was the indicator with the most 
scores of 5, 4, 3 and 2, suggesting that the quality of disclosure was higher than the other 
indicators. WEn30 was the second-most disclosed indicator in environmental information, with 
a mean of 5.21, and 46.22% of the sample companies disclosed this item. EN30 required 
companies to disclose “total environmental protection expenditures and investments by type”. 
As with the previous discussion, many companies not in high-profile industries chose to 
disclose this item because of spending that occurred on environmental protection. WEn5 (4.27) 
and WEn7 (3.94) also obtained considerably high average quality disclosure, and 43.28% and 
42.86% of sample companies disclosed these items. EN5 reported “energy saved due to 
conservation and efficiency improvements” and EN7 reported “initiatives to reduce indirect 
energy consumption and reductions achieved”.  
    WEn26 described “initiatives to mitigate environmental impacts of products and services, 
and extent of impact mitigation”. It was the fifth-most highly disclosed indicator, with a mean 
of 3.93 and 39.08% disclosing rate. However, it is interesting to note that the total score by GRI 
for this indicator was 234, which was higher than the fourth-most highly disclosed indicator 
WEn7, and it was still ranked at a lower level. According to table 5.4, the perceived importance 
for WEn7 and WEn26 were 4.2 and 4 respectively. Consequently, when comparing the total 
scores by CSDPI between the two, the results of WEn7 outweighed those of WEn26 
105 
 
considerably. Similarly, for WEn4 and WEn17, due to the impact from CSDPI, there was some 
degree of influence on their mean values, which affected their rank order. 
    Indicators that ranked 22 and below showed their quality as being inadequate, and they 
were minor items. Interestingly, AQn3 obtained a mean of 0.29, and only 4.62% companies 
disclosed. This once again shows an inverse relationship between disclosure quality and users’ 
perceived importance. 
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Table 6.5: Ranking of environmental indicators  
Rank Environmental 
indicators 
Total score by 
CSDPI 
Total score by GRI Mean by CSDPI per 
company 
% of firms disclosing 
1 AQn4 1724 N/P 7.24 69.75 
2 WEn30 1240 310 5.21 46.22 
3 WEn5 1016 242 4.27 43.28 
4 WEn7 936.6 223 3.94 42.86 
5 WEn26 936 234 3.93 39.08 
6 WEn18 932 209 3.92 40.34 
7 WEn6 848.4 202 3.56 38.24 
8 WEn3 739.2 176 3.11 30.26 
9 WEn16 726.98 163 3.05 26.89 
10 WEn17 713.6 160 3.00 27.73 
11 WEn4 693 165 2.91 28.99 
12 WEn21 636.16 142 2.67 25.63 
13 WEn22 577.92 129 2.42 22.69 
14 WEn27 512 128 2.15 25.21 
15 WEn20 396.94 89 1.67 16.81 
16 WEn10 378.84 84 1.59 13.45 
17 WEn31 324 81 1.36 16.39 
18 WEn19 312.2 70 1.31 12.6 
19 WEn1 296 74 1.24 13.87 
20 WEn8 288.64 64 1.21 10.92 
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Table 6.5: Rank of environmental indicators (Cont’d) 
Rank Environmental 
indicators 
Total score by 
CSDPI 
Total score by GRI Mean by CSDPI per 
company 
% of firms disclosing 
21 WEn2 248 62 1.04 11.76 
22 WEn29 232 58 0.97 7.98 
23 WEn14 152 38 0.64 6.72 
24 WEn11 132 33 0.55 5.88 
25 WEn12 112 28 0.47 5.88 
26 WEn25 85.12 19 0.36 1.68 
27 WEn23 76.16 17 0.32 2.52 
28 WEn13 76 19 0.32 3.36 
29 WEn28 69.6 16 0.29 2.52 
30 AQn3 68 N/P 0.29 4.62 
31 WEn9 67.65 15 0.28 2.94 
32 WEn32 52 13 0.22 3.78 
33 WEn15 44 11 0.18 1.68 
34 WEn24 22.4 5 0.09 0.84 
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6.5 Social sustainability disclosure analyses 
6.51 Social disclosure by categories 
    There are four main aspects in GRI social disclosure initiatives – “Labour practice and 
decent work”, “Human rights”, “Society” and “Product responsibility”. All four subcategories 
were considered under social sustainability disclosure, where the total number of indicators in 
social disclosure is 49, including one extra indicator suggested by the financial analysts 
regarding “sexism”. It was determined by whether a company had a specific section about equal 
rights for males and females.  
    Table 6.6 shows the results of descriptive statistics, in which CSDPI, frequencies of reports 
of different quality, average quality of reports and range are included. The table also includes 
the number of companies that disclosed. With regard to “Labour practice and decent work” 
(LA), overall for average quality disclosed per company, the extent of social disclosure is 
considerably low. As the quality was measured in an ordinal scale from 0 to 5, the highest score 
obtained was 1.85 from LA1 in the “Employment” subcategory, which is just above the score 
for simply disclosed. LA1 describes “total workforce by employment type, employment 
contract, and region, broken down by gender”. A total of 148 companies disclosed this indicator, 
but mostly it was in brief words, not in specific sections. Although the disclosure rate was more 
than 50%, the scores obtained are evidently low on average. The second-most disclosed 
indicator is LA11, with 1.82 scores in the “Training and education” subcategory. The number of 
reporting companies for LA11 is slightly more than that of LA1; however, the mean value is 
lower, indicating the quality of LA11 is considerably low. LA8, LA12 and LA10 from 
“Occupational health and safety” and “Training and education are the last three indicators with 
means greater than 1 under “Labour practice and decent work”, in which the average quality of 
these indicators is 1.22, 1.16 and 1.02 respectively.  
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    There are two least-reported indicators – LA15, “return to work and retention rates after 
parental leave, by gender” and LA5, “minimum notice period(s) regarding operational changes, 
including whether it is specified in collective agreements”. They both had 0.2 for the means and 
minimal values of the disclosure rate. Similarly to the previous sections, it is evident that an 
inverse relationship between report users’ perceived importance and the quality of disclosures 
can be observed in social LA aspects, to some extent.  
    With regard to “Human rights” (HR), there is only one indicator with a mean above 1, of 
the 12 total indicators. HR8 describes “percentage of security personnel trained in the 
organisation’s policies or procedures concerning aspects of human rights that are relevant to 
operations”, with an average quality of 1.31. The remaining indicators from this aspect mostly 
score below 0.5, which leads to the overall HR mean of 0.21, which is the worst-reported main 
category among the four.  
    There are 12 and 9 indicators for “Society” (SO) and “Product responsibility” (PR) 
respectively, and their means are 0.4 and 0.42, which are slightly more than HR. Similarly, they 
both have one indicator with a mean above 1. For SO, indicator 6 regarding “total value of 
financial and in-kind contributions to political parties, politicians, and related institutions by 
country” has an average quality of 2.19, which is the highest score in the category. Interestingly, 
it was perceived as the second-least important indicator in SO. With regard to PR, indicator 5 
about “practices related to customer satisfaction, including results of surveys measuring 
customer satisfaction” obtains the highest average quality. Similarly, PR5 from the subcategory 
“product and service labelling” was not perceived as important as the other indicators. The 
least-reported indicators for these aspects are SO7 and PR9, and the means and CSDPI scores 
for these indicators are 0.03 and 0.02, and 3.88 and 4.25 respectively.  
    In general, similarly to economic and environmental disclosure, indicators in social 
sustainability disclosure mostly show inverse relationships between the quality of disclosure and 
users’ perceived importance. It is evident from the results that the majority of highly-disclosed 
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items have relatively low CSDPI scores. However, according to these results, the least-reported 
indicators, such as SO7, HR12 and LA15, do not necessarily have high CSDPI values. It is 
interesting that the results show such trends, but as this study did not purely focus on the 
relationship between these two factors, there is no further analysis of this.       
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Table 6.6: Social disclosure in Chinese listed companies by categories (N = 238) 
Category CSDPI No. of 
reporting 
companies  
No. of 
non-reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 1 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 2 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 3 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 4 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 5 
reporting 
companies 
Mean per 
company 
(per 
indicator) 
Range 
LA1 3.86 148 90 27 37 27 27 30 1.85 0 – 5  
LA2 3.86 73 165 26 25 12 8 2 0.65 0 – 5 
LA3 3.86 62 176 23 17 10 7 5 0.59 0 – 5 
LA15 3.86 24 214 11 5 5 3 0 0.20 0 – 4  
Employment 0.82 0 – 15  
LA4 4 114 124 53 42 16 0 3 0.84 0 – 5 
LA5 4 27 211 12 12 1 2 0 0.20 0 – 4  
Labour/management relationship 0.52 0 – 9  
LA6 4.22 48 190 16 13 12 4 3 0.46 0 – 5 
LA7 4.22 80 158 41 22 11 4 2 0.61 0 – 5 
LA8 4.22 121 117 32 37 30 15 7 1.22 0 – 5 
LA9 4.22 60 178 12 19 15 9 5 0.66 0 – 5 
Occupational health and safety 0.74 0 – 20  
LA10 4 96 142 29 25 19 8 15 1.02 0 – 5 
LA11 4 169 69 36 58 39 15 21 1.82 0 – 5 
LA12 4 119 119 25 46 38 4 6 1.16 0 – 5 
Training and education 1.34 0 – 15  
LA13 3.81 72 166 27 21 18 2 4 0.63 0 – 5 
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Table 6.6: Social disclosure in Chinese listed companies by categories (N = 238) (Cont’d) 
Category CSDPI No. of 
reporting 
companies  
No. of 
non-reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 1 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 2 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 3 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 4 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 5 
reporting 
companies 
Mean per 
company 
(per 
indicator) 
Range 
Diversity and equal opportunity 0.63 0 – 5 
LA14 4 40 198 10 16 9 1 4 0.39 0 – 5 
Equal remuneration for women and men 0.39 0 – 5 
AQn5 4 40 198 13 12 5 3 7 0.42 0 – 5 
Additional social indicator 0.42 0 – 5 
Labour practice and decent work 0.82 0 – 55  
HR1 3.79 36 202 11 11 11 3 0 0.33 0 – 4  
HR2 3.79 33 205 14 16 2 1 0 0.24 0 – 4  
HR3 3.79 33 205 11 16 3 2 1 0.27 0 – 5  
Investment 0.28 0 – 10  
HR4 3.84 6 232 2 2 1 1 0 0.05 0 – 4  
Non-discrimination 0.05 0 – 4  
HR5 3.81 10 228 7 1 1 1 0 0.07 0 – 4  
Freedom of association and collective bargaining 0.07 0 – 4  
HR6 4.16 7 231 5 2 0 0 0 0.04 0 – 2  
Child labour 0.04 0 – 2  
HR7 4 14 224 6 4 2 1 1 0.12 0 – 5  
Forced or compulsory labour 0.12 0 – 5  
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Table 6.6: Social disclosure in Chinese listed companies by categories (N = 238) (Cont’d) 
Category CSDPI No. of 
reporting 
companies  
No. of 
non-reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 1 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 2 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 3 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 4 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 5 
reporting 
companies 
Mean per 
company 
(per 
indicator) 
Range 
HR8 4.16 127 111 30 37 40 12 8 1.31 0 – 5  
Security practice 1.31 0 – 5  
HR9 3.81 4 234 2 0 0 1 1 0.05 0 – 5  
Indigenous rights 0.05 0 – 5  
HR10 3.78 4 234 1 1 2 0 0 0.04 0 – 3  
Assessment 0.04 0 – 3  
HR11 3.62 2 236 1 0 1 0 0 0.02 0 – 3  
Supplier human rights assessment 0.02 0 – 3  
HR12 3.78 2 236 1 1 0 0 0 0.01 0 – 2  
Human rights grievance mechanisms 0.01 0 – 2  
Human rights 0.21 0 – 17  
SO1 3.76 79 159 28 30 11 6 4 0.69 0 – 5  
SO9 3.76 25 213 13 6 5 1 0 0.18 0 – 4  
SO10 3.76 31 207 19 8 3 1 0 0.20 0 – 4  
Local community 0.36 0 – 13  
SO2 4 23 215 4 12 5 1 1 0.22 0 – 5 
SO3 4 35 203 4 16 10 3 2 0.37 0 – 5 
SO4 4 38 200 11 12 9 5 1 0.37 0 – 5 
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Table 6.6: Social disclosure in Chinese listed companies by categories (N = 238) (Cont’d) 
Category CSDPI No. of 
reporting 
companies  
No. of 
non-reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 1 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 2 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 3 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 4 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 5 
reporting 
companies 
Mean per 
company 
(per 
indicator) 
Range 
Anti-corruption 0.32 0 – 11 
SO5 3.81 29 209 10 11 6 1 1 0.25 0 – 5 
SO6 3.81 177 61 23 41 58 33 22 2.19 0 – 5 
Public policy 1.22 0 – 10  
SO7 3.88 4 234 2 1 1 0 0 0.03 0 – 3  
Anti-competitive behaviour 0.03 0 – 3  
SO8 4.16 8 230 5 1 0 2 0 0.06 0 – 4  
Compliance 0.06 0 – 4  
SO11 3.71 24 214 13 5 4 0 2 0.19 0 – 5  
Supplier assessment for impacts on society 0.19 0 – 5  
SO12 4 7 231 2 3 0 2 0 0.07 0 – 4  
Grievance mechanism for impacts on society 0.07 0 – 4  
Society 0.40 0 – 27  
PR1 4.36 81 157 23 26 20 8 4 0.79 0 – 5  
PR2 4.36 16 222 7 3 5 1 0 0.13 0 – 4  
Customer health and safety 0.46 0 – 9  
PR3 4 37 201 6 20 10 1 0 0.34 0 – 4  
PR4 4 18 220 5 9 3 1 0 0.15 0 – 4  
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Table 6.6: Social disclosure in Chinese listed companies by categories (N = 238) (Cont’d) 
Category CSDPI No. of 
reporting 
companies  
No. of 
non-reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 1 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 2 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 3 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 4 
reporting 
companies 
No. of 
quality 5 
reporting 
companies 
Mean per 
company 
(per 
indicator) 
Range 
PR5 4 105 133 19 25 29 12 20 1.28 0 – 5  
Product and service labelling 0.58 0 – 10  
PR6 3.83 89 149 33 37 13 3 3 0.73 0 – 5  
PR7 3.83 46 192 30 12 3 1 0 0.28 0 – 4  
Marketing communications 0.51 0 – 8  
PR8 4.31 7 231 2 1 2 2 0 0.08 0 – 4  
Customer privacy 0.08 0 – 4  
PR9 4.25 3 235 2 1 0 0 0 0.02 0 – 2  
Compliance 0.02 0 – 2  
Product responsibility 0.42 0 – 24  
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6.52 Best-reported indicators in social disclosure 
    The ranking order of 49 social indicators is presented in table 6.7. The mean value by 
CSDPI per company indicates the ranked positions for the quality of indicators disclosed by the 
companies. There are three most significant indicators in social disclosure, which are SO6, 
LA11 and LA1. As discussed, the CSDPI values for the three indicators are relatively low, with 
3.81, 4 and 3.86 respectively for SO6, LA11 and LA1. However, their extents of disclosure are 
quite sound, with average quality by CSDPI of 8.34, 7.29 and 7.14. Many companies reported 
CSD with quality greater than 3. For instance, 113, 75 and 84 companies disclosed SO6, LA11 
and LA1 with scores more than 3 by GRI.  
    There are another five indicators that are considered well-reported because their means by 
CSDPI per company are greater than 4, meaning that they are more than the indicators for 
simply being present in disclosure. These indicators are: HR8, LA8, PR5, LA12 and LA10. 
HR8 is from the “security practices” subcategory, and it describes “percentage of security 
personnel trained in the organisation’s policies or procedures concerning aspects of human 
rights that are relevant to operations”; LA8 is from the “occupational health and safety” 
sub-category, and it is to show “education, training, counselling, prevention, and risk-control 
programs in place to assist workforce members, their families, or community members 
regarding serious diseases”; PR5, under “product and service labelling”, describes “practices 
related to customer satisfaction, including results of surveys measuring customer satisfaction”. 
LA12 and LA10 are both from the “training and education” subcategory, and they describe 
“percentage of employees receiving regular performance and career development reviews, by 
gender” and “average hours of training per year per employee by gender, and by employee 
category”, respectively.  
    The remaining indicators are not considered to be important or highly-disclosed items, in 
terms of their mean per company and total score by CSDPI. Several indicators obtained means 
of less than 0.1, showing that these indicators are approaching the level of not being disclosed. 
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However, it is interesting that all social indicators were disclosed in companies’ stand-alone 
reports, even though they were considerably low in quality in reports.  
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Table 6.7: Ranking of social indicators 
Rank Social indicators Total score by 
CSDPI 
Total score by GRI Mean by CSDPI per 
company 
% of firms disclosing 
1 WSO6 1985 521 8.34 0.74 
2 WLA11 1736 434 7.29 0.71 
3 WLA1 1698 440 7.14 0.62 
4 WHR8 1298 312 5.45 0.53 
5 WLA8 1228 304 5.16 0.51 
6 WPR5 1216 304 5.11 0.44 
7 WLA12 1108 291 4.66 0.5 
8 WLA10 972 277 4.08 0.40 
9 WPR1 815 243 3.43 0.34 
10 WLA4 800 200 3.36 0.47 
11 WPR6 663 187 2.78 0.32 
12 WLA9 658 173 2.77 0.25 
13 WSO1 620 165 2.61 0.33 
14 WLA7 608 156 2.55 0.33 
15 WLA2 594 154 2.50 0.30 
16 WLA13 575 151 2.42 0.30 
17 WLA3 540 144 2.27 0.26 
18 WLA6 460 140 1.93 0.20 
19 WAQ5 396 N/P 1.66 0.17 
20 WLA14 372 93 1.56 0.17 
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Table 6.7: Ranking of social indicators (Cont’d) 
Rank Social indicators Total score by 
CSDPI 
Total score by GRI Mean by CSDPI per 
company 
% of firms disclosing 
21 WSO3 352 88 1.48 0.14 
22 WSO4 348 87 1.46 0.15 
23 WPR3 320 80 1.34 0.15 
24 WHR1 296 78 1.24 0.15 
25 WPR7 257 67 1.08 0.19 
26 WHR3 246 65 1.04 0.13 
27 WSO5 225 59 0.94 0.12 
28 WHR2 212 56 0.89 0.13 
29 WSO2 208 52 0.87 0.09 
30 WLA5 188 48 0.79 0.11 
31 WLA15 185 48 0.78 0.10 
32 WSO10 180 47 0.76 0.13 
33 WSO11 167 45 0.70 0.10 
34 WSO9 165 44 0.70 0.10 
35 WPR4 144 36 0.61 0.07 
36 WPR2 140 32 0.59 0.07 
37 WHR7 116 29 0.49 0.06 
38 WPR8 78 18 0.33 0.03 
39 WSO12 64 16 0.27 0.03 
40 WSO8 62 16 0.26 0.03 
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Table 6.7: Ranking of social indicators (Cont’d) 
Rank Social indicators Total score by 
CSDPI 
Total score by GRI Mean by CSDPI per 
company 
% of firms disclosing 
41 WHR5 61 15 0.26 0.04 
42 WHR4 50 13 0.21 0.03 
43 WHR9 42 11 0.18 0.02 
44 WHR6 37 9 0.16 0.03 
45 WHR10 34 9 0.14 0.02 
46 WSO7 27 7 0.11 0.02 
47 WPR9 17 4 0.07 0.01 
48 WHR11 14 4 0.06 0.01 
49 WHR12 11 3 0.05 0.01 
121 
 
6.6 Reported corporate sustainability disclosure by category 
    Table 6.8 shows a combined ranking order of economic, environmental and social 
sustainability disclosure by categories, measured by average quality of disclosure per indicator. 
These are ranked on a per-indicator basis, because there are different numbers of indicators in 
each category. As can be seen from the rank order, it is apparent that only 5 categories by GRI 
obtained an average quality above 1 per indicator, showing that the quality of CSD in the 
sample Chinese listed companies is generally low. The quality was examined based on 
companies’ stand-alone reports; it is not possible to measure the extent of CSD as a whole as the 
companies would definitely disclosure sustainable information in their stand-alone CSD; 
however, it is evident from the rank order that the quality of CSD reporting in Chinese listed 
companies was still at the embryonic stage in 2013.  
    In the disclosed categories, the best-reported category is “indirect economic impact” under 
economic disclosure, with an average quality of disclosure of 1.84 – significantly higher than 
the second-highest indicator, “training and education” from social disclosure, by 0.5. “Security 
practice”, “environment overall” and “public policy” are also ranked in the top five indicators, 
with average quality values of 1.31, 1.3 and 1.22 respectively. The rest of the categories are not 
considered, because their average quality is below 1, meaning that the extent of disclosure is 
slightly more than being omitted. Compared to the rank order of users’ perceived importance, 
the “most important” category ranked 28th in terms of average quality of disclosure, whereas 
“indirect economic impact” was ranked 45th out of 47. Nevertheless, this is not significant 
because “training and education”, “security practice” and “environmental overall” were 
perceived as moderately important, with rank positions of 13, 10 and 13 for users’ perceived 
importance respectively. Therefore, it is difficult to determine the relationship between the 
quality of disclosure and the importance by visualisation, but it does show a general trend of a 
possible inverse relationship between the two.  
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Table 6.8: Ranking of corporate sustainability disclosure by categories  
CSD category Rank (average 
quality of 
disclosure) 
Rank (users’ 
perceived 
importance) 
Type of CSD 
Indirect Economic 
impact 
1 (1.84) 45 (3.69) economic 
Training and education 2 (1.34) 13 (4) social 
Security practice 3 (1.31) 10 (4.16) social 
Overall 4 (1.3) 13 (4) environmental 
Public policy 5 (1.22) 36 (3.81) social 
Economic Performance 6 (0.95) 13 (4) economic 
Environmental 
additional questions 
7 (0.91) 13 (4) environmental 
Energy 8 (0.85) 9 (4.2) environmental 
Employment 9 (0.82) 33 (3.86) social 
Products and services 10 (0.76) 13 (4) environmental 
Occupational health 
and safety 
11 (0.74) 8 (4.22) social 
Diversity and equal 
opportunity 
12 (0.63) 36 (3.81) social 
Emissions 13 (0.58) 3 (4.46) environmental 
Product and service 
labelling 
13 (0.58) 13 (4) social 
Labour/management 
relationship 
15 (0.52) 13 (4) social 
Marketing 
communications 
16 (0.51) 35 (3.83) social 
Customer health and 
safety 
17 (0.46) 4 (4.36) social 
Market Presence 18 (0.45) 32 (3.87) economic 
Equal remuneration for 
women and men 
19 (0.42) 13 (4) social 
Additional social 
questions 
19 (0.42) 13 (4) social 
Local community 21 (0.36) 43 (3.76) social 
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Table 6.8: Ranking of corporate sustainability disclosure by categories (Cont’d) 
CSD category Rank (average 
quality of 
disclosure) 
Rank (users’ 
perceived 
importance) 
Type of CSD 
Supplier 
environmental 
assessment 
22 (0.34) 13 (4) environmental 
Anti-corruption 23 (0.32) 13 (4) social 
Materials 24 (0.29) 13 (4) environmental 
Investment 25 (0.28) 40 (3.79) social 
Effluents and Waste 26 (0.26) 2 (4.48) environmental 
Transport 27 (0.24) 13 (4) environmental 
Procurement Practice 28 (0.23) 46 (3.64) economic 
Water 28 (0.23) 1 (4.51) environmental 
Supplier assessment 
for impact on society 
30 (0.19) 44 (3.71) social 
Additional Eco 
questions 
31 (0.16) 13 (4) economic 
Forced or 
compulsory labour 
32 (0.12) 13 (4) social 
Biodiversity 33 (0.11) 13 (4) environmental 
Customer privacy 34 (0.08) 6 (4.31) social 
Compliance 35 (0.07) 5 (4.35) environmental 
Freedom of 
association and 
collective bargaining 
35 (0.07) 13 (4) social 
Grievance 
mechanism for 
impacts on society 
35 (0.07) 36 (3.81) social 
Compliance 38 (0.06) 10 (4.16) social 
Environmental 
grievance 
39 (0.05) 13 (4) environmental 
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Table 6.8: Ranking of corporate sustainability disclosure by categories (Cont’d) 
CSD category Rank (average 
quality of 
disclosure) 
Rank (users’ 
perceived 
importance) 
Type of CSD 
Non-discrimination 39 (0.05) 34 (3.84) social 
Indigenous rights 39 (0.05) 36 (3.81) social 
Child labour 42 (0.04) 10 (4.16) social 
Assessment 42 (0.04) 41 (3.78) social 
Anti-competitive 
behaviour 
44 (0.03) 31 (3.88) social 
Supplier human 
rights assessment 
45 (0.02) 7 (4.25) social 
Compliance 45 (0.02) 47 (3.62) social 
Human rights 
grievance 
mechanisms 
47 (0.01) 41 (3.78) social 
6.7 Findings and discussion 
    In general, as the results showed, the quality of information disclosed varied across 
different types of disclosure, where economic sustainability information was disclosed with 
much higher quality than environmental and social disclosure. This was determined by the 
average quality per indicator of each type of disclosure. Economic disclosure obtained the 
highest average quality of 0.905, followed by social disclosure (0.50) and environmental 
disclosure (0.43), and these eventually lead to the average quality of CSD of 0.55 by GRI. 
These results indicate that the status of corporate sustainability reporting in China was 
considerably low, as the scores were given based on an ordinal scale from ‘0’ to ‘5’. All 
sustainability disclosure was scored below 1, suggesting that, on average, corporate 
sustainability information was disclosed just above the level of information being omitted. The 
results also suggest that there was no significant difference in terms of quality among economic, 
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environmental and social disclosure, even though economic information was disclosed to a 
slightly greater extent.      
    Environmental and social information were often disclosed together in corporate 
sustainability reporting, and they were often considered a form of disclosure in many existing 
CSD studies (Guanawan, Djajadikerta and Smith, 2009; Setyorini and Ishak, 2012). In 2006, 
the central regions stock exchange market in China, the Shenzhen Security Exchange, issued 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZX) Guidelines on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
based on the laws, standards, regulations, rules under the supervision of the Chinese 
Governments (Wang, Qin & Cui, 2010), and provided guidelines for both environmental and 
social information as a whole. This may explain why the quality of environmental and social 
disclosure was shown to be at the same level.  
    Interestingly, the CSD disclosing rate among the sample companies was 100%, and the 
rates were 99.6%, 69.7% and 99.6% for economic, environmental and social disclosure 
respectively, where environmental disclosure was reported to a lesser extent. This indicates that 
companies which are not in environmentally sensitive industries might choose not to disclose. 
In addition, the Chinese National Environmental Protection Agency published the Bulletin on 
Disclosure of Corporate Environmental Performance in 2003, which mandated disclosure of 
environmental information for two types of companies. First, companies that discharged 
pollutants above levels indicated by the government must report relevant environmental 
information from the previous year by March every year (Bai et al., 2015). The second type 
includes companies in 13 selected industrial sectors when applying for public listing or 
refinancing exchange markets. As indicated by the executive orders of 2010 and 2013 issued by 
the Chinese National Environmental Protection Agency, these companies must have their 
environmental reports audited and show their publicised environmental audit reports (CSMAR, 
2013). This explains the relatively low rate of environmental disclosure, compared with the other 
two categories. In addition, when looking specifically into categories, general environmental 
information was disclosed to a much better extent than specific environmental information. The 
policies from the government also explain why the quality of general environmental information 
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is higher than the other categories. According to Stakeholder Theory, as companies were driven 
by external pressures, stakeholders’ power from the government extensively influenced 
management strategy and attitudes to CSD practices, resulting in a higher quality of general 
environmental information (Shan & Taylor, 2014). Therefore, companies that were in these 
industries would be more likely to disclose environmental information, as a way to alleviate the 
government’s environmental concerns (Zeng, Xu, Yin and Tam, 2012). However, environmental 
information that was not encouraged to be disclosed from the government, or related to 
significant social events, was less like to be disclosed.  
    Moreover, information regarding energy was disclosed considerably well in environmental 
disclosure. This is because the Chinese government set goals for energy saving and carbon 
reduction in its 12th five-year plan, and enacted the Circular Economy Promotion Law in 2009. 
These were being undertaken within the next five years, and still being adopted in 2013. As the 
listed firms were influenced by government policies, many firms tended to disclose information 
about their environmental management and practices in CSD, in order to show their stakeholders 
that they had been implementing sustainability, and they were compliant with the policies under a 
legitimate background. Therefore, the quality of “energy” information was higher than the other 
types of specific environmental information. 
    With respect to economic and social disclosure, information regarding economic impacts, 
economic performance, social security and product responsibility was disclosed to a higher level, 
which was primarily because of the change in government control and the effect of significant 
social events. In March 2013, Xi Jinping officially became the president of China, and completed 
a process that began in the previous fall, when he assumed the chairmanship of the Communist 
Party and the control of China’s Control Military Commission (CASS, 2016). While the president 
proved his successful consolidation by a series of initiatives tackling corruption, the party created 
two new governing task forces in the Third Plenary session in November 2013, which included 
economic development and national and social security. Due to the change of government 
leadership, companies were encouraged to have positive economic influences on the local area. 
This is crucial to explain why “indirect economic impact” and “economic performance” were 
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highly disclosed in sustainability reporting – due to the intensity of stakeholder power owned by 
the Chinese government, according to Stakeholder Theory. However, the users’ perceived 
importance of these categories were generally low, due to the fact that this was economic 
information which could be also obtained from annual reports. As additional costs would not be 
generated when producing this form of information, companies would be more likely to disclose 
such information.         
    “Training and education”, “security practice”, “employment” and “public policy” were 
ranked in the top 10 CSD categories with respect to information in social disclosure. The former 
three categories were described in “Labour and decent work” whereas the latter was included in 
“Product responsibility”. All four categories were disclosed with much higher quality than to 
the other social categories, due to their being affected by mandatory requirements in annual 
reporting and it subsequent effect on CSD, as well as influence caused by significant social 
events. Listed Chinese companies were required to disclose employees’ information in annual 
reports, particularly regarding the number of full-time and part-time employees, training or 
education provided, and any relevant information regarding compensation, welfare, 
superannuation and other related costs on employees (CSMAR, 2013). This essentially explains 
why information regarding “training and education”, “security practice” and “employment” was 
disclosed relatively well. Although this was a mandate on firms’ annual reports by the Chinese 
Security Commission, it was reported on a voluntary basis in CSD. However, according to 
Legitimacy theory, in order to fulfil their social contract, companies would implement a social 
responsibility to provide disclosure to a level of acceptance in the society where they operate. 
The Commission has the power to significantly influence listed companies, due to external 
political effects, therefore, even if requirements are not mandatory on the CSD level, companies 
may choose to disclose in order to alleviate concerns from the governing bodies. “Public policy” 
includes two indicators, where SO6 regarding “total value of financial and in-kind contributions 
to political parties, politicians, and related institutions by country” had a high value of average 
quality per company. Although it was included as a social indicator, the definition was 
extensively related to economic contributions to the political party in China. The high disclosure 
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quality once again explains that the quality of CSD in 2013 was mainly driven by government 
policies and political influences.   
    The relationship between the quality of CSD and the report users’ perceived importance of 
CSD was also shown in this chapter. Although a method of visualisation from the results was 
only adopted in this section, it was found that highly disclosed indicators were generally 
perceived as not so important by the report users. This was mainly due to the difference in 
interests between disclosing firms and financial analysts. As discussed in previous sections, 
firms are more likely to be driven by stakeholder power and the duty of fulfilling “social 
contracts” in the society in which they operate. They may also experience extensive political 
pressure and disclose information in order to alleviate political attention or concerns from the 
government. In opposition, the report users were interested in how and what type of 
sustainability information would reflect the performance of the company, and they considered 
how information would impact the society from a broader viewpoint, as well as its influence on 
other types of stakeholders (Lin, 2010). Therefore, the users’ perceived importance of CSD was 
influenced by government policies and significance social events. The results showed that more 
importantly-perceived categories, such as “water”, “emissions”, “effluents and waste”, 
“compliance” and “supplier human rights assessment” were generally disclosed badly. These 
areas were in fact sensitive social issues which concerned the Chinese community since 2006 
with the milk power scandal, and China’s long-term environmental issues. Due to companies’ 
reluctance to disclose sensitive information, it is evident that the report users were more 
interested in this type of information (Yeh et al., 2011). However, as the scope of this study is 
not to investigate the correlations between these two factors, further analyses were not 
considered in the study.  
To summarise, there are four primary findings in this chapter. First, the quality of CSD in 
Chinese listed companies in 2013 was generally low, just more than the information simply 
being disclosed. Second, the quality and the extent of disclosure did not vary much across CSD, 
and these factors need to be examined together while investigating corporate sustainability as a 
whole. In addition, well disclosed corporate sustainability information from the sample 
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companies was mainly driven by government policies, and political influence played a 
significant role in affecting the quality of CSD. Lastly, there was a difference between the 
purposes of the companies for issuing CSD and the interests of the financial analysts who were 
the report users, i.e., well disclosed information was generally not perceived as so important by 
the users. This was because the users were also affected by the interests of other types of 
stakeholders.         
6.8 Summary 
    This chapter presented the quality of CSD in Chinese listed companies in 2013. Corporate 
economic sustainability disclosure, environmental disclosure and social disclosure were also 
examined separately in terms of categories where best-reported categories and indicators were 
specifically analysed. At the end of the chapter, the ranked order for quality of CSD was also 
compared with the ranking of report users’ perceived importance by visualisation, providing a 
general view of their relevance. The next chapter shows regression analyses of the quality of 
CSD. 
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Chapter 7 
Regression analyses and results 
7.1 Introduction 
    This chapter shows and discusses the outcomes of the statistical analyses of the hypotheses 
formulated in Chapter 3, and the research methodology described in Chapter 4, answering 
research questions 4 and 5. Overall, in accordance with the results, the associations between the 
qualities of CSD are only partially explained by the hypothesised theories. As eight models are 
derived from CSD, incorporating economic, environmental and social aspects, each model is 
explained separately in this chapter to show the outcomes from these models. Therefore, this 
chapter answers the fourth and the fifth research questions, regarding the drivers of the quality of 
CSD and the significance of the hypothesised theories. 
7.2 Descriptive statistics   
    Descriptive statistics were firstly employed to determine the central tendency and the 
distribution of the variables. This is a crucial and importance process for parametric analysis, 
due to the assumptions of normality, independence of errors, constant variance of error terms 
and non-collinearity in the data analysis. Indicators for the 10 independent variables and 8 
dependent variables were collected for descriptive statistics. These included mean, median, 
standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis.  
7.21 Normality check 
    Data normality is one of the major assumptions for most statistical analyses. Normality can 
be measured in a number of ways, both graphically and non-graphically (Stevens, 1992). A 
graphical approach to data normality can be done through observing the trends and distributions 
from histograms, boxplots and scatterplots, etc. Stevens (1992) stated that non-graphical 
measures are more convincing in terms of interpreting data normality, such as the combination 
of Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests that are often treated as the most powerful in 
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detecting data normality. As the panel data has a sample size greater than 100, normality can be 
determined by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, whereas the Shapiro-Wilk test requires a sample 
size of less than 100. Alternatively, data normality can also be tested by observing skewness or 
conducting a kurtosis test. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic with a Lilliefors significance 
level for testing normality is often produced with the normal probability of 90 and probability 
plots (Coakes et al., 2010). Data is recognised as normally distributed when the significance 
level is greater than 0.5, and it is acceptable if it approaches 0.5. This can also be confirmed by 
skewness and kurtosis tests, where skewness is acceptable when it falls between -1 and 1, and 
kurtosis when it falls between -2 and 2 (Coakes et al., 2010). 
7.22 Descriptive statistics for CSD in Chinese listed companies  
Table 7.1: Descriptive statistics for CSD in Chinese listed companies – raw data 
Variable Mean Median Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
IND 0.21 0.00 0.41 1.43 0.05 
AREA 0.41 0.00 0.49 0.36 -1.89 
AGE 13.52 14 5.92 0.00 -1.20 
GOWN 0.28 0.29 0.26 0.22 -1.42 
LOWN 0.68 1.00 0.47 -0.76 -1.44 
FOWN 0.54 0.00 0.13 3.04 10.38 
PERF 0.12 0.11 0.68 0.938 0.958 
CSE 4221907.84 1008596.5 8940606.37 3.797 16.01 
SIZE 2.36E11 1.22E10 1.407E12 8.818 83.277 
LEV 2.03 1.13 2.99 3.28 11.09 
CEco 9.36 8.00 6.23 1.61 3.70 
CEvn 15.66 7.5 19.01 1.68 2.79 
CSoc 23.86 16.00 21.10 1.65 3.01 
CSD 48.88 34.00 41.52 1.60 2.96 
WCEco 36.05 30.57 24.6 1.65 3.90 
WCEvn 65.82 30.96 80.58 1.68 2.75 
WCSoc 94.92 64.19 83.92 1.65 2.99 
WCSD 196.79 136.46 168.82 1.60 2.91 
 Note: N = 238 
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    Table 7.1 presents the results from descriptive statistics, and the distributions of the 
dependent and independent variables for the Chinese listed companies. It is evident from the 
table that most of the variables depart from normality. From a graphic approach, for 
independent variables, IND (industry type), AREA (company location), AGE (years that a 
company have been listed), GOWN (percentage of government ownership), LOWN (legal 
person ownership) and PERF (return on equity) satisfy the test of normality, where skewness is 
between -1 and 1, and kurtosis falls between -2 and 2. None of the dependent variables satisfy a 
graphic approach, because skewness and kurtosis results do not fall between the legitimate 
ranges. The results in table 7.2 show the data normality from a non-graphic test, confirming that 
the data departs from normality. Only 6 variables satisfy the test of normality, therefore, data 
transformation is required for the rest of the data. 
Table 7.2: Test of normality for CSD in Chinese listed companies – raw data 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Variable Statistic Sig. 
AREA 0.39 0.00 
AGE 0.10 0.00 
GOWN 0.20 0.00 
LOWN 0.43 0.00 
FOWN 0.40 0.00 
PERF 0.08 0.00 
CSE 0.32 0.00 
SIZE 0.46 0.00 
LEV 0.26 0.00 
CEco 0.14 0.00 
CEvn 0.21 0.00 
CSoc 0.17 0.00 
CSD 0.16 0.00 
WCEco 0.88 0.00 
WCEvn 0.79 0.00 
WCSoc 0.83 0.00 
WCSD 0.84 0.00 
Note: N = 238 
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7.3 Homoscedasticity, linearity and outliers 
    A visualisation approach to analysing homoscedasticity, which is an assumption of 
multivariate analysis, is often adopted by researchers. This includes looking at a particular scatter 
plot or residual histogram, which is indicated as the most informative approach. The assumption 
of multiple regressions is homogenetic, which is also called homoscedasticity in regressions. It is 
assumed that the difference between the obtained and predicted dependent variable scores are 
normally distributed (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). In addition, it is assumed that the residuals have a 
linear relationship with the predicted dependent variable scores, and the variance of the residuals 
is the same for all predicted scores. In order to detect this relationship, therefore, data 
homoscedasticity between the predicted dependent variable and the independent variables was 
performed by examining the residuals of scatter plots, which is the standardised regression 
residual against the standardised regression predicted value (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). Figure 7.1 
shows the scatterplot for testing homoscedasticity for the dependent variables. 
    Figure 7.1 presents the scatterplot for dependent variable CEco, which is the quality of 
economic disclosure by GRI. The graph suggests that homoscedasticity is rejected because a 
pattern cannot be seen from the scatterplot. The data is tighter at the start, from left to right, but it 
starts to disperse as it moves across to the right x-axis, and eventually falls apart. Therefore, the 
data for CEco is conventional heteroscedasticity. In general, homoscedasticity exists when there 
is a clear patter along the equation line, starting from the origin in the x-axis and y-axis, and the 
distance to the equation line between the data is approximately equivalent. Nevertheless, as 
indicated in the previous section, even though the variables do not violate the assumption of 
homoscedasticity, data transformation is required due to data normality.    
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Figure 7.1: Homoscedasticity for economic disclosure by GRI 
 
    Figure 7.2 through 7.8 show the scatterplots for dependent variables CEnv, CSoc, CSD, 
WCEco, WCEnv, WCSoc and WCSD. As seen from the graphs, the data for these variables 
disperse along the equation as they move along. Thus, the patterns of the dependent variables 
suggest that the variable of error terns were not constant, violating homoscedasticity. However, 
as was previously indicated, most of the data violates normal distribution, thus required data 
transformation.  
    Another purpose of a scatterplot is to show univariate outliers, which can be presented by 
visualising normal probability plots and scatter plots of each variable. There are a few outliers 
clearly shown in the figures. However, as the distribution of both independent and dependent 
variables was not normal, which violates the assumption of linearity, transformation of data was 
considered first, rather than deleting outliers to possibly improve data linearity. In addition, 
coding errors and missing data were checked by an experienced content analysis expert, and no 
errors were detected. Therefore, transformation of data was the first priority for data originality.  
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Figure 7.2: Homoscedasticity for environmental disclosure by GRI 
Figure 
7.3: Homoscedasticity for social disclosure by GRI
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Figure 7.4: Homoscedasticity for corporate sustainability disclosure by GRI 
 
Figure 7.5: Homoscedasticity for economic disclosure by CSDPI 
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Figure 7.6: Homoscedasticity for environmental disclosure by CSDPI 
 
Figure 7.7: Homoscedasticity for social disclosure by CSDPI 
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Figure 7.8 Homoscedasticity for corporate sustainability disclosure by CSDPI 
 
7.4 Transformation of data 
    Variables rarely conform to a classic normal distribution and, more often, distributions are 
skewed and display varying degrees of kurtosis. When skewness and kurtosis are extreme, 
transformation is an option. Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) suggest that data transformation can be 
conducted under square root, natural logarithmic or inverse transformation. As the results in the 
previous section show, data that required transformation is positively skewed, and therefore 
natural logarithmic transformation is used for these variables. Transformations were performed 
for both dependent and independent variables which did not have normal distribution in this 
study. Table 7.3 shows the transformation of data that was undertaken for each variable, and the 
results from descriptive statistics are shown in table 7.4. 
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Table 7.3: Data transformation for variables not normally distributed 
Variable Transformation 
CSE Log: LN(CSE) 
SIZE Log: LN(SIZE) 
LEV Log: LN(LEV) 
CEco Log: LN(CEco) 
CEnv Log: LN(CEnv) 
CSoc Log: LN(CSoc) 
CSD Log: LN(CSD) 
WCEco Log: LN(WCEco) 
WCEnv Log: LN(WCEnv) 
WCSoc Log: LN(WCSoc) 
WCSD Log: LN(WCSD) 
Note: N = 238 
    As the distribution of the data for CSE (charitable donation), SIZE (total asset), LEV (debt 
to equity ratio), CEco (economic disclosure by GRI), CEnv (environmental disclosure by GRI), 
CSoc (social disclosure by GRI), CSD (sustainability disclosure by GRI), WCEco (economic 
disclosure by CSDPI), WCEnv (environmental disclosure by CSDPI), WCSoc (social disclosure 
by CSDPI) and WCDS (sustainability disclosure by CSDPI) is severely positively skewed, 
natural logarithmic transformation was employed. As the results show, both skewness and 
kurtosis were reduced to close to normality. This was further confirmed by a 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, in which LN(LEV), LN(CSoc), LN(WCEnv), LN(CSD) and 
LN(WCSD) were found significant and assumed normality. The remaining variables are close 
to normality, which was confirmed by both graphic and non-graphic normality tests.      
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Table 7.4: Descriptive statistics for CSD in Chinese listed companies – data transformation 
Variable Mean Median Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
LN(CSE) 13.69 13.82 2.08 -0.59 0.48 
LN(SIZE) 23.38 23.22 1.79 1.153 2.024 
LN(LEV) 0.07 0.12 1.12 0.03 0.19 
LN(CEco) 2.02 2.08 0.69 -0.78 0.47 
LN(CEnv) 1.83 1.95 1.41 -0.03 -1.34 
LN(CSoc) 2.79 2.79 0.92 -0.35 -0.00 
LN(CSD) 3.55 3.53 0.86 -0.13 -0.57 
LN(WCEco) 3.37 3.42 0.71 -0.78 2.043 
LN(WCEnv) 3.10 3.39 1.80 -0.49 -0.9 
LN(WCSoc) 4.17 4.16 0.95 -0.56 1.03 
LN(WCSD) 4.93 4.91 0.87 -0.12 -0.59 
Note: N = 238 
Table 7.5: Test of normality – data transformation 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Variable Statistic Sig. 
LN(CSE) 0.08 0.00 
LN(SIZE) 0.08 0.00 
LN(LEV) 0.05 0.20* 
LN(CEco) 0.09 0.00 
LN(CEnv) .014 0.00 
LN(CSoc) 0.06 0.75* 
LN(CSD) 0.08 0.00 
LN(WCEco) 0.13 0.00 
LN(WCEnv) 0.06 0.06* 
LN(WCSoc) 0.05 0.20* 
LN(WCSD) 0.05 0.20* 
*Normality is assumed when the significance level is greater than 0.5. 
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7.5 Univariate statistics 
    Univariate analysis was employed to provide the relationships between the dependent 
and the independent variables (Coakes et al., 2010). In particular, it focuses on the correlation 
between the dichotomous variable and continuous variables, as well as the strength of the 
relationships and the possibility of multicollinearity (Field, 2009). Since collinearity is 
another important assumption in OLS regression models, Pearson Correlation between each 
independent variable was drawn first, to detect multicollinearity.  
7.51 Test of multicollinearity in a univariate setting  
    The presence of multicollinearity is considered to be problematic when analysing 
multivariate regressions. In this setting, a correlation matrix was employed to indicate the 
existence of multicollinearity. Coakes et al. (2010) suggest that multicollinearity is 
identified if any of the squared multiple correlations are near or equal to 1. Field (2009) 
further explains that if correlations are above 0.8 or 0.9, multicollinearity exists. 
Nonetheless, the inclusion of the offending variables needs to be reconsidered. Table 7.6 
presents the correlations between the independent variables in the univariate setting. As 
shown in the table, all variables obtained correlations less than 0.8. It is noted that LN(SIZE) 
and LN(LEV) were both statistically significant to the majority of the other independent 
variables. As discussed in Chapter 3, these two variables were control variables, because the 
results showed that they were significantly influential on many other indicators. This is 
consistent with many existing studies (Nie, 2009; Peng, 2007). Therefore, all independent 
variables do not include any harmful multicollinearity in the regression models. 
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Table 7.6: Test of multicollinearity – univariate 
  IND AREA AGE GOWN LOWN FOWN PERF LN(CSE) LN(SIZE) LN(LEV) 
IND Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
1          
AREA Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-0.03 
0.31 
1         
AGE Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-0.01 
0.42 
0.12* 
0.04 
1        
GOWN Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
0.09 
0.78 
0.13* 
0.02 
0.06 
0.18 
1       
LOWN Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
0.05 
0.23 
-0.04 
0.26 
0.02 
0.37 
-0.32** 
0.00 
1      
FOWN Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-0.08 
0.11 
0.03 
0.3 
-0.02 
0.41 
-0.04 
0.26 
-0.03 
0.33 
1     
PERF Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-0.06 
0.19 
0.09 
0.09 
0.018 
0.39 
-0.02 
0.40 
-0.03 
0.35 
-0.01 
0.42 
1    
LN(CSE) Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
0.06 
1.18 
0.01 
0.45 
0.01 
0.45 
0.00 
0.50 
-0.02 
0.38 
0.01 
0.42 
0.18** 
0.00 
1   
LN(SIZE) Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-0.09 
0.09 
0.36** 
0.00 
0.134* 
0.02 
0.39** 
0.00 
-0.14* 
0.01 
0.19** 
0.00 
0.12** 
0.03 
0.33** 
0.00 
1  
LN(LEV) Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-0.14* 
0.16 
0.27** 
0.00 
0.28** 
0.00 
0.29** 
0.00 
-0.14* 
0.02 
0.09 
0.08 
0.023 
0.36 
0.17** 
0.00 
0.70** 
0.00 
1 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed) 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)
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7.6 Univariate analysis 
    Pearson correlation was employed in this section to determine the relationships between 
the dependent and independent variables, including IND (industry type), AREA (company 
location), AGE (the number of years a company has been listed), GOWN (percentage of shares 
owned by the government), LOWN (legal-person ownership), FOWN (percentage of shares 
owned by foreign companies), PERF (ROE), CSE (charitable donation), SIZE (total asset), LEV 
(debt to equity ratio), CEco (economic disclosure by GRI), CEnv (environmental disclosure by 
GRI), CSoc (social disclosure by GRI), CSD (sustainability disclosure by GRI), WCEco 
(economic disclosure by CSD perceptions index), WCEnv (environmental disclosure by 
CSDPI), WCSoc (social disclosure by CSDPI) and WCDS (sustainability disclosure by CSDPI). 
Since there are 8 dependent variables which lead to 8 models, this section is divided into 
different subsections, and each model is examined individually. For Pearson correlation analysis, 
the absolute value of r is the determinants which indicate whether there are strong relationships 
between the predictor variables and the dependent variable. According to Cohen (1988), weak 
correlations exist when the absolute value of r falls between 0.1 and 0.299; moderate correlations 
exist when the absolute value of r falls between 0.3 and 0.499; strong correlations exist when the 
absolute value of r falls from 0.5 to 1. 
7.61 Pearson correlation for economic disclosure by GRI 
    As the results in table 7.7 show, LN (LEV) (debt to equity ratio) (r = 0.12) is the only 
variable which moderately correlated with the dependent variable LN (CEco). Two predictor 
variables show significant correlation with LN (CEco) – AREA (company location) (r = 0.22) 
and LN (SIZE) (r = 0.23). However, the other variables do not show any statistically significant 
relationship with LN (CEco). It is noted that the correlation of variables is statistically 
significant when the significance, which is the p value, is at 0.01 level, and it is moderately 
significant when it is at 0.05 level. The results from Pearson correlation indicate that LN (LEV), 
AREA and LN (SIZE) are significantly correlated with LN (CEco), whereas IND, AGE, 
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GOWN, LOWN, FOWN, PERF and LN (CSE) were not found to be statistically significant in 
the analysis. 
Table 7.7: Results from Pearson correlation – economic disclosure by GRI 
  Expected sign LN (CEco) 
IND Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.07 
0.15 
AREA Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.22** 
0.00 
AGE Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.07 
0.14 
GOWN Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.01 
0.48 
LOWN Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.04 
0.29 
FOWN Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.07 
0.13 
PERF Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.10 
0.44 
LN (CSE) Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.06 
0.18 
LN (SIZE) Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.23** 
0.00 
LN (LEV) Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.12* 
0.03 
Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 
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7.62 Pearson correlation for environmental disclosure by GRI 
    Table 7.8 shows Pearson correlations between the predictor variables and LN (CEnv). Four 
variables are moderately significant to LN (CEnv) at 0.05 level, which are IND (industry type) 
(r = 0.13), AREA (r = 0.12), AGE (firm age) (r = 0.11) and GOWN (percentage of shares 
owned by the government). Three variables are strongly correlated with LN (CEnv) – FOWN 
(percentage of shares owned by foreign companies), LN (SIZE) and LN (LEV). LOWN, PERF 
and LN (CSE) were found not significant in the analysis.    
Table 7.8: Results from Pearson correlation – environmental disclosure by GRI 
  Expected sign LN (CEnv) 
IND Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.13* 
0.02 
AREA Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.12* 
0.03 
AGE Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.11* 
0.05 
GOWN Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.15* 
0.01 
LOWN Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ -0.01 
0.42 
FOWN Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.22** 
0.00 
PERF Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.07 
0.13 
LN (CSE) Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.02 
0.38 
LN (SIZE) Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.25** 
0.00 
LN (LEV) Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.16** 
0.01 
Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 
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7.63 Pearson correlation for social disclosure by GRI 
    The results in table 7.9 show that three variables are strongly correlated with the dependent 
variable LN (CSoc) and only one variable shows moderate correlation. AREA, LN (SIZE) and 
LN (LEV) are significant, with r values of 0.21, 0.28 and 0.16, respectively. LN (CSE) 
(charitable donation) (r = 0.13) is moderately correlated with LN (CSoc). IND, AGE, GOWN, 
LOWN, FOWN and PERF are not statistically significant. 
Table 7.9: Results from Pearson correlation – social disclosure by GRI 
  Expected sign LN (CSoc) 
IND Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.06 
0.46 
AREA Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.21** 
0.00 
AGE Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.06 
0.16 
GOWN Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.04 
0.29 
LOWN Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ -0.03 
0.31 
FOWN Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.08 
0.12 
PERF Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.05 
0.23 
LN (CSE) Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.13* 
0.02 
LN (SIZE) Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.28** 
0.00 
LN (LEV) Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.16** 
0.01 
Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 
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7.64 Pearson correlation for corporate sustainability disclosure by GRI 
    Pearson correlation for CSD by GRI is shown in table 7.10, in which four variables, AREA 
(r = 0.20), FOWN (r = 0.16), LN (SIZE) (r = 0.27) and LN (LEV) (r = 0.16) were found to have 
strong correlations with the dependent variable LN (CSD). The rest of the variables, IND, AGE, 
GOWN, LOWN, PERF, and LN (CSE) were found statistically insignificant. 
Table 7.10: Results from Pearson correlation – corporate sustainability disclosure by GRI 
  Expected sign LN (CSD) 
IND Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.06 
0.19 
AREA Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.20** 
0.00 
AGE Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.08 
0.11 
GOWN Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.06 
0.29 
LOWN Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ -0.01 
0.48 
FOWN Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.16** 
0.01 
PERF Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.04 
0.28 
LN (CSE) Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.07 
0.13 
LN (SIZE) Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.27** 
0.00 
LN (LEV) Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.16** 
0.01 
Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 
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7.65 Pearson correlation for economic disclosure by CSDPI 
    Table 7.11 presents the correlation between the predictors and LN (WCEoc), which is 
economic disclosure by CSDPI. Only one variable, LN (LEV), was found to have a moderate 
correlation, with r = 0.13. LN (SIZE) (r = 0.23) and AREA (r = 0.22) are strongly correlated 
with the dependent variable. IND, AGE, GOWN, LOWN, FOWN, PERF and LN (CSE) show 
statistical insignificance. 
Table 7.11: Results from Pearson correlation – economic disclosure by CSDPI 
  Expected sign LN (WCEoc) 
IND Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.07 
0.14 
AREA Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.22** 
0.00 
AGE Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.08 
0.11 
GOWN Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.01 
0.42 
LOWN Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.05 
0.23 
FOWN Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.07 
0.13 
PERF Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.01 
0.42 
LN (CSE) Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.07 
0.14 
LN (SIZE) Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.23** 
0.00 
LN (LEV) Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.13* 
0.02 
Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 
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7.66 Pearson correlation for environmental disclosure by CSDPI 
    Significant correlations between the variable and LN (WCEnv) are shown in table 7.12, in 
which GOWN, FOWN and LN (SIZE) are strongly correlated with LN (WCEnv) with r values 
of 0.15, 0.19 and 0.21, respectively. AGE (r = 0.140) and LN (LEV) (r = 0.14) are moderately 
significant to LN (WCEnv). AREA, LOWN, PERF, LN (CSE) are not significant to any extent. 
Table 7.12: Results from Pearson correlation – environmental disclosure by CSDPI 
  Expected sign LN (WCEnv) 
IND Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.12* 
0.04 
AREA Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.11 
0.05 
AGE Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.14* 
0.02 
GOWN Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.15** 
0.01 
LOWN Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ -0.04 
0.27 
FOWN Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.19** 
0.00 
PERF Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.08 
0.13 
LN (CSE) Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.02 
0.39 
LN (SIZE) Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.21** 
0.00 
LN (LEV) Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.14* 
0.01 
Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 
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7.67 Pearson correlation for social disclosure by CSDPI 
    Table 7.13 present the results from the Pearson correlation for social disclosure by CSDPI. 
Three variables were found strongly correlated with LN (WCSoc); these were AREA (r = 0.21), 
LN (SIZE) (r = 0.28) and LN (LEV) (r = 0.16). One variable shows moderate significance – LN 
(CSE) (r = 0.13). IND, AGE, GOWN, LOWN, FOWN and PERF were not found to have 
statistical significance. 
Table 7.13: Results from Pearson correlation – social disclosure by CSDPI 
  Expected sign LN (WCSoc) 
IND Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.01 
0.45 
AREA Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.21** 
0.00 
AGE Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.06 
0.18 
GOWN Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.04 
0.26 
LOWN Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ -0.03 
0.30 
FOWN Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.08 
0.11 
PERF Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.05 
0.23 
LN (CSE) Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.13* 
0.02 
LN (SIZE) Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.28** 
0.00 
LN (LEV) Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.16** 
0.01 
Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 
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7.68 Pearson correlation for corporate sustainability disclosure by CSDPI 
    With regard to Ln (WCSD) (corporate sustainability disclosures by CSDPI), table 7.14 
shows that there are four predictors, which are AREA (r = 0.2), FOWN (r = 0.17), LN (SIZE) (r 
= 0.27) and LN (LEV) (r = 0.16), that are strongly correlated with LN (WCSD). The rest of the 
variables, IND, AGE, GOWN, PERF, and LN (CSE) were not found to have statistical 
significance. None of the variables are moderately significant.  
Table 7.14: Results from Pearson correlation – corporate sustainability disclosure by CSDPI 
  Expected sign LN (WCSD) 
IND Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.06 
0.18 
AREA Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.20** 
0.00 
AGE Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.08 
0.11 
GOWN Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.06 
0.18 
LOWN Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ -0.01 
0.49 
FOWN Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.17** 
0.01 
PERF Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.04 
0.27 
LN (CSE) Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.07 
0.13 
LN (SIZE) Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.27** 
0.00 
LN (LEV) Pearson correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
+ 0.16** 
0.01 
Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 
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7.7 Multivariate statistics 
    Multiple regression analysis is used when independent variables are correlated with one 
another and with the dependent variables (Coakes et al., 2010). Therefore, multivariate statistics 
were conducted to test the directional hypotheses variables.  
7.71 Testing of multicollinearity in a multivariate setting  
    A number of assumptions underpin the use of regressions: ratio of cases to 
independent variables, outliers, multicollinearity and singularity, normality, linearity, 
homoscedasticity and independence of residual (Coakes et al., 2010). Ratio of cases to 
independent variables means that a sample size is only acceptable when it satisfies the 
equation ‘n = 50 + 8k’ where k is the number of predictor variables (Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 2007). In this study, the sample size is 238, which is larger than the required 
benchmark of 130. Apart from multicollinearity, the other assumptions have been 
previously discussed; therefore, they will not be specifically introduced again in this 
section. Multicollinearity refers to high correlations existing among the independent 
variables. These problems affect the interpretation of relationships between the 
predictors and the dependent variables. To maintain the quality of the multiple 
regressions, a test of multicollinearity is considered to detect the magnitude of the 
variance inflation factor (VIF). Coakes et al. (2010) indicate that the regression model 
may be biased by multicollinearity when the VIF is greater than 10. Another indicator 
for multicollinearity is tolerance. Yuan (2007) suggests that high collinearity exists 
when the tolerance coefficient is less than 0.2 and close to zero.  
Table 7.15 shows the results of the tests of multicollinearity for the independent 
variables. Overall, the tables show that the T values and VIF fall in the acceptable range, 
and no harmful indicators can be obtained from the results. By looking at both tolerance 
and VIF, all independent variables are accepted for the regression model, and they are 
not materially affected by multicollinearity. 
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Table 7.15: Test of multicollinearity for independent variables – multivariate 
 Collinearity Statistics 
Variable Tolerance VIF 
IND 0.94 1.07 
AREA 0.85 1.18 
AGE 0.91 1.10 
GOWN 0.73 1.38 
LOWN 0.89 1.13 
FOWN 0.93 1.08 
PERF 0.94 1.06 
LN (CSE) 0.82 1.22 
LN (SIZE) 0.37 2.70 
LN (LEV) 0.47 2.15 
7.72 Multiple regressions 
    OLS regression models employing alternate forms of the dependent and independent 
variables were used to test the hypotheses. The results from the ordinary least square multiple 
regression analyses are presented in this subsection, and those from economic, environmental, 
social and sustainability disclosure by GRI or CSDPI are shown and discussed separately. Since 
LN (SIZE) and LN (LEV) were set as control variables, each model was run twice, with and 
without the control variables, and the results are shown sequentially. 
7.73 Multiple regressions for economic disclosure by GRI 
    The first multiple regression test was run with the control variables. With respect to 
economic disclosure by GRI, company size, which is measured by total assets, was strongly 
significant at the p < 0.01 level. The b value from LN (SIZE) is 0.110, which represents the 
gradient of the CEco regression line, indicating the change in outcome resulting from a unit 
change in the predictor LN (SIZE). It is seen from the results that company size is statistically 
significant, and H9 is accepted. The other very significant variable is AREA as a dummy 
variable, measured by whether a company is located in an economically developed region. It is 
highly significant at the p < 0.05 level with a b value of 0.214, indicating that the 
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unstandardised coefficient is highly influential on the model. As the both the b and beta values 
show positive correlations, the results are consistent with the hypothesis, therefore supporting 
H10. The rest of the independent variables were not found to have statistical significance. 
    It is noted that b values for GOWN (percentage of shares owned by the government), 
PERF (return on equity), LN (CSE) (charitable donation) and LN (LEV) (debt to equity ratio) 
are negative, and are in a different direction from the expected signs, suggesting that an inverse 
relationship may potentially exist between these variables and CEco. In particular, GOWN and 
PERF are highly influential, with b values of -0.278 and -0.288. As the results show, statistical 
insignificance was detected, and there may be distortion within the regression, causing b values 
to be negative. Nevertheless, it is worth investigating why these variables are seemingly 
negatively correlated with CEco.  
    According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), the critical value of multiple r squared being 
statistically significant for this study is 10% with an f value between 2 and 3 at 0.01 significance 
level. For satisfying statistical significance at 0.05, multiple r squared for this study needs to be 
over 0.06 with an f value between 2 and 3 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Multiple r is the 
coefficient of multiple correlation. R squared describes the distribution of the scatter around the 
regression line, which is interpreted as the percentage of variance in the dependent variable that 
can be explained by the predictors, and is often used as a parameter measuring the explanatory 
power of a model (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). The r squared and f values of 0.100 and 2.524 for 
CEco indicate that the predictors partially explain the model, and the model is statistically 
significant at 0.01 level.  
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Table 7.16: Results for multiple regressions for economic disclosure by GRI with control 
variables 
Model R2 F Sig. (1-tailed) 
CEco 0.100 2.524 0.007 
Table 7.16: Results of multiple regressions for economic disclosure by GRI with control 
variables (Cont’d) 
Variable Hypothesis 
number 
Expected 
sign 
B Beta T Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
Constant N/A N/A -0.573 N/A -0.670 0.504 
IND H1 + 0.161 0.096 1.475 0.142 
AREA H2 + 0.214 0.153 2.244 0.026** 
AGE H3 + 0.005 0.667 0.667 0.506 
GOWN H4 + -0.278 -1.401 -1.401 0.163 
LOWN H5 + 0.050 0.507 0.507 0.613 
FOWN H6 + 0.132 0.370 0.370 0.712 
PERF H7 + -0.288 -0.437 -0.437 0.663 
LN (CSE) H8 + -0.007 -0.307 -0.307 0.759 
LN (SIZE) H9 + 0.110 2.783 2.783 0.006*** 
LN (LEV) H10 + -0.052 -0.923 -0.923 0.357 
Note: N = 238; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 
    The second test run of the CEco model was undertaken without the control variables, due 
to their high correlation with the other independent variables. As the results show, only one 
variable, AREA, was found statistically significant at 0.01 level, with a p value of 0.001. 
Comparing this with the previous test run, the significance level increased from highly 
correlated with strong correlation, and the influence of the coefficient b value also increased 
from 0.214 to 0.304. GOWN and PERF were found to have negative correlation again in the 
second test. The multiple r squared and f values dropped slightly, to 0.065 and 2.006, due to the 
reduced number of independent variables; however, the model is still statistically significant at 
0.05 level according to Tabachnick and Fidell’s critical values for squared multiple correlation 
r2. 
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Table 7.17: Results for multiple regressions for economic disclosure by GRI without control 
variables 
Model R2 F Sig. (1-tailed) 
CEco 0.065 2.006 0.047 
Table 7.17: Results for multiple regressions for economic disclosure by GRI without control 
variables (Cont’d) 
Variable Hypothesis 
number 
Expected 
sign 
B Beta T Sig.  
(1-tailed) 
Constant N/A N/A 1.523 N/A 4.684 0.000 
IND H1 + 0.128 0.076 1.175 0.241 
AREA H2 + 0.304 0.218 3.347 0.001*** 
AGE H3 + 0.005 0.046 0.719 0.473 
GOWN H4 + -0.052 -0.019 -0.284 0.777 
LOWN H5 + 0.056 0.038 0.562 0.575 
FOWN H6 + 0.389 0.071 1.104 0.271 
PERF H7 + -0.144 -0.014 -0.217 0.829 
LN (CSE) H8 + 0.018 0.055 0.845 0.399 
Note: N = 238; ***p < 0.01 
7.74 Multiple regressions for environmental disclosures by GRI 
    With respect to model 2, showing environmental disclosures by GRI with control variables, 
IND (whether a company is in the high-profile industry) (p = 0.010) and FOWN (percentage of 
shares held by a foreign company) (p = 0.002) are strongly significant variables at the p < 0.1 
level, supporting H1 and H6. The unstandardised coefficient b of 0.573 for IND shows that it is 
moderately influential on CEnv. The b value for FOWN, which is 2.213, suggests a much 
stronger correlation with CEnv. Another very significant variable is LN (SIZE) (p = 0.050, b = 
0.156), which is highly significant at 0.05 level. The rest of the independent variables did not 
show statistical significance.  
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Table 7.18: Results for multiple regressions for environmental disclosure by GRI with control 
variables 
Model R2 F Sig. (1-tailed) 
CEnv 0.138 3.621 0.000 
Table 7.18: Results of multiple regressions for environmental disclosure by GRI with control 
variables (Cont’d) 
Variable Hypothesis 
number 
Expected 
sign 
B Beta T Sig.  
(1-tailed) 
Constant N/A N/A -1.994 N/A -1.158 0.248 
IND H1 + 0.573 0.166 2.602 0.010*** 
AREA H2 + 0.084 0.029 0.439 0.661 
AGE H3 + 0.020 0.083 1.283 0.201 
GOWN H4 + 0.395 0.072 0.990 0.323 
LOWN H5 + 0.101 0.034 0.512 0.609 
FOWN H6 + 2.213 0.196 3.072 0.002*** 
PERF H7 + 1.508 0.072 1.139 0.256 
LN (CSE) H8 + -0.047 -0.069 -1.010 0.134 
LN (SIZE) H9 + 0.156 0.199 1.962 0.050** 
LN (LEV) H10 + -0.014 -0.011 -0.121 0.904 
Note: N = 238; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 
    Notably, LN (CSE) (b = -0.047) and LN (LEV) (b = -0.014) showed negative gradients to 
CEnv, indicating slightly negative correlations; nonetheless, the p values were not statistically 
significant. The regression overall showed statistical significance at p < 0.005 level, with r 
squared = 0.138 where f = 3.621.   
 
Table 7.19 indicates the results from multiple regressions for CEnv without the control 
variables. IND (p = 0.023, b = 0.500) and FOWN (p = 0.000, b = 2.261) are highly significant 
and strongly significant at p < 0.05 level and p < 0.01 level, respectively. Comparing this model 
with the previous model (with control variables), IND reduced its significance. Interestingly, 
GOWN (percentage of shares owned by the government) (p = 0.035, b = 0.781) is highly 
significant to CEnv without the control variables, at p < 0.05 level. Thus, H1, H4 and H6 are 
supported. The rest of the variables also show no statistical significance.  
158 
 
    LN (CSE) again showed slightly negative correlation in the analysis, even though it did not 
approach statistically significant levels. Similarly to the model with control variables, PERF has 
a relatively high b value of 1.675, stating that more profitable firms are likely to issue better 
quality environmental disclosure. However, statistical significance was not detected.  
    The model is statistically significant with an r squared value of 0.116 when f = 3.752 at p < 
0.005 level. Compared to model 2 with control variables, r squared once again decreased 
slightly due to the number of independent variables being reduced. However, importantly, f 
increased slightly to 3.752, indicating that the predictors’ explanatory power on the dependent 
variable increased slightly, even though the value is still considerably low.  
Table 7.19: Results for multiple regressions for environmental disclosure by GRI without 
control variables 
Model R2 F Sig. (1-tailed) 
CEnv 0.116 3.752 0.000 
Table 7.19 Results for multiple regressions for environmental disclosure by GRI without control 
variables (Cont’d) 
Variable Hypothesis 
number 
Expected 
sign 
B Beta T Sig.  
(1-tailed) 
Constant N/A N/A 0.847 N/A 1.304 0.194 
IND H1 + 0.500 0.145 2.292 0.023** 
AREA H2 + 0.239 0.084 1.318 0.189 
AGE H3 + 0.023 0.096 1.529 0.128 
GOWN H4 + 0.781 0.142 2.124 0.035** 
LOWN H5 + 0.103 0.034 0.520 0.604 
FOWN H6 + 2.261 0.233 3.720 0.000*** 
PERF H7 + 1.675 0.080 1.261 0.209 
LN (CSE) H8 + -0.005 -0.007 -0.114 0.909 
Note: N = 238; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 
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7.75 Multiple regressions for social disclosure by GRI 
    Table 7.20 shows the results for model 3, which is social disclosure by GRI with the 
control variables. LN (SIZE) (p = 0.008, b = 0.144) was strongly significant at p < 0.01, and the 
b value indicates its moderate influence on CSoc, supporting H9. Another significant variable is 
AREA, which is moderately significant at 0.1 level with a p value of 0.052 and a b value of 
0.250. Thus, H2 is accepted. The other independent variables were found not to be statistically 
significant in the analysis.  
Table 7.20: Results for multiple regressions for social disclosure by GRI with control variables 
Model R2 F Sig. (1-tailed) 
CSoc 0.103 2.603 0.005 
Table 7.20: Results of multiple regressions for social disclosure by GRI with control variables 
(Cont’d) 
Variable Hypothesis 
number 
Expected 
sign 
B Beta T Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
Constant N/A N/A -0.917 N/A -0.798 0.426 
IND H1 + 0.080 0.035 0.544 0.587 
AREA H2 + 0.250 0.133 1.956 0.052* 
AGE H3 + 0.005 0.033 0.504 0.614 
GOWN H4 + -0.299 -0.083 -1.123 0.262 
LOWN H5 + -0.044 -0.022 -0.334 0.739 
FOWN H6 + 0.168 0.023 0.350 0.727 
PERF H7 + -0.049 -0.004 -0.055 0.956 
LN (CSE) H8 + 0.020 0.046 0.661 0.509 
LN (SIZE) H9 + 0.144 0.279 2.698 0.008*** 
LN (LEV) H10 + -0.049 -0.059 -0.641 0.522 
Note: N = 238; *p < 0.1; ***p < 0.01 
It is noted that GOWN (b = -0.299), LOWN (b = -0.044), PERF (b = -0.049) and LN (LEV) (b 
= -0.049) showed negative gradients to CSoc, indicating inverse correlations, as opposed to the 
expected signs of positive correlation, even though the p values for these variables were not 
significant. The model (r2 = 0.103, f = 2.603) overall shows statistical significance at 0.005 level 
with r squared barely past the legitimate benchmark of 10%.  
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    In regards to model 3 without the control variables, AREA (p = 0.002, b = 0.376) showed 
strong statistical significance at p < 0.01, with a considerably high b value. Compared to the test 
with control variables, the significance level increased from high to strong. Interestingly, Ln 
(CSE) shows moderate significance in the analysis, with a p value of 0.058 and a b value of 
0.055. This was not found in the model with all variables. In addition, GOWN (b = 0.016) and 
PERF (b = 0.127) were positively correlated with CSoc without LN (SIZE) and LN (LEV), 
which is completely different from the results from the previous test where both variables were 
shown positive. The rest of the variables showed consistent results with the previous test, and no 
statistical significance was detected. With regard to the significance of regression, since r 
squared is slightly above 0.06, it falls within the critical value when f is between 2 and 3, and is 
significant at 0.05 level. 
Table 7.21: Results for multiple regressions for social disclosure by GRI without control 
variables 
Model R2 F Sig. (1-tailed) 
CSoc 0.068 2.078 0.039 
Table 7.21: Results for multiple regressions for social disclosure by GRI without control 
variables (Cont’d) 
Variable Hypothesis 
number 
Expected 
sign 
B Beta T Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
Constant N/A N/A 1.769 N/A 4.050 0.000 
IND H1 + 0.029 0.013 0.196 0.845 
AREA H2 + 0.376 0.201 3.084 0.002*** 
AGE H3 + 0.006 0.041 0.637 0.525 
GOWN H4 + 0.016 0.004 0.063 0.950 
LOWN H5 + -0.038 -0.019 -0.286 0.775 
FOWN H6 + 0.516 0.070 1.090 0.277 
PERF H7 + 0.127 0.009 0.142 0.887 
LN (CSE) H8 + 0.055 0.124 1.904 0.058* 
Note: N = 238; *p < 0.1; ***p < 0.01 
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7.76 Multiple regressions for corporate sustainability disclosure by GRI 
    Model 4 is an integrated model that combines sustainability disclosure of all three aspects. 
Table 7.22 shows the results for this model with all control variables, where LN (SIZE) (p = 
0.011, b = 0.127), unsurprisingly, was highly significant at p < 0.05 level. Another two 
significant independent variables include AREA (p = 0.079, b = 0.209) and FOWN (p = 0.067, 
b = 0.819) which were significant at p < 0.1 level. Notably, the explanatory power of FOWN 
was considerably high among all independent variables. In addition, GOWN (b = -0.161), LN 
(CSE) (b = -0.005) and LN (LEV) (b = -0.037) showed their correlations with CSD as negative, 
which is in the opposite direction from the hypotheses, even though they are not statistically 
significant. The rest of the variables did not show statistical significance. With respect to the 
significance of model 4, the r squared value of 0.113 is generally low; however, it falls within 
the legitimate range of 0.1 when f is between 2 and 3, therefore it is significant at 0.01 level.  
Table 7.22: Results for multiple regressions for corporate sustainability disclosure by GRI with 
control variables 
Model R2 F Sig. (1-tailed) 
CSD 0.113 2.886 0.002 
Table 7.22: Results of multiple regressions for corporate sustainability disclosure by GRI with 
control variables (Cont’d) 
Variable Hypothesis 
number 
Expected 
sign 
B Beta T Sig.  
(1-tailed) 
Constant N/A N/A 0.409 N/A 0.385 0.701 
IND H1 + 0.199 0.094 1.462 0.145 
AREA H2 + 0.209 0.119 1.763 0.079* 
AGE H3 + 0.007 0.049 0.740 0.460 
GOWN H4 + -0.161 -0.048 -0.652 0.515 
LOWN H5 + 0.028 0.015 0.228 0.820 
FOWN H6 + 0.819 0.119 1.840 0.067* 
PERF H7 + 0.074 0.006 0.091 0.928 
LN (CSE) H8 + -0.005 -0.013 -0.186 0.853 
LN (SIZE) H9 + 0.127 0.264 2.571 0.011** 
LN (LEV) H10 + -0.037 -0.048 -0.523 0.602 
Note: N = 238; *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05 
162 
 
    Model 4 was run for the second time without control variables. Overall, both r squared 
(0.08) and f values (2.492) dropped to a small extent, which can be explained by the reduced 
number of independent variables. The decrease in f value indicates that the model without the 
control variables has less prediction power. Nevertheless, despite the relatively low r squared 
value, the model was still significant at 0.05 level, as it was barely over the critical value of 
0.06.  
    Independent variables AREA and FOWN were both strongly significant at 0.01 level, with 
p values equal to 0.005 and 0.010 respectively, supporting H2 and H6. In particular, FOWN 
showed a highly influential correlation to CSD with a b value of 1.131, whereas AREA showed 
this to a lesser extent, with a b value of 0.323. The rest of the variables did not show statistical 
significance, and the signs from the analysis were the same as expected. 
Table 7.23: Results for multiple regressions for corporate sustainability disclosure by GRI 
without control variables 
Model R2 F Sig. (1-tailed) 
CSD 0.08 2.492 0.013 
Table 7.23: Results for multiple regressions for corporate sustainability disclosure by GRI 
without control variables (Cont’d) 
Variable Hypothesis 
number 
Expected 
sign 
B Beta T Sig.  
(1-tailed) 
Constant N/A N/A 2.767 N/A 6.848 0.000 
IND H1 + 0.151 0.072 1.113 0.267 
AREA H2 + 0.323 0.185 2.861 0.005*** 
AGE H3 + 0.008 0.058 0.903 0.367 
GOWN H4 + 0.124 0.037 0.541 0.589 
LOWN H5 + 0.032 0.018 0.262 0.794 
FOWN H6 + 1.131 0.165 2.582 0.010*** 
PERF H7 + 0.225 0.018 0.273 0.785 
LN (CSE) H8 + 0.026 0.063 0.970 0.333 
Note: N = 238; ***p < 0.01 
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    In comparison with the first run, AREA and FOWN increased their significance 
extensively, from p < 0.1 level to P < 0.01 level. Also, GWON and LN (CSE) changed their 
signs due to controlling variables LN (SIZE) and LN (LEV). Even though the explanatory 
power of the model dropped slightly, this is significant to the study. 
7.77 Multiple regressions for economic disclosure by CSDPI 
Table 7.24: Results for multiple regressions for economic disclosure by CSDPI with control 
variables 
Model R2 F Sig. (1-tailed) 
WCEco 0.102 2.584 0.006 
Table 7.24: Results for multiple regressions for economic disclosure by CSDPI with control 
variables (Cont’d) 
Variable Hypothesis 
number 
Expected 
sign 
B Beta T Sig.  
(1-tailed) 
Constant N/A N/A 0.747 N/A 0.849 0.397 
IND H1 + 0.170 0.098 1.512 0.321 
AREA H2 + 0.222 0.154 2.265 0.024** 
AGE H3 + 0.006 0.052 0.788 0.432 
GOWN H4 + -0.243 -0.088 -1.193 0.234 
LOWN H5 + 0.075 0.050 0.749 0.455 
FOWN H6 + 0.165 0.029 0.447 0.655 
PERF H7 + -0.251 -0.024 -0.371 0.711 
LN (CSE) H8 + -0.003 -0.010 -0.141 0.888 
LN (SIZE) H9 + 0.107 0.271 2.622 0.009*** 
LN (LEV) H10 + -0.043 -0.069 -0.747 0.456 
Note: N = 238; *p < 0.1; ***p < 0.01 
    Models 5 represents the regression for economic disclosure by CSDPI. The regression 
model WCEco, in general, is statistically significant at 0.01 level, where the multiple r squared 
= 0.102 and f = 2.584. Regarding independent variables, two very significant variables AREA 
(p = 0.024, b = 0.222) and LN (SIZE) (p = 0.009, b = 0.107) were found highly correlated and 
strongly correlated with WCEco at p < 0.05 level and p < 0.01 level respectively. The b values 
for both variables were found to be moderately influential on the model.  
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    Notably, GOWN (b = -0.243), PERF (b = -0.251), LN (SIZE) (b = -0.003) and LN (LEV) 
(b = -0.043) were negatively correlated with WCEco, and were in the opposite direction from 
the expected signs. Nonetheless, statistical significance was not detected in the analysis. The 
other variables also showed no statistical significance. Therefore, H2 and H9 were accepted and 
the other hypotheses were rejected.  
Table 7.25: Results for multiple regressions for economic disclosure by CSDPI without control 
variables 
Model R2 F Sig. (1-tailed) 
WCEco 0.070 2.167 0.031 
Table 7.25: Results for multiple regressions for economic disclosure by CSDPI without control 
variables (Cont’d) 
Variable Hypothesis 
number 
Expected 
sign 
B Beta T Sig.  
(1-tailed) 
Constant N/A N/A 2.761 N/A 8.272 0.000 
IND H1 + 0.135 0.078 1.205 0.230 
AREA H2 + 0.312 0.218 3.350 0.001*** 
AGE H3 + 0.007 0.057 0.884 0.378 
GOWN H4 + -0.017 -0.006 -0.089 0.929 
LOWN H5 + 0.081 0.053 0.791 0.430 
FOWN H6 + 0.418 0.074 1.156 0.249 
PERF H7 + -0.116 -0.011 -0.170 0.865 
LN (CSE) H8 + 0.022 0.064 0.986 0.325 
Note: N = 238; ***p < 0.01 
    With respect to model 5 without control variables, the regression (r2 = 0.070, f = 2.167) 
barely satisfies the critical value of r squared greater than 0.06, and it is significant at 0.05 level. 
Only one variable was found strongly correlated with WCEco, where AREA (p = 0.001, b = 
0.312) was statistically significant at p < 0.01 level. GOWN (b = -0.017) and PERF (b = -0.116) 
were once again found to have negative correlations to WCEco. Ln (CSE) became positively 
correlated in the second run of the model, with a slightly higher b value of 0.022. All in all, 
apart from LN (SIZE), most of the independent variables did not show statistical significance. 
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7.78 Multiple regressions for environmental disclosure by CSDPI 
Table 7.26: Results for multiple regressions for environmental disclosure by CSDPI with 
control variables 
Model R2 F Sig. (1-tailed) 
WCEnv 0.117 3.000 0.001 
Table 7.26: Results for multiple regressions for environmental disclosure by CSDPI with 
control variables (Cont’d) 
Variable Hypothesis 
number 
Expected 
sign 
B Beta T Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
Constant N/A N/A -1.122 N/A -0.506 0.613 
IND H1 + 0.638 0.145 2.249 0.025** 
AREA H2 + 0.081 0.022 0.329 0.743 
AGE H3 + 0.036 0.118 1.798 0.073* 
GOWN H4 + 0.583 0.083 1.135 0.257 
LOWN H5 + 0.019 0.005 0.072 0.943 
FOWN H6 + 2.547 0.178 2.746 0.007*** 
PERF H7 + 1.970 0.074 1.155 0.249 
LN (CSE) H8 + -0.048 -0.056 -0.810 0.419 
LN (SIZE) H9 + 0.158 0.157 1.536 0.123 
LN (LEV) H10 + -0.029 -0.018 -0.195 0.846 
Note: N = 238; *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 
    Model 6 (r2 = 0.117, f = 3.000), which represents environmental disclosure by CSDPI, is 
statistically significant at 0.01 level. Two very significant variables, IND (p = 0.025, b = 0.638) 
and FOWN (p = 0.007, b = 2.547), are highly significant and strongly significant at p < 0.05 
level and p < 0.01 level, respectively. The b value is, interestingly, very high at 2.547, which is 
much greater than those of the other variables, indicating its substantial correlation with WCEnv. 
PERF was also detected with a considerably high b value of 1.970, suggesting a potentially high 
correlation, even though it is not significant in terms of the p value. LN (CSE) and LN (LEV) 
showed slightly negative signs for correlation. Apart from IND and FOWN, the rest of the 
independent variables did not show statistical significance. 
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    Table 7.27 presents the results for model 6 without the control variables. Four independent 
variables showed statistical significance to WCEnv. FOWN (p = 0.001, b = 2.948) was strongly 
significant at p < 0.01 level, with a substantial influence of 2.948 on the model. Three very 
significant variables, IND (p = 0.042, b = 0.571), AGE (p = 0.048, b = 0.038) and GOWN (p = 
0.043, b = 0.956), were highly significant at 0.05 level. The rest of the variables did not show 
statistical significance. The model (r2 = 0.104, f = 3.326) overall is statistically significant at 
0.005 level.  
    Compared to the first run of the analysis with the control variables, r squared dropped 
slightly due to the reduced number of independent variables; however, f increased considerably 
from 3 to 3.326, indicating that the model without the control variables was explained slightly 
better by the independent variables. In terms of the variables, the significance levels generally 
improved and GOWN became significant in the second run. Both test run showed LN (CSE) 
slightly negative correlated with WCEnv.
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Table 7.27: Results for multiple regressions for environmental disclosure by CSDPI without 
control variables 
Model R2 F Sig. (1-tailed) 
WCEnv 0.104 3.326 0.001 
Table 7.27: Results for multiple regressions for environmental disclosure by CSDPI without 
control variables (Cont’d) 
Variable Hypothesis 
number 
Expected 
sign 
B Beta T Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
Constant N/A N/A 1.774 N/A 2.131 0.034 
IND H1 + 0.571 0.130 2.041 0.042** 
AREA H2 + 0.231 0.063 0.993 0.322 
AGE H3 + 0.038 0.126 1.992 0.048** 
GOWN H4 + 0.956 0.136 2.031 0.043** 
LOWN H5 + 0.022 0.006 0.087 0.931 
FOWN H6 + 2.948 0.206 3.266 0.001*** 
PERF H7 + 2.148 0.081 1.262 0.208 
LN (CSE) H8 + -0.008 -0.009 -0.136 0.862 
Note: N = 238; **p < 0.5; ***p < 0.01 
7.79 Multiple regressions for social disclosure by CSDPI 
    With regard to model 7, WCSoc, the regression overall is statistically significant at 0.01 
level, with r squared at 0.102 and f at 2.565. Only two variables, AREA (p = 0.050, b = 0.259) 
and LN (SIZE) (p = 0.009, b = 0.144), showed significance to the model with moderate b values, 
supporting H2 and H9. Four variables showed negative correlations to WCSoc, which were 
GOWN (b = -0.282), LOWN (b = -0.044), PERF (b = -0.044) and LN (LEV) (b = -0.047). The 
signs were therefore different from the hypotheses. Apart from AREA and LN (SIZE), the other 
independent variables did not show statistical significance. 
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Table 7.28: Results for multiple regressions for social disclosure by CSDPI with control 
variables 
Model R2 F Sig. (1-tailed) 
WCSoc 0.102 2.565 0.006 
Table 7.28: Results for multiple regressions for social disclosure by CSDPI with control 
variables (Cont’d) 
Variable Hypothesis 
number 
Expected 
sign 
B Beta T Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
Constant N/A N/A 0.445 N/A 0.378 0.706 
IND H1 + 0.087 0.037 0.574 0.566 
AREA H2 + 0.259 0.135 1.975 0.050* 
AGE H3 + 0.004 0.028 0.419 0.675 
GOWN H4 + -0.282 -0.076 -1.034 0.302 
LOWN H5 + -0.044 -0.022 -0.324 0.746 
FOWN H6 + 0.191 0.025 0.388 0.698 
PERF H7 + -0.044 -0.003 -0.048 0.961 
LN (CSE) H8 + 0.020 0.045 0.648 0.518 
LN (SIZE) H9 + 0.144 0.273 2.639 0.009*** 
LN (LEV) H10 + -0.047 -0.055 -0.598 0.550 
Note: N = 238; *p < 0.1; ***p < 0.01 
    With regard to model 7 without the control variables, r squared increased slightly to 0.067, 
barely past the critical variable of 0.06, and the model is significant at 0.05 level. Only one 
independent variable, AREA (p = 0.002, b = 0.386) was found strongly significant at 0.01 level. 
LOWN (b = -0.038) was once again detected to have a negative correlation with WCSoc, but no 
statistical significance was found. The other variables also did not show statistical significance.  
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Table 7.29: Results for multiple regressions for social disclosure by CSDPI without control 
variables 
Model R2 F Sig. (1-tailed) 
WCSoc 0.067 2.070 0.040 
Table 7.29: Results for multiple regressions for social disclosure by CSDPI without control 
variables (Cont’d) 
Variable Hypothesis 
number 
Expected 
sign 
B Beta T Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
Constant N/A N/A 3.134 N/A 7.005 0.000 
IND H1 + 0.034 0.015 0.227 0.821 
AREA H2 + 0.386 0.201 3.091 0.002*** 
AGE H3 + 0.006 0.036 0.557 0.578 
GOWN H4 + 0.036 0.010 0.142 0.888 
LOWN H5 + -0.038 -0.019 -0.279 0.780 
FOWN H6 + 0.542 0.072 1.117 0.265 
PERF H7 + 0.130 0.009 0.143 0.887 
LN (CSE) H8 + 0.056 0.122 1.873 0.062* 
Note: N = 238; *p < 0.1; ***p < 0.01 
7.710 Multiple regressions for corporate sustainability disclosure by CSDPI 
Table 7.30: Results for multiple regressions for corporate sustainability disclosure by CSDPI 
with control variables 
Model R2 F Sig. (1-tailed) 
WCSD 0.113 2.887 0.002 
Table 7.30: Results for multiple regressions for corporate sustainability disclosure by CSDPI 
with control variables (Cont’d) 
Variable Hypothesis 
number 
Expected 
sign 
B Beta T Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
Constant N/A N/A 1.786 N/A 1.659 0.098 
IND H1 + 0.204 0.096 1.485 0.139 
AREA H2 + 0.209 0.118 1.746 0.082* 
AGE H3 + 0.007 0.048 0.734 0.464 
GOWN H4 + -0.152 -0.045 -0.608 0.544 
LOWN H5 + 0.034 0.018 0.276 0.783 
FOWN H6 + 0.848 0.122 1.882 0.061* 
PERF H7 + 0.104 0.008 0.125 0.900 
LN (CSE) H8 + -0.006 -0.013 -0.195 0.846 
LN (SIZE) H9 + 0.127 0.261 2.541 0.012** 
LN (LEV) H10 + -0.036 -0.046 -0.500 0.618 
Note: N = 238; *p < 0.1; ***p < 0.01 
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    Model 8 was run once again without the control variables, and the regression showed 
statistical significance at 0.05 level with r squared of 0.081 when f = 2.511, barely past the 
critical value of multiple r squared, 0.06. Regarding independent variables, two variables, 
AREA (p = 0.005, b = 0.324) and FOWN (p = 0.009, b = 1.160) were strongly significant to the 
model. Compared to the first run with the control variables, the significance levels of both 
variables increased extensively from p < 0.1 level to p < 0.01. All variables were detected with 
the expected sign; however, apart from AREA and FOWN, the rest of the variables did not 
show statistical significance. 
Table 7.31: Results for multiple regressions for corporate sustainability disclosure by CSDPI 
without control variables 
Model R2 F Sig. (1-tailed) 
WCSD 0.081 2.511 0.012 
Table 7.31: Results for multiple regressions for corporate sustainability disclosure by CSDPI 
without control variables (Cont’d) 
Variable Hypothesis 
number 
Expected 
sign 
B Beta T Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
Constant   4.140  10.135 0.000 
IND H1 + 0.156 0.073 1.137 0.257 
AREA H2 + 0.324 0.183 2.837 0.005*** 
AGE H3 + 0.008 0.058 0.901 0.368 
GOWN H4 + 0.134 0.039 0.581 0.562 
LOWN H5 + 0.038 0.021 0.307 0.759 
FOWN H6 + 1.160 0.167 2.620 0.009*** 
PERF H7 + 0.254 0.020 0.304 0.761 
LN (CSE) H8 + 0.026 0.062 0.952 0.342 
Note: N = 238; ***p < 0.01 
7.8 Findings and discussion 
    Multiple regression analyses in CSD by GRI and CSDPI were conducted in this chapter. 
The results showed that all eight hypothesised models were statistically significant with 
acceptable levels of r squared. While the results indicated that some variables from the theories 
were able to explain the quality of CSD in listed Chinese companies, the other ones were less 
able to perform this function.  
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    The results across the models by GRI and the models by CSDPI indicated that they had 
almost identical statistically significant variables across economic, environmental, and social 
disclosure models, as well as the integrated CSD models. In terms of the signs of the variables, the 
results also showed consistency in models developed from both measures; however, a slight 
difference was found in the environmental disclosure models. There are two reasons for this trend 
in the results. As indicated in the previous chapter, the report users’ perceived importance was 
different from the level of importance intended by GRI. In other words, some indicators in GRI 
were not considered as important by the report users. The results from the t-test suggested that 
while some indicators were more important, the other ones were important to a lesser extent. 
Based on these results, the instrument used in this study – the CSDPI – was built to measure the 
quality of CSD. However, the importance of CSD indicators perceived by the users did not vary 
significantly because the top importance value was 4.51 (Water, Environment) and the bottom 
value was 3.62 (Supplier human rights assessment, Social). Besides, about 50% of the indicators 
showing importance from the users’ perspectives did not change from what was intended by GRI. 
So, the users’ perceived importance was not dramatically different from what was intended by 
GRI, although certain areas were of more interest to the report users.  
    In addition to the disturbance from the CSDPI, the relatively low quality of CSD also 
explained why the significant variables from the models by both measures were the same. 
Descriptive statistics of the quality of CSD in Chinese listed firms indicated that the quality of 
disclosure was generally low across all three types of disclosure, where the highest average per 
indicator was economic disclosure at 0.905. The quality of the other two sustainability disclosures 
was 0.50 and 0.43, for social disclosure and environmental disclosure, respectively. These 
eventually made the average quality of CSD as low as 0.55 – the level just above information 
being omitted. Due to the limited level of CSD in Chinese listed firms in 2013, the CSDPI was not 
substantial enough to show statistical significance when comparing the models by GRI, 
considering that the CSDPI was not dramatically different from GRI. As a consequence from both 
causes, the significant variables in the models by GRI and the CSDPI showed consistency.   
    Regarding the results from the models across economic, environmental, social and integrated 
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corporate sustainability disclosure, the significant variables were mostly the same across 
CSD/WCSD, CEco/WCEco, Soc/WCSoc, and partially with CEnv/WCEnv. Independent 
variables that were found common in economic disclosure, social disclosure and CSD were 
AREA, FOWN and SIZE. However, the significant variables found in environmental disclosure 
models were IND, AGE, FOWN, GOWN and AREA, where AGE and AREA were at 0.1 level. 
In order to explain why common variables were obtained from CSD/WCSD, CEco/WCEco and 
Soc/WCSoc, it is important to look at the results from descriptive statistics of the quality of CSD. 
The average quality was detected to vary across disclosure, where economic and social 
information were disclosed better than environmental disclosure. As the quality of CSD was 
measured by the sum of all three types of disclosures, it was more affected by the values 
contributed by economic and social disclosure, due to their quality being higher than 
environmental disclosure. This explains why there were common statistically significant 
variables obtained from economic disclosure models, social models and the integrated CSD 
models. Moreover, in the previous section, it was indicated that environmental information must 
be disclosed only by listed companies from certain industries with the required standards. This 
suggests that companies that chose to disclose environmental information could be completely 
different from those that disclosed economic or social information.  
    It is notable that the results from the multivariate analyses suggested including corporate 
economic disclosure, environmental disclosure and social disclosure as one whole when 
analysing Chinese corporate sustainability reports, due to the similarity in variable significance 
shown in the models. However, the types of disclosure may be investigated separately depending 
on the purpose of a study, where in particular, environmental disclosure shall be looked at 
individually due to its partial inconsistency of results with the other types of disclosure in China.   
    With respect to the predictors in the models developed based on the hypotheses, consistent 
with Legitimacy Theory expectations, the study found SIZE statistically significant in all CSD 
models, which suggested that larger companies were more like to disclose CSD with higher 
quality. This results are consistent with the existing studies (Ni, Qian and Crilly, 2014; Zeng, Xu, 
Yin and Tam, 2011), as larger companies face more political pressure and public exposure about 
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their operation, performance and sustainability. According to Hackston and Milne (1996) larger 
companies disclose a high quality of CSD in order to mitigate the risk and pressure they face. 
AREA was also found to be consistent with the expectation from Legitimacy Theory, where 
statistically significant positive correlations were found in the sustainability disclosure models, 
and this was also consistent with existing studies (Yeh, Juo and Yu, 2011; Kuo, Yu and Chang, 
2015). The regional economically developed area was usually along the eastern China coast line, 
where there was a strong degree of political pressure and companies were more likely to face 
extra pressure from governing bodies. Under Legitimacy Theory, companies had to comply with 
what society requires and meet their social expectations in order to fulfil the social contract under 
tighter control from the government. This explains why a higher quality of CSD was obtained 
from companies located in the economically developed regions of China.   
    Foreign ownership was found to be statistically significant in the quality of environmental 
disclosure and the integrated CSD model, whereas significance was not indicated in the other 
models. Listed companies with foreign ownership were under greater competitive pressure and 
retained a higher degree of administrative efficiency than state-owned firms (Zu and Song, 2009). 
Therefore, the need to meet expectations from society and dominant stakeholders reduces 
political costs by providing visible and transparent environmental information. However, in the 
models of economic and social disclosure, statistical significance was not shown. This is because 
China is still in an early stage of balancing between economic and sustainability interests, during 
a transitional economic system. Corporate sustainability was not yet set as a fundamental goal for 
many companies. As China’s regulations and policies regarding sustainability reporting were still 
at an early stage, it may take time for companies with foreign ownership to synthesise China’s 
regulations and engage in legitimising tactics.   
    Government ownership was coded as a dummy variable, and it was only found significant in 
the quality of environmental disclosure. No statistical significance was obtained from the models 
of economic disclosure, social disclosure and integrated sustainability disclosure. Also, negative 
signs were shown in the multiple regressions, which were entirely different from what was 
hypothesised. One possible explanation is that in the context of the unique Chinese political 
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background, encouragement from the government often has more influence on listed companies, 
as they are more likely to follow encouragement from the government in the consideration of 
stakeholder power from a theoretical perspective. However, for state owned enterprises, showing 
their sustainability practices in CSD increases only the richness of their disclosure. It does not 
grant extra credit from the government, but additional costs for preparing such disclosure are 
generated (Zhou, 2005). This explains why the results from the regression model showed a 
potential negative correlation between the quality of CSD and the government ownership of a 
company. Overall, the results showed very limited evidence about government owned firms, 
which were under pressure from the government to provide an advanced quality of CSD as well as 
good CSD behaviour. In opposition, the models of CSD, economic disclosure and social 
disclosure showed negative correlations with government ownership. However, it is notable that 
GOWN showed strongly significant correlation in CEnv models due to the mandatory 
requirement from the governing body. In the previous section, it was indicated that industrial 
companies that exceeded the pollution standard must disclose environmental sustainability 
information. Although according to Legitimacy Theory, government owned firms may choose 
not to disclose as much as other types of companies, the results showed that a significant 
correlation exists between the quality of environmental disclosure and the government ownership 
of a company. In addition, by re-examining the sample firms, it was found that the majority of the 
listed high-profile government owned firms exceeded the standard from mandatory requirements. 
As the firm size of these companies was also considerably greater, this explains why GOWN was 
significant at p < 0.05 level when control variables SIZE and LEV were excluded. Consequently, 
this suggested a positive effect from mandatory and regulatory pressure on government-owned 
firms to provide implications on policies from environmental disclosure. However, it was only an 
effective tool to encourage CSR reporting, particularly for economic and social disclosure, where 
the requirements were not mandatory in the Chinese context.   
    Industry type was also coded as a dummy variable, which measured whether a company 
operated in a high-profile industry. The results from OLS showed that industry type was 
significant in the environmental disclosure model at p < 0.05 level, in both models, with or 
175 
 
without the control variables. This is consistent with prior research. Several existing studies 
indicated that the level of CSD tends to be higher in high-profile industries (Ni et al., 2014) in 
China, as a result of the Chinese government’s great effort to regulate environmentally sensitive 
industries in recent years (Wang et al, 2004). In addition to the regulations published by the 
Chinese National Environmental Protection Agency, many companies in these industries would 
choose to disclose environmental information in order to alleviate the government’s concerns, 
according to Stakeholder Theory. Therefore, the results from environmental disclosure models 
showed consistency with the existing studies where a positive correlation exists between the 
quality of environmental discourse and whether a company is in a high profile industry. However, 
the results from the models of CSD, economic disclosure and social disclosure did not show 
statistical significance, due to the lack of mandatory regulations as required in environmental 
disclosure activities. 
    AGE was found significant in the models of environmental disclosure at p < 0.1 level and P < 
0.05 level, with and without the control variables respectively. The result shows consistency with 
the expectation from Legitimacy Theory, in which older firms tend to have higher social 
reputations and involvement in disclosure of sustainability activities. The public might then 
expect more environmental information to be issued by these companies, due to their longer time 
being listed (Robert, 1992). This is consistent with previous studies, and therefore, legitimacy 
theory explains the correlation between firm listed age and the quality of corporate environmental 
disclosure. However, results from other models indicated that AGE was not significant to explain 
CSD, economic disclosure and social disclosure. One possible explanation for this could be the 
significant effect of the mandatory reporting requirements in environmental disclosure, which 
played an important role for older companies to disclose. As discussed previously, companies that 
had been listed for longer were more likely to attract political pressure and public attention. As 
required by regulations, they must disclose in order to meet expectations from society (Zhang, 
2013). This would make environmental sustainability a priority compared to economic and social 
responsibility. In addition, China’s 12th Five Year Plan for National Economic and Social 
Development was being implemented in 2013, in which environmental issues and constraints 
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were considered a primary focus. This also explains why environmental disclosure for companies 
that have been listed longer was made a priority among corporate sustainability disclosure.   
    Corporate sustainability expenditure (CSE) was measured by the amount of charitable 
donations made in 2013. This variable was found only in the social disclosure model without the 
control variables SIZE and LEV. By definition, charitable donation reflects love for mankind and 
integrity from the intangible assets of a company in the business context. This variable was 
previously shown in existing studies to have a valid relationship between firm financial 
performance and firm size (Crampton and Pattern, 2008), and it was also shown to have a direct 
relationship with the market value of a firm (Yeh et al, 2011). As an indirect signal, companies 
with more charitable donations were more like to have a higher level of CSD shown for firm 
performance. The results of this study are consistent with the existing literature, in that charitable 
donation is positively correlated with the quality of corporate social disclosure with statistical 
significance. However, it is notable that this variable was not significant in the integrated CSD 
model, even though it showed statistical significance in social disclosure in particular. One 
explanation is that the significance of CSE is not sufficiently strong in the social disclosure 
models, as it was significant at only p < 0.1 level. This is not statistically significant enough to be 
shown in the integrated CSD models which included all three economic, environmental and social 
perspectives. 
    PERF measured companies’ profitability in terms of ROE, and it was not found statistically 
significant in any of the models; therefore, signalling effect theory fails to explain the influence 
from profitability. However, from another perspective of Legitimacy Theory, profitability can be 
regarded either positively or negatively to the level of CSD. This is due to the fact that CSD may 
be used as a vehicle for management to adopt strategies for repairing, maintaining or obtaining 
legitimacy (Neu et al, 1988). When a company is profitable, a higher level of CSD is able to 
explain the financial performance of the company by reflecting the degree of its corporate 
sustainability; on the contrary, when a company is not making profit, CSD could be used as a 
strategy to explain and convince financial stakeholders that the current sustainability investments 
will result in long-term benefit, or perhaps divert concerns from its poor financial performance 
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(Reverte, 2009). Moreover, profitability was not found to be significant in the research models. 
This can perhaps be explained by Agency Theory during 2013, when the Chinese listed 
companies were still experiencing economic downturn from the previous period. The equity 
holders and debt holders of these companies were subsequently more likely to desire 
information about corporate financial performance in the short-run, rather than long-term 
corporate sustainability (Shan & Taylor, 2014). It is then reasonable to suggest that firms with 
high leverage generated less CSD, in order to minimise associated costs and reserve solvency 
for their creditors. Nevertheless, profitability has been found to be inconsistent to explain the 
level of CSD in recent studies (Tilling & Tile, 2010; Mukherjee et al., 2010; Chu et al., 2013). 
    LOWN represents legal person ownership, which describes whether the majority of shares of 
a company were owned by a legal person. This may include an individual or parties whose 
interests may not coincide with the interests of other investors or those of employees and 
managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). LOWN was not found to be statistically significant in any 
of the models, but it showed negative correlations with CSD, which is opposite to the hypothesis. 
This can be explained by the difference in interest between legal person ownership and other 
investors. Luo (2006) indicated that inappropriate transactions to expropriate benefits at the 
expense of the minority for the legal person party were always considered. It is very likely that the 
controlling shareholder would divert wealth through mechanisms such as inter-corporate loans 
(Li, et al 2012), and in the long-run, neglect disclosure of corporate sustainability. If stakeholder 
theory is considered in this context, as the Chinese government takes great control over listed 
companies disclosing policies, the major shareholder of an organisation must consider terms of 
stakeholder power to a great extent, especially in 2013 when the leader of the party changed, 
causing significant influence on the focus of national development and its policies. Therefore, if 
this is taken into account, it is less likely that legal person ownership would have had a significant 
influence on CSD reporting during this special period of time.   
    Statistical significance was not found in Leverage, and it showed a slight negative coefficient 
with all corporate sustainability models. The hypothesis based on Legitimacy Theory suggested 
that highly leveraged firms would be more like to disclose sustainability information to show their 
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capability of being profitable, and to reduce the tension from their debt holders. However, a 
negative sign was obtained from the study. The rationale for this could be that there could be close 
relationships between highly leveraged firms and their debt holders. Consequently, firms may 
disclose corporate sustainability information through vehicles other than stand-alone corporate 
sustainability reports.   
7.9 Robustness checks 
    A robustness check examines the certainty of the regression coefficients by estimating their 
behaviour when the regression specification is modified from adding or removing variables (Lu 
and White, 2014). If the coefficients are plausible and robust, this is commonly interpreted as 
evidence of structural validity. Two types of robustness check were employed in the study in 
order to eliminate any extreme variables, which reduced the distortion from the samples, thereby 
making sure of the validity of the analyses (Shan and Taylor, 2014). A binary logistics regression 
analysis was first used as an alternative technique for data not being normally distributed (Hair, 
Anderson, Tatham and Black, 1995). As for a logistics regression model, the dependent variables 
need to be categorical, and the quality of the disclosure was transformed from continuous to 
dichotomous, where 0 was given to disclosure below the median value of the sample, otherwise 
coded as 1. Appendix I shows the robustness test results from binary logistics regression for the 
eight models. Only LEV was found statistically significant, with negative correlations in model 1 
and model 5, due to the transformation of data for the dependent variables. Nevertheless, the 
results from the test did now show significant differences from the primary findings. 
    The second robustness check was done through stepwise backwards regression analysis based 
on the multiple linear regression models developed. In this analysis, all independent variables 
were initially involved, and they were tested one by one for statistical significance. The models 
deleted the ones that were not significant. Appendices J, K, L, M, N, O, P and Q show the results 
from the stepwise backwards regression analysis for the 8 models in the study. The results were 
shown to be the same as the primary findings. 
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7.10 Summary 
    This chapter overall showed empirical support for the hypotheses developed by Legitimacy 
Theory, Stakeholder Theory and Signalling Theory, and the findings in this study are expected 
to contribute valuable evidence to this CSD research area. The main statistical tests adopted 
were descriptive statistics, univariate analysis and multivariate analysis, where OLS multiple 
regression models were used to examine the hypotheses. A logistic regression model and 
stepwise backward regression model were also employed for robustness tests. The results 
suggest that the hypotheses can only partially be accepted, and that ‘firm size’ and ‘company 
location’ have constantly influenced CSD as driving forces in all CSD models. The other 
variables also had different degrees of influence among the models. Legitimacy and stakeholder 
theories were shown to play essential and important roles in explaining different parts of the 
findings, whereas Signalling Theory was shown to have influence to a lesser extent. Overall, all 
three theories were evidently complementing each other, and explained different parts of the 
study. The robustness showed no difference from the main OLS regression analysis. The next 
chapter presents summaries of all chapters in this study. Further conclusions, implications, 
limitations and suggestions for future studies are also included.      
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
    This final chapter provides summaries of the previous chapters, and major findings and 
discussions of the study. It also provides answers to the research questions in regards to the 
users’ perceived importance of CSD in China and the current status of the quality of CSD in 
Chinese listed firms, as well as its driving forces. Implications of the study, limitations and 
suggestions for future studies are also presented in this chapter. 
8.2 General review and chapter summaries 
    The study overall has shown empirical findings of the Chinese report users’ perceived 
importance of CSD in the Chinese listed companies. It also examined the quality of CSD using 
the CSDPI developed in the study as an instrument, and by GRI. Comparisons from both 
instruments were made to draw a conclusion, showing the differences between the models. The 
final analyses provide the degree of influence from the driving forces hypothesised based on the 
perspectives of Legitimacy Theory, Stakeholder Theory and Signalling Theory. The following 
sections provide summaries of each chapter (excluding Chapter 1). 
    Chapter 2 presented a review of the literature on empirical studies of CSD. This chapter 
particularly reviewed the concept and definition of CSD in the Chinese context, where a strong 
degree of influence impacted on Chinese stakeholders, causing different understandings and 
perceptions of CSD. It also reviewed the influence on corporate sustainability reporting from 
GRI in China, as well as how GRI had an impact on the ownership structures of the listed 
Chinese firms. The empirical studies reviewed were grouped into internal driving forces and 
external driving forces on CSD. The literature review provided conceptual and theoretical 
resources from which the author was able to develop appropriate theoretical frameworks and 
methodology for this study.  
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    In the first part of Chapter 3, the Signalling Theory framework was elaborated on, and its 
importance and relevance for the development of the research instrument was justified, 
analysing the users’ perceived importance of CSD. With respect to the driving forces of the 
quality of CSD, the second part of the chapter developed 10 hypotheses based on three key 
theoretical frameworks – Legitimacy Theory, Stakeholder Theory and Signalling Theory. 
Hypotheses developed from Legitimacy Theory included industry type, company location, firm 
age, firm size and leverage, where firm size and leverage were control variables. Three 
hypotheses were developed from Stakeholder Theory, including government ownership, legal 
person ownership and foreign ownership. Two hypotheses were developed from Signalling 
Theory: performance and corporate sustainability expenditure.   
    Chapter 4 outlined the methodology employed for the three main analyses for this study – 
the development of the research instrument, the analysis of the quality of CSD and the driving 
forces of CSD. Sample selection and data collection for all analyses were presented first, 
followed by a description of the instrument, and the coding method based on the instrument. 
This chapter also described research design, data analyses and the research models used in this 
study.    
    Chapter 5 described the analyses of the users’ perceptions of CSD and the instrument 
development. The analyses examined how important the Chinese report users perceived CSD in 
the listed Chinese companies, and this was compared with the results from the importance 
intended by GRI. A set of survey questionnaires was developed to collect data on the users’ 
perceptions, and a pilot study was first conducted to ensure its validity for a full study survey. 
Data collected was shown by descriptive statistics and analysed by one sample t-test. The 
research instrument was developed based on the results from the analyses, and was referred to 
as CSDPI later in the study. This chapter answered research question 1, and partially answered 
research question 2. 
    Chapter 6 showed and discussed the analyses of CSD of the Chinese listed companies in 
2013. The analyses examined the type and the quality of CSD, based on GRI and CSDPI. This 
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chapter also showed the quality of CSD in terms of economic disclosure, environmental 
disclosure, social disclosure and the integrated corporate sustainability disclosure. Research 
question 3 was answered in this chapter.  
    Chapter 7 presented a series of statistical analyses to examine the association between the 
quality of CSD and the driving forces hypothesised in Chapter 2. There were a total of 8 
research models, and each model was examined twice, with or without the control variables. 
Data analyses included in this chapter were descriptive statistics, univariate analysis – Pearson 
correlation analysis, Multivariate analysis – OLS, logistic regression and stepwise backward 
regressions. Comparisons between the model by the CSDPI and by GRI were made based on 
the statistical results. This chapter answered research questions 4 and 5, and addressed the 
unanswered part of research question 2. 
8.3 Major findings  
    This section presents the conclusive findings, organised in the order of the research 
questions.  
8.31 The Chinese report users’ perceived importance of CSD 
    In general, the results of the analyses of the users’ perceived importance of CSD indicated 
that the importance of CSD perceived by the report users was partially different from what was 
intended by GRI. The degree of difference varied across disclosure categories. The trends in 
results showed that while environmental disclosure was perceived the most important aspect in 
sustainability, social and economic disclosure were considerably less important. It was noted that 
economic disclosure was perceived as less important by the users than was intended by GRI. The 
results from this analysis are consistent with what the study hypothesised, due to the unique 
cultural and political background of the Chinese context, and it provides much relevance to 
existing research into China’s corporate sustainability or social responsibility practices and 
reporting mechanisms.     
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    With respect to the individual aspect of sustainability, all the categories from environmental 
disclosure were perceived as more important than was intended by GRI. Both the results from the 
t-test and descriptive statistics showed evidence that none of the environmental categories 
obtained a CSDPI score less than GRI’s default importance value of ‘4’. This can be explained 
due to the success of implementation of the 12th Five Year Plan of National Economic and Social 
Development, announced by the Chinese government in 2011. Similar findings were highlighted 
by existing research, showing that the implementation of the national sustainability plan was 
successful in terms of raising people’s awareness and understanding of environmental protection 
and national sustainability development (CSMAR, 2013). In terms of the importance of 
environmental disclosure by category, items included in the 12th Five Year Plan had significant 
influence on the users’ perceived importance of environmental disclosure. The results indicated 
that “Energy”, “Water”, “Emissions”, “Effluents and Waste” and “Compliance” were perceived 
as more important than the other indicators. The relevant items in the Five Year Plan include 
information disclosure on emissions and pollutants containing carbon dioxide, sulphur dioxide, 
chemical oxygen demand and nitrogen oxide, where emissions of CO2 was listed as the primary 
pollution to be reduced (CASS, 2016). It is known in the context of China that around 60% to 
70% of energy is generated from burning coal, which causes enormous amounts of carbon 
emission and air pollution. The 12th Five Year Plan extends the mission from the 11th Five Year 
Plan by beginning a low-carbon economy, and it also lists details of promoting energy-saving and 
carbon reduction in major industries (CASS, 2016). The tendency in the results shows that the 
Chinese government had been making an effort to promote a carbon reduction policy, which 
consequently raised people’s understanding of the seriousness of national environmental issues.  
    Categories from economic disclosure and social disclosure were perceived as less important 
by the report users, compared to environmental disclosure. Items related to significant social 
events or exposed by media showed more importance in the results, particularly when they were 
related to faulty products and the milk power scandal of 2006. The three sub-categories under 
“Product Responsibility”: “Customer health and safety”, “Customer privacy” and “Compliance” 
showed significant importance in the results. Economic disclosure was perceived least important 
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in comparison to the other two types of disclosure, due to the fact that its information could be 
obtained from companies’ annual reports. However, as it shows the less frequently reported 
information that is often desired by readers of sustainability reports, report users could still obtain 
information that they could not often find in annual reports. Nonetheless, the users might find it 
less important in comparison with the other two types of disclosure because information was 
available from annual reports. 
    A research instrument was developed based on the findings from the analyses. Consequently, 
the following categories obtained higher weightings in the CSDPI: energy, water, emissions, 
effluents and waste, compliance, child labour, security practice, environmental compliance, 
customer health and safety, customer privacy and social compliance. On the contrary, the 
following items were perceived as having less importance: market presence, indirect economic 
impacts, procurement practices, human rights investment, non-discrimination, freedom of 
association and collective bargaining, indigenous rights assessment, supplier human rights 
assessment, human rights grievance mechanisms, local community, public policy, 
anti-competitive behaviour, supplier assessment for impact on society, marketing 
communications, employment, and diversity and equal opportunity. The rest of the categories in 
G4 retained their importance as intended by GRI in the research instrument.    
8.32 The extent and quality of CSD in Chinese listed companies 
    The results of the study suggest that the overall level of CSD quality was low, and the 
information disclosed was limited to descriptions of positive sustainability practices. This is 
made evident by the level of the average quality per indicator in CSD, which was barely above 
information being omitted. A minority of the sample firms obtained a high quality of disclosure, 
with scores of ‘4’ or ‘5’; however, as this was only the case for the minority of the companies 
selected, it was not significant enough to have a strong influence on the final results. In terms of 
specific sustainability disclosure, economic disclosure was best-disclosed among environmental 
disclosure and social disclosure, even though the average quality per indicator (0.9) was still 
less than an acceptable level. Social disclosure was the second-best reported, slightly better than 
the quality of environmental disclosure with an average quality of 0.5 and 0.43 for social and 
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environmental respectively. This result indicates that there was not much difference in terms of 
the scores obtained for each type of disclosure, and as the scores were below 1, it suggests that, 
overall, the quality of CSD was fairly low in 2013. The extent of CSD, which was measured by 
CSD disclosing rate, indicated that economic and social information was disclosed to a 
significantly greater extent than environmental disclosure. As discussed in chapter seven, this 
was due to the introduction of the Bulletin of Disclosure of Corporate Environmental 
Performance in 2003, stating that companies only needed to disclose when they exceeded the 
level of discharged pollutant set in the Bulletin. Also, companies from the 13 high-profile 
industries were more likely to report environmental information, whereas if a company was not 
so environmentally sensitive, it was less likely to disclose. There was not much restriction in 
terms of company industries on disclosing economic and social information. Consequently, as 
the results show, it is necessary to combine economic, environmental and social disclosure 
when analysing CSD as a whole. 
    In terms of the specific categories in CSD, it was generally found that items relevant to 
policies and requirements from government and governing bodies, as well as significant social 
events, were more likely to be disclosed. There were 9 categories in the instrument shown to 
have a significantly higher quality of disclosure, due to their average quality being well above 
the mean of total CSD. These include indirect economic impact, training and education, security 
practice, environmental overall, public policy, economic performance, environmental impact 
(additional question), energy and employment. The highly disclosed economic and social 
categories that were in association with economic impacts, economic performance and social 
security, were influenced by the formation of two new governing task forces in the Third Plenary 
session in November 2013. The national tasks were to focus on economic development and 
national and social security due to the change of government leadership. With regard to energy 
and environmental overall, the categories being highly disclosed were affected by the 12th Five 
Year National Plan which enacted the Circular Economy Promotion Law, in which energy was 
listed as the main focus area environmentally, in order to create a low-carbon economy. 
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    It is evident from the study that well disclosed items in CSD were not necessarily perceived as 
so important by the report users. Most of the top disclosed items were at a low rank in terms of the 
CSDPI, and more importantly-perceived items were ranked at the bottom in terms of the amount 
of CSD quality. For example, although water was perceived as most important by the users, the 
amount of CSD quality was only 0.23, ranked 28th out of the total of 47 categories. On the 
contrary, indirect economic impact was the second-least important item, but it obtained the 
highest amount of CSD quality. The results from the analysis suggest that there is a potential 
negative correlation between the users’ perceived importance of CSD and the actual quality of 
CSD. The rationale behind a highly importantly perceived item could possibly be twofold. The 
report users did not see enough information about a specific area; although the information was 
disclosed, the extent and the quality of information was not sufficient for evaluation. The second 
reason could be that the report users did not see information that they perceived to be highly 
important, and they wish to see more of such information in future. Nonetheless, due to the scope 
of this study, no further analyses were carried out to specifically investigate the correlation 
between the users’ perceived importance and the quality of CSD. This can be a variable 
suggestion for future studies.               
8.33 The driving forces of the quality of CSD 
This study examined the associations between the quality of CSD in the Chinese listed 
companies in 2013 and the driving forces of CSD using content analysis. Based on the nature of 
the data, Ordinary Least Square models were employed in the multivariate analysis as the main 
statistical tools. There were 8 models developed in this study to test each aspect of CSD. The 
dependent variables were coded by CSDPI and GRI, and each coding method obtained four 
models to test the associations between the driving forces and the quality of CSD. As company 
size and leverage were set as control variables, each model was tested twice, with or without the 
control variable. However, the results did not show significant differences in relation to the 
inclusion or exclusion of the control variables. In order to ensure the accuracy and validity of 
the regression models, logistic regression models and stepwise backward regression models 
were adopted in robustness tests. Results from all three regression models showed similar 
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findings and statistical significance for the predictor variables. As corporate sustainability 
incorporates economic, environmental and social aspects, the models in this study examined 
economic disclosure, environmental disclosure and social disclosure separately. An integrated 
CSD model that combines all three types of disclosure, representing overall sustainability, was 
also included. With respect to the significance of the variables, company size as represented by 
total assets was found to be a significant predictor of variables on the quality of all CSD. 
Similarly, company location, represented as whether a company was located in a developed 
economic area, was found significant in economic disclosure, social disclosure and overall 
sustainability disclosure. Foreign ownership measured by percentage of shared held by foreign 
companies was found significant in environmental disclosure and overall sustainability 
disclosure. Other variables, found statistically significant only in environmental disclosure and 
social disclosure, were company age and industry, and corporate sustainability expenditure. It is 
interesting that government ownership and leverage were found to have negative signs in 
common among all CSD models, as tentative existing studies on CSD suggested positive 
correlations between the variables. Overall, as the results from the regression models showed, 
common statistically significant variables were found in the models of economic disclosure, 
social disclosure, corporate sustainability disclosure and, partially, environmental disclosure. 
This suggests combining all three types of disclosure when analysing CSD as a whole; however, 
environmental disclosure may be examined separately depending on the purpose of a study, due 
to its partial consistency with the other types of disclosure. In addition, it is interesting and 
notable that there is no significant difference between the models coded by GRI and by CSDPI. 
The possible explanation for this could be the influence on and disturbance from the quality of 
CSD in the listed firm and the degree of difference between the users’ perceived importance and 
what was intended by GRI. Nevertheless, the models coded from the two indexes were not 
identical, suggesting that statistically significant differences could still be examined. To 
conclude this finding, it is evident that a certain degree of difference in the perceived 
importance of CSD existed between the users and what was intended by GRI, provided that the 
extent was considerably small in respect to overall corporate sustainability. 
188 
 
    Relevant to bivariate analysis, Pearson correlation analyses were adopted to test the 
correlations of the predictors with each of the CSD models individually. The analysis overall 
showed similar results as the in multiple regression models. Company location and company 
size were both found statistically significant at p < 0.01 level in all CSD models. Foreign 
ownership was found strongly significant in environmental disclosure and sustainability 
disclosure. Interestingly, leverage was found to have strong statistical significance in 
environmental disclosure, social disclosure and CSD models, and a significance level of 0.1 was 
obtained in economic disclosure; however, leverage did not show statistical significance at all in 
the multiple regression models. No signs of significance were shown in the robustness test, 
where stepwise backward regressions tested the variables by eliminating the least significant 
ones. Leverage once again did not show statistical significance in this analysis.  
    The outcomes of the statistical test overall partially supported the hypotheses in accordance 
with Legitimacy Theory, Stakeholder Theory and Signalling Theory during the year of 2013. 
Larger firms with foreign ownership, located in a developed economic area, were more likely to 
produced CSD of higher quality. For environmental disclosure, the quality was more likely to 
be higher for older, high-profile industrial companies with government ownership or foreign 
ownership.      
8.4 Implications of findings 
    The findings of this study have many implications for corporate sustainability report 
preparers, regulators, general report users and researchers in this field. Content analysis used in 
CSDPI captured the quality of CSD in relation to economic disclosure, environmental 
disclosure and social disclosure, in which 47 categories were specifically examined in each type 
of CSD. This study provides a clear insight into companies’ internal and external driving forces 
of CSD from the perspectives of Stakeholder Theory, Legitimacy Theory and Signalling Theory. 
It was found that not all dimensions of the theories were significant in any one model. With 
respect to Legitimacy Theory, most of the hypothesised variables were significant in either one 
of the models, with firm size and location being the most significant over all of the research 
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models. This indicates that legitimacy is key in the context of China. With regard to Stakeholder 
Theory, the dimensions of stakeholder power and ownership diffusion were most considered in 
this study, from which variables regarding different types of ownership were developed. The 
results only partially showed that these dimensions of Stakeholder Theory explained the quality 
of CSD. Signalling Theory was employed for the development of the instrument, as well as for 
the hypothesis. However, the results from the study showed that the hypotheses developed 
based on this theory were not able to explain the quality of CSD, and corporate sustainability 
expenditure was only significant in social disclosure models. 
    One major implication of the findings from the study is the research instrument developed 
from the analysis of the Chinese report users’ perceptions towards corporate sustainability 
reporting. The analysis captured the level of importance perceived by the report users, which 
was compared with the importance intended by GRI. Consequently, this study has implications 
first for the report preparers, in terms of sustainability information that was of the most interest 
to the users. It helps CSD preparers to understand the difference in perceptions between report 
users and governing bodies, thereby increasing the effectiveness of disclosure. The preparers 
would be also benefit from this study as a guide to making sustainability disclosure and 
understanding report users’ concerns of and interests in CSD at different levels of the reporting 
process. For regulators, policies can be made, amended or mandated relevant to the results 
showed in this study, by looking at the areas of sustainability that users are most interested in 
and concerned with, as well as how this differs from the global standards. This helps regulators 
in the regulatory process and policy-making decisions, as the study reveals the interests of an 
important group of stakeholders extensively. It is crucial to the governing bodies in the Chinese 
market economy, because the report users generally represent the public that eventually obtain 
evaluation of CSD from financial analysts.   
    Another implication from the study is from the results of the quality of CSD with the most 
up-to-date evidence, which helps CSD users in general to understand the sustainability aspects 
of a company when investing. It provides insight into the quality of CSD in the listed Chinese 
companies, showing the disclosed information with the level of importance perceived by 
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financial analysts. The users in general would subsequently benefit from the study as a guide for 
their decision-making processes. As indicated in the results, the most importantly-perceived 
information was barely disclosed in the disclosure reports from the listed companies; therefore, 
this study can also help industries to improve their quality of CSD. In addition, only a slight 
difference was obtained in the comparison of results between the models of economic, 
environmental, and social disclosure, and the integrated model of CSD, which suggests that 
these sustainability disclosures should be considered as a whole when analysing CSD practices, 
due to their strong relevance to each other. This implies to policy makers that policies for 
corporate sustainability must include all three perspectives in the development process. 
Therefore, in the context of China, this study provides an indication of a perception of CSD 
from the users’ perspective, by revealing the users’ perceived importance of GRI items. The 
quality values for CSD indicate that the level of corporate sustainability reporting was generally 
low, and it suggests to Chinese regulators when preparing reporting standards that they must be 
mindful of the report users’ perceptions of the importance of disclosing items. It is important to 
use GRI as a guideline, but there are factors that influence users’ perceptions, such as political 
interference, public pressure, media exposure and significant social events, and these issues 
must be considered in the regulatory and policy-making processes. Furthermore, since economic 
disclosure was reported with a higher level of quality than the other types of disclosure, the cost 
of information should also be considered from the regulators’ and the users’ perspective. The 
study also showed the disclosing rate of 100 percent in firms’ stand-alone sustainability reports. 
Even though the nature of the stand-alone reports was essentially to disclose sustainability 
information, it was clear that all companies reported at least something from GRI. This suggests 
that, overall, the level of CSD in China is improving under the encouragement and monitoring 
activities from the governing bodies, as well as many other external driving forces, such as 
business ethics and corporate governance, which could be interesting to investigate in future 
studies.                
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8.5 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
    There are a number of limitations in the current study. First, the study is limited to collecting 
only stand-alone reports from the listed companies; therefore, it may not be possible to generalise 
these results for a larger Chinese context, because of other CSD media such as newspapers and 
stand-alone website disclosure.  
Secondly, stand-alone CSD was on a completely voluntary basis, and companies that did not issue 
such reports could be neglected, because they could disclose corporate sustainability in their 
annual reports. Nevertheless, in chapter four, it was indicated that many Chinese companies do 
not disclose sustainability if they have issued a separate stand-alone disclosure report. Therefore, 
in future research, in order to obtain the most optimal results, all publicly available corporate 
sustainability report media should be considered.  
    The business environment in China changes over time due to its complexity in nature and its 
unique economic background. There could be inherent difficulties and limits to obtaining and 
capturing corporate sustainability in a single observation of the 2013 period. Therefore, the results 
of this study do not show the trend of development and influence of corporate sustainability over 
years. Future studies could apply a longitudinal approach in which they measure how perceptions 
of CSD change, as well as CSD’s influence over a number of years.   
    The r squared values in the models were relatively low, and the results in variables suggested 
that the theories could only partially explain the quality of CSD in the Chinese context. This 
suggests that future studies may find other representative variables in the Chinese context. 
Nonetheless, the values were statistically significant and acceptable overall in terms of the 
statistical critical values. In addition, company location and foreign ownership may be considered 
in future studies, because there was a lack of investigation of influence from a regional level and 
from a foreign company’s perspective. This is important because there are different levels of 
legitimacy faced by companies due to their location and type of ownership.  
In addition, there may be some issues surrounding the validity of the content analysis method, 
due to the problem of the subjectivity of a single researcher (Krippendorff, 2004). Nevertheless, 
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the results from content analysis were partially re-examined by another experienced researcher, 
and no major errors were indicated. Inconsistency in results was discussed and adjusted with 
accuracy. 
        With regard to the users’ perceptions of CSD in 2013, no explanatory hypotheses were set 
to explain why the users perceived CSD in the ways indicated in the study. This is due to the fact 
that the purpose of this analysis was essentially to develop an instrument for this study, and the 
analysis of the users’ perceptions was an exploratory process for creating the instrument. 
Although indicators of the users’ perceived importance of CSD could be examined by 
visualisation from descriptive statistics, more specific measures and predication can be 
considered in future research. In addition, this study only considered financial analysts as the 
sample representing and generalising the report users, but there could be other types of 
stakeholders who used the report. Therefore, future studies could consider users other than 
financial analysts. As this study examined only perceptions of CSD in 2013, results may change 
over time as the policies and setting for corporate sustainability change. China is currently 
experiencing fast-paced sustainability development, and the perceptions of CSD from companies 
stakeholders’ will also change as time passes. Therefore, researchers in the future need to 
consider the comprehensiveness of the instrument and coding methods which will be appropriate 
and suitable in the context of China.  
    This study has provided evidence of CSD practice in Chinese listed companies in 2013, and 
important areas were examined based on the report users’ perceived importance of CSD. Due to 
the broad nature of corporate sustainability, this research cannot include many other aspects or 
methods for testing. Nevertheless, Legitimacy Theory and Stakeholder Theory played critical 
roles to explain the quality of CSD, and Signalling Theory helped explain the users’ perceptions 
of CSD. This study considered only the quality of CSD and the users’ perceived importance of 
CSD in 2013, and generalisation of the results could be difficult. All in all, the findings of this 
study should be viewed in light of the limitations, but it provides solid information and a 
contribution to future research into corporate sustainability reporting.    
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Appendix A: Statement of objectives 
Ordinal Scale Description 
5 Separate statement in section of corporate sustainability, 
which must include the following items: mission, goals, 
and performance targets in specific, concise, 
understandable, and realistic terminology. All items must 
have measureable/quantitative dimensions and a given 
time frame. 
4 As per 5, but deficient in one significant item. 
3 General and specific, some breadth, and including only 
some significant measurement. 
2 Lacking any significant measurement. 
1 Brief; incomplete. 
0 Omitted. 
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Appendix B: Email to participants 
Dear Participants， 
An invitation to participate in a research project。 
My name is Alex Zhang (Junru Zhang), a PhD candidate in the Faculty of Business and Law at 
Edith Cowan University who is conducting a research on corporate sustainability and 
sustainability reporting which have now become two of the most serious concerns in the business 
world in China.  
 
I would like to invite you to participate in this survey that has been designed to explore the 
perceptions of the sustainability from the report users. The questionnaire should take not more 
than 20 minutes of your valuable time. This survey is entirely voluntary and there will be no 
sensitive or confidential information asked and collected. Your responses will be treated 
anonymously and with the strictest confidence. Your participation will be very important and 
highly appreciated, and it will help to complete a research project in order to fulfil my doctoral 
degree requirement.  
 
Should you have any questions or require any further information regarding this research, please 
contact: 
• Alex Zhang (Junru Zhang), PhD Candidate, Email: junruz@our.ecu.edu.au 
• Associate Professor Hadrian Djajadikerta, Principal Supervisor, Email: 
h.djajadikerta@ecu.edu.au 
• Associate Professor Zhaoyong Zhang, Co-Supervisor, Email: zhaoyong.zhang@ecu.edu.au 
 
Address:  Faculty of Business and Law, Edith Cowan University 
270 Joondalup Drive, Joondalup, WA 6027, Australia 
 
This research project has been approved by ECU Human Research Ethics Committee. If you 
have any concern or complaint about the study and wish to speak to an independent person, you 
may contact: 
 
Research Ethics Officer 
Edith Cowan University 
Phone: +61 8 63042170, Email: research.ethics@ecu.edu.au 
 
If you agree to participate in this survey, please click on the below website address: 
https://ecuau.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_cHosL68IcSwlFFr 
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If you wish to get a copy of the result of this research you can put your email address at the end of 
the survey. The result will be emailed to you once the research is completed.  
 
Thank you very much for your time and kind participation.  
 
Kind regards, 
Alex Zhang (Junru Zhang) 
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Appendix C: Environmental information (pilot study and full 
study)  
1. Material usage (by weight or volume; percentage of materials used are from recycled 
materials)  
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
2. Energy (energy consumption within the organisation; energy consumption outside of the 
organisation; energy intensity; reduction of energy consumption; reduction in energy 
requirements of products and services) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
3. Water (total amount of withdrawal by source; water sources significantly affected by 
withdrawal of water; percentage and total volume of water recycled and reused) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
4. Biodiversity (operational sites owned, leased, managed in, or adjacent to, protected areas and 
areas of high biodiversity value outside protected areas; description of significant impacts of 
activities, products, and services on biodiversity in protected areas and areas of high 
biodiversity value outside protected areas; habitats protected or restored; total number of 
ICUH red list species and national conservation list species with habitats in areas affected by 
operations, by level of extinction risk)  
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
5. Emissions (direct greenhouse gas emissions; energy indirect greenhouse gas emissions; other 
indirect greenhouse gas emissions; greenhouse gas emission intensity; reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions; emissions of ozone-depleting substances; NOx, SOx, and other 
significant air emissions)  
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
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6. Effluents and waste (total water discharge by quality and destination; total weight of waste by 
type and disposal method; total number and volume of significant spills; weight of 
transported, imported, exported, or treated waste deemed hazardous under the terms of the 
Basel convention annexes i, ii, iii, and viii, and percentage of transported waste shipped 
internationally; identity, size, protected status, and biodiversity value of water bodies and 
related habitats significantly affected by the organisation’s discharges of water and runoff ) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
7. Products and services (extent of impact mitigation of environmental impacts of products and 
services; percentage of products sold and their packaging materials that are reclaimed by 
category) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
8. Compliance (monetary value of significant fines and total number of non-monetary sanctions 
for non-compliance with environmental laws and regulations)  
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
9. Transportation (significant environmental impacts of transporting products and other goods 
and materials for the organisation’s operations, and transporting members of the workforce) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
10. Overall (total environmental protection expenditures and investments by type) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
11. Supplier Environmental Assessment (percentage of new suppliers that were screened using 
environmental criteria; significant potential negative environmental impacts in the supply 
chain and actions taken) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
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12. Environmental grievance mechanisms (number of grievances about environmental impacts 
filed, addressed, and resolved through formal grievance mechanism) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
13. Other: please specify here and rate.  
  
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
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Appendix D: Economic information (pilot study and full 
study) 
1. Economic performance (direct economic value generated and distributed; financial 
implications and other risks and opportunities for the organisation’s activities due to climate 
change; coverage of the organisation’s defined benefit plan obligation; financial assistance 
received from government) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
2. Market presence (ratios of standard entry level wage by gender compared to local minimum 
wage at significant locations of operation; proportion of senior management hired from the 
local community at significant locations of operation) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
3. Indirect economic impacts (development and impact of infrastructure investments and 
services supported; significant indirect economic impacts, including the extent of impacts) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
4. Procurement practices (proportion of spending on local suppliers at significant location of 
operation) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
5. Other: please specify here and rate. 
     
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
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Appendix E: Social information (pilot study) 
1. Labour practise and decent work (employment; labour/management relationship; 
occupational health and safety; training and education; diversity and equal opportunity; equal 
remuneration for women and men; supplier assessment for labour practices; labour practices 
grievance mechanisms) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
2. Human rights (investment; non-discrimination; freedom of association and collective 
bargaining; child labour; forced or compulsory labour; security practice; indigenous rights 
assessment; supplier human rights assessment; human rights grievance mechanisms) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
3. Society (local community; anti-corruption; public policy; anti-competitive behaviour; 
compliance; supplier assessment for impacts on society; grievance mechanism for impacts on 
society) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
4. Product responsibility (customer health and safety; product and service labelling; marketing 
communications; customer privacy; compliance) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
5. Other: please specify here and rate. 
  
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
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Appendix F: Social information (full study) 
Labour practices and decent work 
1. Employment (total workforce by employment type, employment contract and region, broken 
down by gender; total number and rate of new employee heirs and employee turnover by age 
group, gender, and region; benefits provided to full-time employees that are not provided to 
temporary or part-time employees, by significant locations of operations; return to work and 
retention rates after parental leave by gender) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
2. Labour/management relations (percentage of employees covered by collective bargaining 
agreements; minimum notice periods regarding operational changes, including whether it is 
specified in collective agreements) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
3. Occupational health and safety (percentage of total workforce represented in formal joint 
management – worker health and safety committees that help monitor and advise on 
occupational health and safety programs; rates of injury, occupational diseases, lost days 
and absenteeism, and total number of work-related fatalities, by region and by gender; 
education, training, counselling, prevention, and risk-control programs in place to assist 
workforce members, their families, or community members regarding serious diseases; 
health and safety topics covered in formal agreements with trade unions) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
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4. Training and education (average hours of training per employee by gender, and by 
employee category; programs for skill management and lifelong learning that support the 
continued employability of employees and assist them in managing retirement; percentage 
of employees receiving regular performance and career development reviews, by gender) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
5. Diversity and equal opportunity (composition of governance bodies and breakdown of 
employees per employee category according to gender, age group, minority group 
membership, and other indicators of diversity) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
6. Equal remuneration for women and men (ratio of basic salary and remuneration of women 
to men by employee category, by significant locations of operation) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
Human rights 
7. Investment and procurement practices (percentage and total number of significant 
investment agreements and contracts that include clauses incorporating human rights 
concerns, or that have undergone human rights screening; percentage of significant 
suppliers, contractors, and other business partners that have undergone human rights 
screening, and actions taken; total hours of employee training on policies and procedures 
concerning aspects of human rights that are relevant to operations, including the percentage 
of employees trained) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
8. Non-discrimination (total number of incidents of discrimination and corrective action taken) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
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9. Freedom of association and collective bargaining (operations and significant suppliers 
identified in which the right to exercise freedom of association and collective bargaining 
may be violated or at significant risk, and action taken to support these rights) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
10. Child labour (operations and significant suppliers identified as having significant risk for 
incidents of forced or compulsory labour, and measures to contribute to the elimination of 
all forms of forced or compulsory labour) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
11. Forced and compulsory labour (Operations and significant suppliers identified as having 
significant risk for incidents of forced or compulsory labour, and measures to contribute to 
the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
12. Security practices (percentage of security personnel trained in the organisation’s policies or 
procedures concerning aspects of human rights that are relevant to operations) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
13. Indigenous rights (total number of incidents of violations involving rights of indigenous 
people and actions taken) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
14. Assessment (number of grievances related to human rights filed, addressed and resolved 
through formal grievance mechanisms) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
15. Supplier human rights assessment  
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
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16. Human rights grievance mechanisms  
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
Society 
17. Local communities (percentage of operations with implemented local community 
engagement, impact assessments and development programs; operations with significant 
potential or actual negative impacts on local communities; prevention and mitigation 
measures implemented in operations with significant potential or actual negative impacts on 
local communities) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
18. Corruption (percentage and total number of business units analysed for risks related to 
corruption; percentage of employees trained in organisation’s anti-corruption policies and 
procedures; action taken in response to incidents of corruption) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
19. Public policy (public policy positions and participation in public policy development and 
lobbying; total value of financial and in-kind contributions to political parties, politicians, 
and related institutions by country) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
20. Anti-competitive behaviour (total number of legal actions for anti-competitive behaviour, 
anti-trust and monopoly practices and their outcomes) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
21. Compliance (monetary value of significant fines and total number of non-monetary 
sanctions for non-compliance with laws and regulations) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
22. Supplier assessment for impact on society 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
23. Grievance mechanism for impact on society 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
Product responsibility 
24. Customer health and safety (life cycle stages in which health and safety impacts on products 
and services are assessed for improvement, and percentage of significant products and 
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services categories subject to such procedures; total number of incidents of non-compliance 
with regulations and voluntary codes concerning health and safety impacts on products and 
services during their life cycle, by type of outcome) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
25. Product and service labelling (type of product and service information required by 
procedures, and percentage of significant products and services subject to such information 
requirements; total number of incidents of non-compliance with regulations and voluntary 
codes concerning product and service information and labelling, by type of outcome; 
practices related to customer satisfaction, including results of surveys measuring customer 
satisfaction) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
26. Marketing communications (programs for adherence to laws, standards, and voluntary 
codes related to marketing communications, including advertising promotion and 
sponsorship; total number of incidents of non-compliance with regulations and voluntary 
codes concerning marketing communications, including advertising, promotion and 
sponsorship by type of outcomes) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
27. Customer privacy (total number of substantiated complaints regarding breaches of customer 
privacy and losses of customer data) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
28. Compliance (monetary value of significant fines for compliance with laws and regulations 
concerning the provision and use of products and services) 
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
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29. Other: please specify here and rate. 
  
Least important Not important Neutral Important Most important 
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Appendix G: Results from Pilot study  
Results from descriptive statistics 
Frequency of environmental indicators (sample size N = 34) 
 Least 
important 
Not 
important 
Neutral Important Most 
important 
Mode 
Material usage  0 1 (2.9%) 6 (17.6%) 23 (67.6%) 4 (11.8%) Important 
Energy 0 1 (2.9%) 5 (14.7%) 22 (64.7%) 6 (7.6%) Important 
Water 0 1 (2.9%) 2 (5.9%) 14 (41.2%) 17 (50%) Most 
Important 
Biodiversity 1 (2.9%) 1 (2.9%) 6 (17.6%) 22 (64.7%) 4 (11.8%) Important 
Emissions 0  1 (2.9%) 2 (5.9%) 18 (52.9%) 13 
(38.2%) 
Important 
Effluents and 
Waste 
0 0 5 (14.7%) 14 (41.2%) 15 
(44.1%) 
Most 
Important 
Products and 
services 
0 0 11 (32.4%) 18 (52.9%) 5 (14.7%) Important 
Compliance 0 0 4 (11.8%) 18 (52.9%) 12 
(35.3%) 
Important 
Transportation 1 (2.9%) 3 (8.8%) 10(29.4%) 18 (52.9%) 2 (5.9%) Important 
Overall 
environmental 
sustainability 
0 1 (2.9%) 7 (20.6%) 23 (67.6%) 3 (8.8%) Important 
Supplier 
environmental 
assessment 
0 2 (5.9%) 6 (17.6%) 21 (61.8%) 5 (14.7%) Important 
Environmental 
grievance 
1 (2.9%) 2 (5.9%) 11 (32.4%) 19 (55.9%) 1 (2.9%) Important 
Open-ended question                   No response 
 
224 
 
Results from descriptive statistics 
Frequency of economic indicators (sample size N = 34) 
 Least 
important 
Not 
important 
Neutral Important Most 
important 
Mode 
Economic 
performance 
1 (2.9%) 1 (2.9%) 11 (32.4%) 19 (55.9%) 2 (5.9%) Important 
Market 
presence 
0 2 (5.9%) 10 (29.4%) 20 (58.8%) 2 (5.9%) Important 
Indirect 
economic 
impacts 
0 4 (11.8%) 13 (38.2%) 17 (50%) 0 Important 
Procurement 
practices 
0 6 (17.6%) 14 (41.2%) 14 (41.2%) 0 Important 
and 
Neutral 
Open-ended question    CPI of employees within a company; Accumulated unemployment   
 
Frequency of levels of importance among social sustainability aspects 
 Least 
important 
Not 
important 
Neutral Important Most 
important 
Mode 
Labour 
Practice and 
Decent Work 
0  2 (5.9%) 7 (20.6%) 22 (64.7%) 3 (8.8%) Important 
Human Rights 1 (2.9%) 1 (2.9%) 10 (29.4%) 14 (41.2%) 8 (23.5%) Important 
Society 0 3 (8.8%) 9 (26.5%) 20 (58.8%) 2 (5.9%) Important 
Product 
Responsibility 
0 2 (5.9%) 3 (8.8%) 22 (64.7%) 7 (20.6%) Important 
Open-ended question                      Sexism 
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Results from one sample t-test 
T-test for environmental indicators (sample size N = 34) 
T-test 95% Confidence Interval 
 Mean Std. Deviation t Sig. (2-tailed) 
Material usage  3.88 0.640 -1.071 0.292 
Energy 3.97 0.674 -0.255 0.801 
Water 4.38 0.739 3.016 0.005*** 
Biodiversity 3.79 0.808 -1.485 0.147 
Emissions 4.26 0.710 2.175 0.037** 
Effluents and 
Waste 
4.29 0.719 2.385 0.023** 
Products and 
services 
3.82 0.673 -1.529 0.136 
Compliance 4.24 0.654 2.098 0.044** 
Transportation 3.50 0.862 -3.384 0.002*** 
Overall 
environmental 
sustainability 
3.82 0.626 -1.643 0.110 
Supplier 
environmental 
assessment 
3.85 0.744 -1.153 0.257 
Environmental 
grievance 
3.50 0.788 -3.699 0.001*** 
*Significant at 0.1 level; **Significant at 0.05 level; ***Significant at 0.01 level
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Results from one sample t-test 
T-test for economic indicators (sample size N = 34) 
T-test 95% Confidence Interval 
 Mean Std. Deviation t Sig. (2-tailed) 
Economic 
performance 
3.59 0.783 -3.066 0.004*** 
Market 
presence 
3.65 0.691 -2.978 0.005*** 
Indirect 
economic 
impacts 
3.38 0.697 -5.167 0.000*** 
Procurement 
practices 
3.24 0.741 -6.018 0.000*** 
*Significant at 0.1 level; **Significant at 0.05 level; ***Significant at 0.01 level 
 
T-test for social indicators (N = 34) 
T-test 95% Confidence Interval 
 Mean Std. Deviation t Sig. (2-tailed) 
Labour 
Practice and 
Decent Work 
3.76 0.699 -1.963 0.058* 
Human Rights 3.79 0.946 -1.268 0.214 
Society 3.62 0.739 -3.016 0.005*** 
Product 
Responsibility 
4 0.739 0.000 1.000 
*Significant at 0.1 level; **Significant at 0.05 level; ***Significant at 0.01 level 
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Appendix H: Research instrument 
Code Category/indicator CSD type Score of 
quality by 
GRI 
CSD 
perceptions 
index (CSDPI) 
Score of 
quality by 
CSDPI 
 Economic performance   4  
EC1 Direct economic value generated and distributed Economic  4  
EC2 Financial implications and other risks and opportunities for the organisation’s 
activities due to climate change 
Economic  4  
EC3 Coverage of the organisation’s defined benefit plan obligation Economic  4  
EC4 Financial assistance received from government Economic  4  
 Market presence   3.87  
EC5 Ratios of standard entry level wage by gender compared to local minimum 
wage at significant locations of operation 
Economic  3.87  
EC6 Policy, practices, and proportion of spending on locally-based suppliers at 
significant locations of operation 
Economic  3.87  
EC7 Proportion of senior management hired from the local community at 
significant locations of operation 
Economic  3.87  
 Indirect economic impacts   3.69  
EC8 Development and impact of infrastructure investments and services supported Economic  3.69  
EC9 Significant indirect economic impacts, including the extent of impacts Economic  3.69  
 
 
Appendix H: Research instrument (Cont’d) 
228 
 
Code Category/indicator CSD type Score of 
quality by 
GRI 
CSD 
perceptions 
index (CSDPI) 
Score of 
quality by 
CSDPI 
EC10 Proportion of spending on local suppliers at significant location of operation Economic  3.64  
 Additional questions  N/P 4  
AQ1 CPI of employees Economic N/P 4  
AQ2 Spending regarding unemployed/retired workers Economic N/P 4  
 Material usage   4  
EN1 Material used by weight or volume Environmental  4  
EN2 Percentage of materials used are from recycled materials Environmental  4  
 Energy   4.2  
EN3 Direct energy consumption by primary energy Environmental  4.2  
EN4 Indirect energy consumption by primary energy Environmental  4.2  
EN5 Energy saved due to conservation and efficiency improvements Environmental  4.2  
EN6 Initiatives to provide energy-efficient or renewable energy based products 
and services, and reductions in energy requirements as a result of these 
initiatives 
Environmental  4.2  
EN7 Initiatives to reduce indirect energy consumption and reductions achieved Environmental  4.2  
 Water    4.51  
EN8 Total water withdrawal by source Environmental  4.51  
EN9 Water sources significantly affected by withdrawal of water  Environmental  4.51  
EN10 Percentage and total volume of water recycled and reused  Environmental  4.51  
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Appendix H: Research instrument (Cont’d) 
Code Category/indicator CSD type Score of 
quality by 
GRI 
CSD perceptions 
index (CSDPI) 
Score of 
quality by 
CSDPI 
EN11 Location and size of land owned, leased, managed in, or adjacent to, 
protected areas and areas of high biodiversity value outside protected areas 
Environmental  4  
EN12 Description of significant impacts of activities, products and services on 
biodiversity in protected areas and areas of high biodiversity value outside 
protected areas 
Environmental  4  
EN13 Habitats protected or restored Environmental  4  
EN14 Strategies, current actions, and future plans for managing impacts on 
biodiversity 
Environmental  4  
EN15 Number of IUCN red list species and national conservation list specifies 
with habitats in areas affected by operations, by level of extinction risk 
Environmental  4  
 Emissions   4.46  
EN16 Total direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions by weight Environmental  4.46  
EN17 Other relevant indirect greenhouse gas emissions by weight Environmental  4.46  
EN18 Initiatives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and reductions achieved Environmental  4.46  
EN19 Emissions of ozone-depleting substance by weight Environmental  4.46  
EN20 NO, SO and other significant air emissions by type and weight Environmental  4.46  
 Effluents and waste   4.48  
EN21 Total water discharge by quality and destination Environmental  4.48  
EN22 Total weight of waste by type and disposal method Environmental  4.48  
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Appendix H: Research instrument (Cont’d) 
Code Category/indicator CSD type Score of 
quality by 
GRI 
CSD 
perceptions 
index (CSDPI) 
Score of 
quality by 
CSDPI 
EN23 Total number and volume of significant spills Environmental  4.48  
EN24 Weight of transported, imported, exported, or treated waste deemed 
hazardous under the terms of the Basel Convention Annex I, II, III, and 
VIII, and percentage of transported waste shipped internationally 
Environmental  4.48  
EN25 Identity, size, protected status and biodiversity value of water bodies and 
related habitats significantly affected by the reporting organisation’s 
discharges of water and runoff 
Environmental  4.48  
 Products and services   4  
EN26 Initiatives to mitigate environmental impacts of products and services and 
extent of impact mitigation 
Environmental  4  
EN27 Percentage of products sold and their packaging materials that are 
reclaimed by category 
Environmental  4  
 Compliance   4.35  
EN28 Monetary value of significant fines and total number of non-monetary 
sanctions for non-compliance with environmental laws and regulations 
Environmental  4.35  
 Transport   4  
EN29 Significant environmental impacts of transporting products and other goods 
and materials used for the organisation’s operations, and transporting 
members of the workforce 
Environmental  4  
 Overall   4  
EN30 Total environmental protection expenditures and investments by type Environmental  4  
 Supplier Environmental Assessment   4  
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Appendix H: Research instrument (Cont’d) 
Code Category/indicator CSD type Score of 
quality by 
GRI 
CSD 
perceptions 
index 
(CSDPI) 
Score of 
quality by 
CSDPI 
EN31 Percentage of new suppliers that were screened using environmental criteria; 
significant potential negative environmental impacts in the supply chain and 
actions taken 
Environmental  4  
 Environmental grievance mechanisms   4  
EN32 Number of grievances about environmental impacts filed, addressed, and 
resolved through formal grievance mechanism 
Environmental  4  
 Additional questions  N/P 4  
AQ3 Pollution and waste by technical issues Environmental N/P 4  
AQ4 Overall environmental influence Environmental N/P 4  
 Labour practice and decent work     
 Employment   3.86  
LA1 Total workforce by employment type, employment contract and region, 
broken down by gender 
Social  3.86  
LA2 Total number and rate of new employee heirs and employee turnover by age 
group, gender, and region 
Social  3.86  
LA3 Benefits provided to full-time employees that are not provided to temporary 
or part-time employees, by significant locations of operations 
Social  3.86  
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Appendix H: Research instrument (Cont’d) 
Code Category/indicator CSD type Score of 
quality by GRI 
CSD 
perceptions 
index 
(CSDPI) 
Score of 
quality by 
CSDPI 
LA15 Return to work and retention rates after parental leave by gender Social  3.86  
 Labour/management relations   4  
LA4 Percentage of employees covered by collective bargaining agreements Social  4  
LA5 Minimum notice periods regarding operational changes, including whether 
it is specified in collective agreements 
Social  4  
 Occupational health and safety   4.22  
LA6 Percentage of total workforce represented in formal joint management – 
worker health and safety committees that help monitor and advise on 
occupational health and safety programs 
Social  4.22  
LA7 Rates of injury, occupational diseases, lost days and absenteeism, and total 
number of work-related fatalities, by region and by gender 
Social  4.22  
LA8 Education, training, counselling, prevention, and risk-control programs in 
place to assist workforce members, their families, or community members 
regarding serious diseases 
Social  4.22  
LA9 Health and safety topics covered in formal agreements with trade unions Social  4.22  
 Training and education   4  
LA10 Average hours of training per employee by gender, and by employee 
category 
Social  4  
LA11 Programs for skill management and lifelong learning that support the 
continued employability of employees and assist them in managing 
retirement 
Social  4  
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Appendix H: Research instrument (Cont’d) 
Code Category/indicator CSD type Score of 
quality by GRI 
CSD 
perceptions 
index 
(CSDPI) 
Score of 
quality by 
CSDPI 
LA12 Percentage of employees receiving regular performance and career 
development reviews, by gender 
Social  4  
 Diversity and equal opportunity   3.81  
LA13 Composition of governance bodies and breakdown of employees per 
employee category according to gender, age group, minority group 
membership, and other indicators of diversity 
Social  3.81  
 Equal remuneration for women and men   4  
LA14 Ratio of basic salary and remuneration of women to men by employee 
category, by significant locations of operation 
Social  4  
 Additional question  N/P 4  
AQ5 Sexism Social N/P 4  
 Human rights     
 Investment and procurement practices   3.79  
HR1 Percentage and total number of significant investment agreements and 
contracts that include clauses incorporating human rights concerns, or that 
have undergone human rights screening 
Social  3.79  
HR2 Percentage of significant suppliers, contractors, and other business partners 
that have undergone human rights screening, and actions taken 
Social  3.79  
HR3 Total hours of employee training on policies and procedures concerning 
aspects of human rights that are relevant to operations, including the 
percentage of employees trained 
Social  3.79  
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Appendix H: Research instrument (Cont’d) 
Code Category/indicator CSD type Score of 
quality by GRI 
CSD 
perceptions 
index 
(CSDPI) 
Score of 
quality by 
CSDPI 
 Non-discrimination   3.84  
HR4 Total number of incidents of discrimination and corrective action taken Social  3.84  
 Freedom of association and collective bargaining   3.81  
HR5 Operations and significant suppliers identified in which the right to exercise 
freedom of association and collective bargaining may be violated or at 
significant risk, and actions taken to support these rights 
Social  3.81  
 Child labour   4.16  
HR6 Operations and significant suppliers identified as having significant risk for 
incidents of child labour, and measures to contribute to the elimination of 
all forms of child labour 
Social  4.16  
 Forced and compulsory labour   4  
HR7 Operations and significant suppliers identified as having significant risk for 
incidents of forced or compulsory labour, and measures to contribute to the 
elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour 
Social  4  
 Security practices   4.16  
HR8 Percentage of security personnel trained in the organisation’s policies or 
procedures concerning aspects of human rights that are relevant to 
operations 
Social  4.16  
 Indigenous rights   3.81  
HR9 Total number of incidents of violations involving rights of indigenous 
people and actions taken 
Social  3.81  
 Assessment   3.78  
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Appendix H: Research instrument (Cont’d) 
Code Category/indicator CSD type Score of 
quality by GRI 
CSD 
perceptions 
index 
(CSDPI) 
Score of 
quality by 
CSDPI 
HR10 Number of grievances related to human rights filed, addressed and resolved 
through formal grievance mechanisms 
Social  3.78  
 Supplier human rights assessment   3.62  
HR11 Supplier human rights assessment Social  3.62  
 Human rights grievance mechanisms   3.78  
HR12 Human rights grievance mechanisms Social  3.78  
 Society     
 Local communities   3.76  
SO1 Percentage of operations with implemented local community engagement, 
impact assessments and development programs 
Social  3.76  
SO9 Operations with significant potential or actual negative impacts on local 
communities 
Social  3.76  
SO10 Prevention and mitigation measures implemented in operations with 
significant potential or actual negative impacts on local communities 
Social  3.76  
 Anti-corruption   4  
SO2 Percentage and total number of business units analysed for risks related to 
corruption 
Social  4  
SO3 Percentage of employees trained in organisation’s anti-corruption policies 
and procedures 
Social  4  
SO4 Action taken in response to incidents of corruption Social  4  
 Public policy   3.81  
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Appendix H: Research instrument (Cont’d) 
Code Category/indicator CSD type Score of 
quality by GRI 
CSD 
perceptions 
index 
(CSDPI) 
Score of 
quality by 
CSDPI 
SO5 Public policy positions and participation in public policy development and 
lobbying 
Social  3.81  
SO6 Total value of financial and in-kind contributions to political parties, 
politicians, and related institutions by country 
Social  3.81  
 Anti-competitive behaviour   3.88  
SO7 Total number of legal actions for anti-competitive behaviour, anti-trust and 
monopoly practices and their outcomes 
Social  3.88  
 Compliance   4.16  
SO8 Monetary value of significant fines and total number of non-monetary 
sanctions for non-compliance with laws and regulations 
Social  4.16  
SO11 Supplier assessment for impact on society Social  3.71  
SO12 Grievance mechanism for impact on society Social  4  
 Product responsibility      
 Customer health and safety   4.36  
PR1 Lifecycle stages in which health and safety impacts on products and 
services are assessed for improvement, and percentage of significant 
products and services categories subject to such procedures 
Social  4.36  
PR2 Total number of incidents of non-compliance with regulations and 
voluntary codes concerning health and safety impacts of products and 
services during their lifecycle, by type of outcomes 
Social  4.36  
 Product and service labelling   4  
237 
 
Appendix H: Research instrument (Cont’d) 
Code Category/indicator CSD type Score of 
quality by GRI 
CSD 
perceptions 
index 
(CSDPI) 
Score of 
quality by 
CSDPI 
PR3 Type of product and service information required by procedures, and 
percentage of significant products and services subject to such information 
requirements 
Social  4  
PR4 Total number of incidents of non-compliance with regulations and 
voluntary codes concerning product and service information and labelling, 
by type of outcome 
Social  4  
PR5 Practices related to customer satisfaction, including results of surveys 
measuring customer satisfaction 
Social  4  
 Marketing communications   3.83  
PR6 Programs for adherence to laws, standards, and voluntary codes related to 
marketing communications, including advertising promotion and 
sponsorship 
Social  3.83  
PR7 Total number of incidents of non-compliance with regulations and 
voluntary codes concerning marketing communications, including 
advertising, promotion and sponsorship by type of outcome 
Social  3.83  
 Customer privacy   4.31  
PR8 Total number of substantiated complaints regarding breaches of customer 
privacy and losses of customer data 
Social  4.31  
 Compliance   4.25  
PR9 Monetary value of significant fines for compliance with laws and 
regulations concerning the provision and use of products and services 
Social  4.25  
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Appendix I:   
Robustness test results – Binary logistics regressions (N = 238) 
  Model 1 (CEco) Model 2 (CEnv) Model 3 (CSoc) Model 4 (CSD) 
Variable Expected sign b Sig. (1-tailed) b Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
b Sig. (1-tailed) b Sig. (1-tailed) 
Constant N/A -8.326 0.007*** -0.818 0.176 -0.350 0.548 -0.401 0.496 
IND + -0.064 0.860 -0.880 0.013** -0.304 0.374 -0.521 0.131 
AREA + -1.077 0.000*** -0.236 0.450 -0.538 0.070* -0.636 0.034** 
AGE + -0.003 0.905 0.045 0.086* 0.002 0.947 0.035 0.165 
GOWN + -0.176 0.788 0.310 0.623 0.648 0.282 0.016 0.980 
LOWN + -0.322 0.332 -0.013 0.969 -0.348 0.292 -0.301 0.365 
FOWN + 0.785 0.498 3.091 0.101 0.133 0.909 1.930 0.092* 
PERF + 0.736 0.733 2.754 0.210 1.220 0.567 0.734 0.733 
CSE + -0.041 0.596 0.000 0.136 0.000 0.632 0.000 0.728 
SIZE + 0.390 0.025** 0.000 0.025** 0.000 0.087* 0.000 0.079* 
LEV + -0.449 0.007*** -0.163 0.115 -0.078 0.385 -0.080 0.381 
Note: Variable significance levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Appendix I:  
Robustness test results –Binary logistics regressions (N = 238) (Cont’d) 
  Model 5 (WEco) Model 6 (WEnv) Model 7 (WCSoc) Model 8 (WCSD) 
Variable Expected sign b Sig. (1-tailed) b Sig. (1-tailed) b Sig. (1-tailed) b Sig. (1-tailed) 
Constant N/A 0.122 0.838 -0.818 0.176 -0.326 0.577 -0.401 0.496 
IND + -0.121 0.735 -0.880 0.013** -0.341 0.319 -0.521 0.131 
AREA + -1.029 0.001*** -0.236 0.450 -0.574 0.054* -0.636 0.034** 
AGE + 0.013 0.614 0.045 0.086* 0.006 0.805 0.035 0.165 
GOWN + 0.209 0.739 0.310 0.623 0.516 0.395 0.016 0.980 
LOWN + -0.448 0.188 -0.013 0.969 -0.394 0.237 -0.301 0.365 
FOWN + 1.002 0.380 3.091 0.101 0.200 0.863 1.930 0.092* 
PERF + 1.286 0.558 2.754 0.210 1.053 0.623 0.734 0.733 
CSE + 0.000 0.697 0.000 0.136 0.000 0.589 0.000 0.728 
SIZE + 0.000 0.019** 0.000 0.025** 0.000 0.089* 0.000 0.079* 
LEV + -0.293 0.026** -0.163 0.115 -0.075 0.408 -0.080 0.381 
Note: Variable significance levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Appendix J:  
Robustness test results – Stepwise backwards regression for CEco (N = 238) 
   Test model 1 Test model 2 Test model 3 Test model 4 
Variable Hypothesis 
number 
Expected 
sign 
b Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
b Sig. (1-tailed) b Sig. (1-tailed) b Sig. (1-tailed) 
Constant N/A N/A -0.573 0.504 -0.578 0.499 -0.637 0.449 -.609 0.467 
LN (SIZE) H9 + 0.110 0.006*** 0.106 0.005*** 0.109 0.003*** .110 0.003*** 
AREA H2 + 0.214 0.026** 0.217 0.022** 0.216 0.022** .216 0.022** 
GOWN H4 + -0.278 0.163 -0.268 0.171 -0.278 0.152 -.306 0.098 
IND H1 + 0.161 0.142 0.158 0.148 0.155 0.153 .159 0.141 
LN (LEV) H10 + -.052 0.357 -0.051 0.363 -0.053 0.349 -.054 0.332 
AGE H3 + 0.005 0.506 0.005 0.501 0.005 0.506 .005 0.485 
PERF H7 + -0.288 0.663 -0.318 0.625 -0.332 0.609 -.342 0.597 
LOWN H5 + 0.050 0.613 0.050 0.607 0.049 0.617   
FOWN H6 + 0.132 0.712 0.140 0.694     
LN (CSE) H8 + -0.007 0.759       
Note: Variable significance levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
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Appendix J:  
Robustness test results – Stepwise backwards regression for CEco (N = 238) (Cont’d) 
   Test model 5 Test model 6 Test model 7 Test model 8 Test mod   
Variable Hypothesis 
number 
Expected 
sign 
b Sig. (1-tailed) b Sig. (1-tailed) b Sig. (1-tailed) b Sig. (1-tailed) b Sig. 
(1-ta  
Constant N/A N/A -0.586 0.483 -0.465 0.569 -0.057 0.624 0.103 0.868 0.375 0.52  
LN (SIZE) H9 + 0.107 0.003*** 0.105 0.004*** 0.087 0.028** 0.082 0.003*** 0.067 0.01  
AREA H2 + 0.214 0.023** 0.218 0.020** 0.217 0.093* 0.217 0.021** 0.218 0.02  
GOWN H4 + -0.301 0.103 -0.301 0.103 -0.307 0.183 -0.266 0.146   
IND H1 + 0.162 0.133 0.164 0.128 0.173 0.106     
LN (LEV) H10 + -0.052 0.354 -0.042 0.436       
AGE H3 + 0.005 0.492         
PERF H7 +           
LOWN H5 +           
FOWN H6 +           
LN (CSE) H8 +           
Note: Variable significance levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Appendix K: 
Robustness test results - Stepwise backwards regression for CEnv (N = 238) 
   Test model 1 Test model 2 Test model 3 Test model 4 
Variable Hypothesis 
number 
Expected 
sign 
b Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
b Sig. (1-tailed) b Sig. (1-tailed) b Sig. (1-tailed) 
Constant N/A N/A -1.994 0.248 -1.857 0.155 -2.014 0.108 -1.925 0.121 
LN (SIZE) H9 + .156 0.051* 0.150 0.018** 0.160 0.007*** .0160 0.007*** 
IND H1 + .573 0.010*** 0.576 0.009*** 0.578 0.009*** 0.587 0.007*** 
FOWN H6 + 2.213 0.002*** 2.219 0.002*** 2.205 0.002*** 2.191 0.002*** 
AGE H3 + .020 0.201 0.019 0.196 0.020 0.184 0.020 0.176 
LN (CSE) H8 + -.047 0.314 -0.046 0.315 -0.049 0.282 -0.050 0.277 
PERF H7 + 1.508 0.256 1.522 0.249 1.559 0.236 1.542 0.240 
GOWN H4 + .395 0.323 0.395 0.322 0.389 0.328 0.327 0.388 
LOWN H5 + .101 0.609 0.103 0.602 0.103 0.601   
AREA H2 + .084 0.661 0.084 0.661     
LN (LEV) H10 + -.014 0.904       
Note: Variable significance levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Appendix K: 
Robustness test results - Stepwise backwards regression for CEnv (N = 238) (Cont’d) 
   Test model 5 Test model 6 Test model 7 Test model 8 
Variable Hypothesis 
number 
Expected 
sign 
b Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
b Sig. (1-tailed) b Sig. (1-tailed) b Sig. (1-tailed) 
Constant N/A N/A -2.266 0.054* -2.282 0.053* -2.493 0.032** -2.437 0.036** 
LN (SIZE) H9 + 0.182 0.001*** 0.186 0.001*** 0.167 0.001*** 0.177 0.000*** 
IND H1 + 0.614 0.005*** 0.598 0.006*** 0.577 0.007*** 0.576 0.008*** 
FOWN H6 + 2.109 0.003*** 2.082 0.004*** 2.119 0.003*** 2.076 0.004*** 
AGE H3 + 0.020 0.176 0.020 0.174 0.021 0.161   
LN (CSE) H8 + -0.056 0.215 -0.048 0.283     
PERF H7 + 1.493 0.254       
GOWN H4 +         
LOWN H5 +         
AREA H2 +         
LN (LEV) H10 +         
Note: Variable significance levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
244 
 
Appendix L:  
Robustness test results – Stepwise backwards regression for CSoc (N = 238) 
   Test model 1 Test model 2 Test model 3 Test model 4 
Variable Hypothesis 
number 
Expected 
sign 
b Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
b Sig. (1-tailed) b Sig. (1-tailed) b Sig. (1-tailed) 
Constant N/A N/A -.917 0.426 -0.913 0.426 -0.936 0.413 -1.008 0.369 
LN (SIZE) H9 + 0.144 0.008*** 0.143 0.007*** 0.143 0.007*** 0.147 0.005*** 
AREA H2 + 0.250 0.052* 0.249 0.051* 0.249 0.051* 0.247 0.052* 
GOWN H4 + -0.299 0.262 -0.298 0.262 -0.272 0.283 -0.284 0.257 
LN (CSE) H8 + 0.020 0.509 0.020 0.509 0.020 0.502 0.020 0.518 
LN (LEV) H10 + -0.049 0.522 -0.048 0.523 -0.047 0.535 -0.048 0.519 
IND H1 + 0.080 0.587 0.081 0.583 0.077 0.598 0.074 0.609 
AGE H3 + 0.005 0.614 0.005 0.615 0.005 0.627 0.005 0.632 
FOWN H6 + 0.168 0.727 0.169 0.724 0.176 0.713   
LOWN H5 + -0.044 0.739 -0.044 0.739     
PERF H7 + -0.049 0.956       
Note: Variable significance levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Appendix L:  
Robustness test results – Stepwise backwards regression for CSoc (N = 238) (Cont’d) 
   Test model 5 Test model 6 Test model 7 Test model 8 Test model 9 
Variable Hypothesis 
number 
Expected 
sign 
b Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
b Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
b Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
b Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
b Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
Constant N/A N/A -0.894 0.414 -0.867 0.427 -0.442 0.595 -0.382 0.644 -0.081 0.919 
LN 
(SIZE) 
H9 + 0.145 0.005*** 0.143 0.005*** 0.124 0.002*** 0.135 0.000*** 0.119 0.001*** 
AREA H2 + 0.251 0.047** 0.252 0.046** 0.251 0.047** 0.239 0.056* 0.241 0.054* 
GOWN H4 + -0.285 0.255 -0.264 0.285 -0.267 0.280 -0.294 0.228   
LN (CSE) H8 + 0.019 0.521 0.021 0.481 0.022 0.452     
LN 
(LEV) 
H10 + -0.039 0.588 -0.043 0.548       
IND H1 + 0.076 0.599         
AGE H3 +           
FOWN H6 +           
LOWN H5 +           
PERF H7 +           
Note: Variable significance levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Appendix M:  
Robustness test results – Stepwise backwards regression for CSD (N = 238) 
   Test model 1 Test model 2 Test model 3 Test model 4 
Variable Hypothesis 
number 
Expected 
sign 
b Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
b Sig. (1-tailed) b Sig. (1-tailed) b Sig. (1-tailed) 
Constant N/A N/A 0.409 0.701 0.404 0.704 0.402 0.704 0.416 0.693 
LN (SIZE) H9 + 0.127 0.011** 0.127 0.010*** 0.124 0.007*** 0.124 0.007*** 
AREA H2 + 0.209 0.079* 0.209 0.077* 0.212 0.071* 0.212 0.070* 
FOWN H6 + 0.819 0.067* 0.817 .067* 0.824 0.063* 0.820 0.064* 
IND H1 + 0.199 0.145 0.198 0.145 0.196 0.147 0.198 0.141 
GOWN H4 + -0.161 0.515 -0.162 0.511 -0.155 0.523 -0.171 0.458 
AGE H3 + 0.007 0.460 0.007 0.458 0.007 0.455 0.007 0.446 
LN (LEV) H10 + -0.037 0.602 -0.037 0.594 -0.037 0.600 -0.038 0.589 
LOWN H5 + 0.028 0.820 0.027 0.821 0.028 0.817   
LN (CSE) H8 + -0.005 0.853 -0.005 0.861     
PERF H7 + 0.074 0.928       
Note: Variable significance levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Appendix M:  
Robustness test results – Stepwise backwards regression for CSD (N = 238) (Cont’d) 
   Test model 5 Test model 6 Test model 7 Test model 8 
Variable Hypothesis 
number 
Expected 
sign 
b Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
b Sig. (1-tailed) b Sig. (1-tailed) b Sig. (1-tailed) 
Constant N/A N/A 0.792 0.318 0.819 0.301 1.019 0.172 1.138 0.126 
LN (SIZE) H9 + 0.109 0.002*** 0.111 0.002*** 0.101 0.002*** 0.097 0.003*** 
AREA H2 + 0.211 0.070* 0.217 0.062* 0.218 0.060* 0.218 0.062* 
FOWN H6 + 0.833 0.059* 0.822 0.062* 0.862 0.048** 0.820 0.060* 
IND H1 + 0.206 0.121 0.206 0.122 0.193 0.143   
GOWN H4 + -0.175 0.446 -0.175 0.447     
AGE H3 + 0.006 0.517       
LN (LEV) H10 +         
LOWN H5 +         
LN (CSE) H8 +         
PERF H7 +         
Note: Variable significance levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Appendix N:  
Robustness test results – Stepwise backwards regression for WCEco (N = 238) 
   Test model 1 Test model 2 Test model 3 Test model 4 
Variable Hypothesis 
number 
Expected 
sign 
b Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
b Sig. (1-tailed) b Sig. (1-tailed) b Sig. (1-tailed) 
Constant N/A N/A 0.747 0.397 0.744 0.397 0.765 0.383 0.692 0.422 
LN (SIZE) H9 + 0.107 0.009*** 0.105 0.007*** 0.103 0.007*** 0.106 0.004*** 
AREA H2 + 0.222 0.024** 0.223 0.022** 0.222 0.022** 0.220 0.023** 
IND H1 + 0.170 0.132 0.168 0.133 0.170 0.127 0.168 0.132 
GOWN H4 + -0.243 0.234 -0.239 0.236 -0.233 0.245 -0.245 0.217 
LOWN H5 + 0.075 0.455 0.076 0.452 0.077 0.443 0.075 0.453 
AGE H3 + 0.006 0.432 0.006 0.429 0.006 0.434 0.006 0.439 
LN (LEV) H10 + -0.043 0.456 -0.043 0.459 -0.041 0.480 -0.042 0.461 
FOWN H6 + 0.165 0.655 0.168 0.646 0.176 0.630   
PERF H7 + -0.251 0.711 -0.265 0.691     
LN (CSE) H8 + -0.003 0.888       
Note: Variable significance levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Appendix N:  
Robustness test results – Stepwise backwards regression for WCEco (N = 238) (Cont’d) 
   Test model 5 Test model 6 Test model 7 Test model 8 Test model 9 
Variable Hypothesis 
number 
Expected 
sign 
b Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
b Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
b Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
b Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
b Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
Constant N/A N/A 1.108 0.090 1.129 0.083 1.204 0.062 1.521 0.013 1.630 0.008 
LN 
(SIZE) 
H9 + 0.089 0.002*** 0.091 0.002*** 0.090 0.002*** 0.074 0.006*** 0.070 0.008*** 
AREA H2 + 0.219 0.023** 0.224 0.020** 0.224 0.020** 0.226 0.019** 0.226 0.020** 
IND H1 + 0.177 0.110 0.176 0.110 0.183 0.095 0.160 0.143   
GOWN H4 + -0.248 0.211 -0.246 0.215 -0.294 0.121     
LOWN H5 + 0.080 0.426 0.082 0.410       
AGE H3 + 0.005 0.545         
LN 
(LEV) 
H10 +           
FOWN H6 +           
PERF H7 +           
LN (CSE) H8 +           
Note: Variable significance levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Appendix O:  
Robustness test results – Stepwise backwards regression for WCEnv (N = 238) 
   Test model 1 Test model 2 Test model 3 Test model 4 
Variable Hypothesis 
number 
Expected 
sign 
b Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
b Sig. (1-tailed) b Sig. (1-tailed) b Sig. (1-tailed) 
Constant N/A N/A -1.122 0.613 -1.113 0.615 -0.821 0.621 -0.972 0.542 
LN (SIZE) H9 + 0.158 0.126 0.158 0.124 0.145 0.074* 0.155 0.043** 
IND H1 + 0.638 0.025** 0.640 0.024** 0.646 0.022** 0.648 0.021** 
AGE H3 + 0.036 0.073* 0.036 0.072* 0.035 0.070* 0.035 0.065* 
FOWN H6 + 2.547 0.007*** 2.545 0.006*** 2.556 0.006*** 2.543 0.006*** 
GOWN H4 + 0.583 0.257 0.572 0.244 0.570 0.244 0.565 0.248 
PERF H7 + 1.970 0.249 1.967 0.249 1.997 0.239 2.032 0.229 
LN (CSE) H8 + -0.048 0.419 -0.048 0.417 -0.048 0.421 -0.050 0.391 
AREA H2 + 0.081 0.743 0.081 0.742 0.081 0.742   
LN (LEV) H10 + -0.029 0.846 -0.029 0.841     
LOWN H5 + 0.018 0.943       
Note: Variable significance levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Appendix O:  
Robustness test results – Stepwise backwards regression for WCEnv (N = 238) (Cont’d) 
   Test model 5 Test model 6 Test model 7 
Variable Hypothesis 
number 
Expected 
sign 
b Sig. (1-tailed) b Sig. (1-tailed) b Sig. (1-tailed) 
Constant N/A N/A -1.117 0.481 -1.133 0.475 -1.804 0.227 
LN (SIZE) H9 + .131 0.065* 0.142 0.045** .178 0.006*** 
IND H1 + .618 0.027** 0.607 0.030** .652 0.019** 
AGE H3 + .036 0.060* 0.036 0.060** .036 0.060* 
FOWN H6 + 2.592 0.005*** 2.543 0.006*** 2.405 0.009*** 
GOWN H4 + .631 0.191 0.595 0.216   
PERF H7 + 1.817 0.276     
LN (CSE) H8 +       
AREA H2 +       
LN (LEV) H10 +       
LOWN H5 +       
Note: Variable significance levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Appendix P:  
Robustness test results – Stepwise backwards regression for WCSoc (N = 238) 
   Test model 1 Test model 2 Test model 3 Test model 4 
Variable Hypothesis 
number 
Expected 
sign 
b Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
b Sig. (1-tailed) b Sig. (1-tailed) B Sig. (1-tailed) 
Constant N/A N/A 0.445 0.706 0.449 0.702 0.426 0.716 0.523 0.648 
LN (SIZE) H9 + 0.144 0.009*** 0.144 0.009*** 0.143 0.009*** 0.141 0.009*** 
AREA H3 + 0.259 0.050* 0.258 0.049** 0.258 0.048** 0.262 0.045** 
GOWN H4 + -0.282 0.302 -0.282 0.302 -0.256 0.326 -0.256 0.323 
LN (CSE) H8 + 0.020 0.518 0.020 0.517 0.021 0.510 0.020 0.513 
IND H1 + 0.087 0.566 0.087 0.563 0.083 0.577 0.085 0.569 
LN (LEV) H10 + -0.047 0.550 -0.046 0.551 -0.045 0.562 -0.037 0.620 
FOWN H6 + 0.191 0.698 0.192 0.696 0.199 0.685 0.194 0.692 
AGE H3 + 0.004 0.675 0.004 0.676 0.004 0.688   
LOWN H5 + -0.044 0.746 -0.044 0.747     
PERF H7 + -0.044 0.961       
Note: Variable significance levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Appendix P:  
Robustness test results – Stepwise backwards regression for WCSoc (N = 238) (Cont’d) 
   Test model 5 Test model 6 Test model 7 Test model 8 Test model 9 
Variable Hypothesis 
number 
Expected 
sign 
b Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
b Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
b Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
b Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
b Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
Constant N/A N/A 0.440 0.695 0.816 0.344 0.894 0.294 0.954 0.260 1.238 0.126 
LN 
(SIZE) 
H9 + 0.146 0.006*** 0.129 0.002*** 0.125 0.002*** 0.136 0.000*** 0.121 0.001*** 
AREA H3 + 0.259 0.046** 0.258 0.047** 0.259 0.046** 0.247 0.054* 0.249 0.053* 
GOWN H4 + -0.270 0.293 -0.274 0.285 -0.250 0.323 -0.277 0.267   
LN (CSE) H8 + 0.019 0.531 0.020 0.509 0.023 0.460     
IND H1 + 0.082 0.580 0.090 0.541       
LN (LEV) H10 + -0.039 0.600         
FOWN H6 +           
AGE H3 +           
LOWN H5 +           
PERF H7 +           
Note: Variable significance levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
254 
 
Appendix Q:  
Robustness test results – Stepwise backwards regression for WCSD (N = 238) 
   Test model 1 Test model 2 Test model 3 Test model 4 
Variable Hypothesis 
number 
Expected 
sign 
b Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
b Sig. (1-tailed) b Sig. (1-tailed) b Sig. (1-tailed) 
Constant N/A N/A 1.786 0.098* 1.778 0.099 1.776 0.098* 1.794 0.094* 
AREA H2 + 0.209 0.082* 0.210 0.079* 0.213 0.073* 0.213 0.072* 
FOWN H6 + 0.848 0.061* 0.845 0.061* 0.852 0.058* 0.847 0.059* 
LN (SIZE) H9 + 0.127 0.012*** 0.127 0.011** 0.124 0.008*** 0.125 0.008*** 
IND H1 + 0.204 0.139 0.203 0.139 0.201 0.141 0.203 0.134 
GOWN H4 + -0.152 0.544 -0.153 0.539 -0.146 0.552 -0.166 0.478 
AGE H3 + 0.007 0.464 0.007 0.461 0.007 0.458 0.007 0.447 
LN (LEV) H10 + -0.036 0.618 -0.036 0.607 -0.036 0.614 -0.037 0.601 
LOWN H5 + 0.034 0.783 0.034 0.785 0.034 0.781   
LN (CSE) H8 + -0.006 0.846 -0.005 0.858     
PERF H7 + 0.104 0.900       
Note: Variable significance levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Appendix Q:   
Robustness test results – Stepwise backwards regression for WCSD (N = 238) (Cont’d) 
   Test model 5 Test model 6 Test model 7 Test model 8 
Variable Hypothesis 
number 
Expected 
sign 
b Sig. 
(1-tailed) 
b Sig. (1-tailed) b Sig. (1-tailed) b Sig. (1-tailed) 
Constant N/A N/A 2.162 0.007*** 2.189 0.007*** 2.382 0.002*** 2.505 0.001*** 
AREA H2 + 0.212 0.072* 0.218 0.064* 0.219 0.062* 0.218 0.064* 
FOWN H6 + 0.860 0.054* 0.848 0.057* 0.888 0.044** 0.844 0.056* 
LN (SIZE) H9 + 0.109 0.003*** 0.112 0.002*** 0.101 0.002*** 0.098 0.003*** 
IND H1 + 0.212 0.116 0.211 0.116 0.198 0.136   
GOWN H4 + -0.170 0.466 -0.169 0.467     
AGE H3 + 0.006 0.516       
LN (LEV) H10 +         
LOWN H5 +         
LN (CSE) H8 +         
PERF H7 +         
Note: Variable significance levels: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Appendix R:  
Registered securities companies in survey 
Number Company Name 
1 Ai Jiang Security Co., Ltd 
2 An Xing Security Co., Ltd 
3 Gao Hua Beijing Security Co., Ltd 
4 Bo Hai Security Co., Ltd 
5 Caida Security Co., Ltd 
6 Cai Fu Security Co., Ltd 
7 Cai Tong Security Co., Ltd 
8 Chang Cheng Security Co., Ltd 
9 Cheng Hao Security Co., Ltd 
10 Chang Jiang Security Co., Ltd 
11 Chuan Cai Security Co., Ltd 
12 Da Tong Security Co., Ltd 
13 DT Security Co., Ltd 
14 De Bang Security Co., Ltd 
15 Di Yi Security Co., Ltd 
16 Dongbei Security Co., Ltd 
17 Dongfang Security Co., Ltd 
18 Dong Hai Security Co., Ltd 
19 Dong wu Security Co., Ltd 
20 Dong Xing Security Co., Ltd 
21 Fang Zheng Security Co., Ltd 
22 Dong Wan Security Co., Ltd 
23 Guang da Security Co., Ltd 
24 Guang FA Security Co., Ltd 
25 Guang Zhou Security Co., Ltd 
26 Guo Du Security Co., Ltd 
27 Guo Hai Security Co., Ltd 
28 Guo Jin Security Co., Ltd 
29 Guo Kai Security Co., Ltd 
30 Guo Lian Security Co., Ltd 
31 Guo Sheng Security Co., Ltd 
32 Guo Tai Jun An Security Co., Ltd 
33 Guo Xin Security Co., Ltd 
34 Guo Yuan Security Co., Ltd 
35 Hai Yong Security Co., Ltd 
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36 Hang tian Security Co., Ltd 
37 Heng Tai Security Co., Ltd 
38 Hong Ta Security Co., Ltd 
39 Hong Xin Security Co., Ltd 
40 Hong Yuan Security Co., Ltd 
41 Hua An Security Co., Ltd 
42 Hua Bao Security Co., Ltd 
43 Hua Fu Security Co., Ltd 
44 Hua Chuang Security Co., Ltd 
45 Hua Lin Security Co., Ltd 
46 Hua Long Security Co., Ltd 
47 Hua Rong Security Co., Ltd 
48 Hua Tai Security Co., Ltd 
49 Hua Xi Security Co., Ltd 
50 Hua Xin Security Co., Ltd 
51 Jiang Hai Security Co., Ltd 
52 Jin Yuan Security Co., Ltd 
53 Kai Yuan Security Co., Ltd 
54 Lian Xun Security Co., Ltd 
55 Min Sheng Security Co., Ltd 
56 Min Zu Security Co., Ltd 
57 Nan Jing Security Co., Ltd 
58 Ping an Security Co., Ltd 
59 Ji Lu Security Co., Ltd 
60 Bai Xin Security Co., Ltd 
61 Rui Yin Security Co., Ltd 
62 Shan Xi Security Co., Ltd 
63 Shang Hai Security Co., Ltd 
64 Shen Yin Security Co., Ltd 
65 Shi JI Security Co., Ltd 
66 Shou Chuang Security Co., Ltd 
67 Tai Ping Yang Security Co., Ltd 
68 Tian Feng Security Co., Ltd 
69 Tian Yuan Security Co., Ltd 
70 Wan He Security Co., Ltd 
71 Wan Lian Security Co., Ltd 
72 Wu Kuang Security Co., Ltd 
73 Xi Bu Security Co., Ltd 
74 Xi Zang Tong Xin Security Co., Ltd 
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75 Xi Nan Security Co., Ltd 
76 Xia Men Security Co., Ltd 
77 Xiang Cai Security Co., Ltd 
78 Xin Shi Dai Security Co., Ltd 
79 Xin Da Security Co., Ltd 
80 Xing Ye Security Co., Ltd 
81 Yin He Security Co., Ltd 
82 Yin Tai Security Co., Ltd 
83 Ying Da Security Co., Ltd 
84 Zhao Shang Security Co., Ltd 
85 Zhe Shang Security Co., Ltd 
86 Zhong Hang Security Co., Ltd 
87 Zhong JIN Security Co., Ltd 
88 Zhong Shan Security Co., Ltd 
89 Zhong Tian Security Co., Ltd 
90 Zhong Tou Security Co., Ltd 
91 Zhong Xin Security Co., Ltd 
92 Zhong Xin Jian Tou Security Co., Ltd 
93 Zhong Yin Guo JI Security Co., Ltd 
94 Zhong You Security Co., Ltd 
95 Zhong Yuan Security Co., Ltd 
96 Zhong Cheng Security Co., Ltd 
97 Hua Tai Lian He Security Co., Ltd 
98 Heng Tai Security Co., Ltd 
99 Gao Sheng Gao Hua Security Co., Ltd 
100 Zhang Jiang Bao Jian Security Co., Ltd 
101 Cai Fu Li Ang Security Co., Ltd 
102 Hai Ji Da He Security Co., Ltd 
103 Rui Xin Fang Zheng Security Co., Ltd 
104 Zhong De Security Co., Ltd 
105 Zhong Xin Wan Tong Security Co., Ltd 
106 Hua Ying Security Co., Ltd 
107 Mo Gen Da Tong Security Co., Ltd 
108 Hua Xin Security Co., Ltd 
109 Guo Tai Jun AN (Shanghai) Security Co., Ltd 
110 Dong Fang Security Co., Ltd 
111 Guang Da Zi Chan Security Co., Ltd 
112 Hai Tong Security Co., Ltd 
113 Zhong Xin (Zhejiang) Security Co., Ltd 
114 Dong Fang Hua Qi Security Co., Ltd 
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Appendix S:  
Listed companies in sample 
Number Stock Code Company Name Industry 
1 000001 Ping An Bank Co., Ltd Finance 
2 000002 China Vanke Co., Ltd Real estate 
3 000009 China Baoan Group Co., Ltd Conglomerates 
4 000012 CSG Holding Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
5 000021 Shenzhen Kaifa Technology Co., Ltd 
Wholesale and 
retail 
6 000024 Zhaoshang Dichan Co., Ltd Real estate 
7 
000039 
China International Marine Containers 
(Group) Co., Ltd 
Manufacturing 
8 000046 Oceanwide Holdings Co., Ltd Real estate 
9 000060 Shenzhen Zhongjin Lingnan Company Ltd Mining 
10 000061 Shenzhen Agricultural Products Co., Ltd 
Business 
support 
11 000069 Shenzhen Overseas Chinese Town Co., Ltd 
Environmental 
protection 
12 000157 
Zoomlion Heavy Industry Science and 
Technology Co., Ltd 
Manufacturing 
13 000301 
Jiangsu Wujiang china Eastern Silk market 
Co., Ltd 
Utilities 
14 000333 Midea Group Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
15 000338 Weichai Power Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
16 000402 Financial Street Holding Co., Ltd Real estate 
17 000498 Shandong Hi-Speed Road and Bridge Co., Ltd Construction 
18 000528 Guangxi Liugong Machinery Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
19 000536 CPT Technology (Gourp) Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
20 000538 Yunnan Baiyao Group Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
21 000550 Jiangling Motors Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
22 000568 Luzhou Laojiao Company Ltd Manufacturing 
23 000581 Weifu High-technology Group Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
24 000651 Gree Electric Appliances, Inc. of Zhuhai Manufacturing 
25 000655 Shandong Jingling Mining Co., Ltd Mining 
26 000671 Sunshine City Group Co., Ltd Real estate 
27 000718 Suning Universal Co., Ltd Real estate 
28 000725 BOE Technology Group Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
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29 000726 Lu Thai Textile Co., Ltd Textile 
30 000729 Beijing Yanjing Brewery Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
31 000776 GF Securities Co., Ltd Finance 
32 000778 Xinxing Ductile Iron Pipes Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
33 000792 Yanhu Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
34 000797 China Wuyi Co., Ltd Real estate 
35 000819 Yueyang Xingchang Co., Ltd Mining 
36 000861 Haiying Co., Ltd Business support 
37 000869 Yantai Zhangyu Winery Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
38 000876 New Hope Liuhe Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
39 000877 Tianshan Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
40 000895 Shuanghui Fazhan Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
41 000970 Zhongke Sanhuan Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
42 000973 Fosuo Technology Co., Ltd IT 
43 000981 Yinyi Real Estate Co., Ltd Real estate 
44 000983 
Shenxi Xishan Coal and Electricity 
Power Co., Ltd 
Mining 
45 000993 Fujian Mindong Electric Power Co., Ltd Utilities 
46 002001 Zhejiang NHU Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
47 002008 
Han's Laser Technology Industry Group 
Co., Ltd 
Manufacturing 
48 002035 Vatti Corporate Limited Manufacturing 
49 002038 Beijing SL Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
50 002041 Shandong Denghai Seeds Co., Ltd Agriculture 
51 002042 Huafu Top Dyed Melange Yarn Co., Ltd Textile 
52 002051 China CAMC Engineering Co., Ltd Construction 
53 002056 
Hengdian Group DMEGC Magertics 
Co., Ltd 
Manufacturing 
54 002063 Ygsoft Inc. IT 
55 002064 Zhejiang Huafeng Spandex Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
56 002070 Zhonghe Co., Ltd Textile 
57 002081 
Suzhou Gold Mantis Construction and 
Decoration Co., Ltd 
Construction 
58 002092 Wiscom System Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
59 002098 
Fujian SBS Zipper Science and 
Technology Co., Ltd 
Manufacturing 
60 002102 
Fujian Guanfu Modern Household 
Wares Co., Ltd 
Manufacturing 
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61 002121 Shenzhen Clou Electronics Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
62 002128 
Huolinhe Opencut Coal Industry 
Corporation Limited of Inner Mongolia, 
Co., Ltd 
Mining 
63 002155 Hunan Gold Corporation Limited Mining 
64 002179 
AVIC Jonhon Optronic Technology Co., 
Ltd 
Manufacturing 
65 002216 Sanquan Food Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
66 002224 Sanlux Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
67 002233 Guangdong Tapai Group Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
68 002236 Zhejiang Dahua Techonolgy Co., ltd Manufacturing 
69 002241 Goertek Inc. Manufacturing 
70 002244 
Hangzhou Binjiang Real Estate Group 
Co., Ltd 
Real estate 
71 002249 
Zhongshan Broad-ocean Montor Co., 
Ltd 
Manufacturing 
72 002250 Lianhe Chemical Technology Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
73 002269 
Shanghai Metersbonwe Fashion and 
Accessories Co., Ltd 
Textile 
74 002271 
Beijing Oriental Yuhong Waterproof 
Teachnology Co., Ltd 
Manufacturing 
75 002287 
Tibet Cheezheng Tibetan Medicine Co., 
Ltd 
Manufacturing 
76 002300 Fujian Nanping Sun Cable Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
77 002304 
Jiangsu Yanghe Brewery Join-stock Co., 
Ltd 
Manufacturing 
78 002344 Haining China Leather Market Co., Ltd Business support 
79 002367 Canny Elevator Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
80 002372 
Zhejiang Weixing New Building 
materials Co., Ltd 
Manufacturing 
81 002394 Jiangsu Lianfa Textile Co., Ltd Textile 
82 002419 Rainbow Department Store Co., Ltd Wholesale and retail 
83 002438 Jiangsu Shentong Valva Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
84 002454 
Songz Automobile Aire Conditioning 
Co., Ltd 
Manufacturing 
85 002470 
Kingenta Ecological Engineering Group 
Co., Ltd 
Manufacturing 
86 002498 Qingdao Hanhe Cable Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
87 002500 Shanxi Securities Company Lited Business support 
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88 002509 Tianguang Fire-fighting Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
89 002527 Shanghai Setp Electric Corporation Manufacturing 
90 002543 
Guangdong Vanward New Electric Co., 
Ltd 
Manufacturing 
91 002545 Qingdao East Steel Tower Stock Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
92 002546 Nanjing Xinlian Electronics Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
93 002570 
Beingmate Baby and Child Food Co., 
Ltd 
Manufacturing 
94 002578 Fujian Minfa Aluminium Co., Ltd Mining 
95 002584 Xilong Scientific Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
96 002595 
Shandong Himile Mechanical Science 
and Technology Co., Ltd 
Manufacturing 
97 002635 Suzhou anjie Technology Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
98 002641 Yonggao Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
99 002656 Modern Avenue Group Co. Ltd Textile 
100 002673 Western Securities Co., Ltd Business support 
101 002674 Xingye Leather Technology Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
102 002716 
Chenzhou City Jingui Silber Industry 
Co., Ltd 
Mining 
103 300003 Lepu Medical technology Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
104 300015 Aier Eye Hospital Group Co., Ltd Public Health 
105 300019 
Chengdu Guibao Science and 
Technology Co., Ltd 
Manufacturing 
106 300067 Shanghai Anoky Group Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
107 300132 Fujian Green Pine Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
108 300179 SF Diamond Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
109 300181 Zhejiang Jolly Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
110 300197 
Shenzhen Techand Ecology and 
Environmental Co., Ltd 
Construction 
111 300198 
Fujiang Newchoice Pipe Technology 
Co., Ltd 
Manufacturing 
112 600021 Shanghai Electric Power Co., Ltd Utilities 
113 600027 
Huadian Power International 
Corporation Limited 
Utilities 
114 600029 China Southern Airlines Co., Ltd Transportation 
115 600030 CITIC Securities Company Limited Business support 
116 600031 Sany Heavy Industry Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
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117 600036 China Merchants Bank Co., Ltd Finance 
118 600048 Poly Real Estate Group Co., Ltd Real estate 
119 600050 
China United Network Communications 
Limited  
IT 
120 600051 Ningbo United Group Co., Ltd Wholesale and retail 
121 600052 Zhejiang Guangsha Co., Ltd Real estate 
122 600056 China Meheco Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
123 600058 Minmetals Development Co., Ltd Wholesale and retail 
124 600059 
Zhejiang Guyuelongshan Shaoxing 
Wine Co., Ltd 
Manufacturing 
125 600062 
China Resources Double-crance 
Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd 
Manufacturing 
126 600064 Nanjing Gaoke Company Limited  Real estate 
127 600067 Citychamp Dartong Co., Ltd Real estate 
128 600085 Beijing Tong Ren Tang Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
129 600089 Tebian Electric Apparatus Stock Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
130 600100 Tsinghua Tongfang Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
131 600109 Sinolink Securities Co., Ltd Business support 
132 600111 
China Northern Rare Earth (Group) 
High-Tech Co., Ltd 
Manufacturing 
133 600123 Shanxi Lanhua Sci-tech Venture Co., Ltd Mining 
134 600138 China CYTS Tours Holding Co., Ltd Business support 
135 600153 Xiamen CD Inc. Wholesale and retail 
136 600170 Shanghai Construction Group Co., Ltd Construction 
137 600177 Youngor Group Co., Ltd Real estate 
138 600190 Jinzhou Port Co., Ltd Transportation 
139 600195 
China Animal Husbandry Industry Co., 
Ltd 
Manufacturing 
140 600196 
Shanghai Fosun Pharmaceutical (Group) 
Co., Ltd 
Manufacturing 
141 600197 Xinjiang Yilite Industry Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
142 600203 Fujian Furi Electronics Co., Ltd Wholesale and retail 
143 600208 Xinhu Zhongbao Co., Ltd Real estate 
144 600223 Lushang Property Co., Ltd Real estate 
145 600246 Beijing Vantone Real Estate Co., Ltd Real estate 
146 600252 
Guangxi Wuzhou Zhongheng Group 
Co., Ltd 
Manufacturing 
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147 600261 Zhejiang Yankon Group Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
148 600262 
Inner Mongolia North Hauler Joint Stock 
Co., Ltd 
Manufacturing 
149 600266 
Beijing Urban Construction Investment 
and Development Co., Ltd 
Real estate 
150 600267 Zhejiang Hisun Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
151 600298 Angel Yeast Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
152 600309 Wanhua Chemical Group Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
153 600322 
Tianjin Reality Development (Group) 
Co., Ltd 
Real estate 
154 600329 
Tianjin Zhongxin Pharmaceutical Group 
Corporation Limited 
Manufacturing 
155 600337 
Markor International Home Furnishings 
Co., Ltd 
Wholesale and retail 
156 600352 Zhejiang Longsheng Group Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
157 600356 Mudanjiang Hengfeng Paper Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
158 600372 China Avionics Systems Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
159 600376 Beijing Capital Development Co., Ltd Real estate 
160 600377 
Markor International Home Furnishings 
Co., Ltd 
Wholesale and retail 
161 600383 Gemdale Corporation Real estate 
162 600388 Fujian Longking Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
163 600389 
Nantong Jiangshan Agrochemical and 
Chemicals Limited Liability Co. 
Manufacturing 
164 600422 KPC Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Manufacturing 
165 600436 
Zhangzhou Pientzehuang 
Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd 
Manufacturing 
166 600483 Fujian Funeng Co., Ltd Utilities 
167 600486 Jiangsu Yangnong Chemical Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
168 600505 Sichuan Xichang Electric Power Co., Ltd Utilities 
169 600510 Black Peony (Group) Co., Ltd Real estate 
170 600511 
China National Medicines Corporation 
Ltd 
Wholesale and retail 
171 600518 Kangmei Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
172 600525 Changyuan Group Ltd IT 
173 600535 Tasly Pharmaceutical Group Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
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174 600549 Xiamen Tungsten Co., Ltd Mining 
175 600582 
Tian Di Science and Technology Co., 
Ltd 
Manufacturing 
176 600583 Offshore Oil Engineering Co., Ltd Mining 
177 600597 Bright Dairy and Food Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
178 600611 Dazhong Transportion (Group) Co., Ltd Transportation 
179 600619 Shanghai Highly (Group) Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
180 600628 Shanghai New World Corporation Ltd Wholesale and retail 
181 600660 Fuyao Glass Industry Group Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
182 600704 
Materials Industry Zhongda Group Co., 
Ltd 
Wholesale and retail 
183 600705 AVIC Capital Co., Ltd Finance 
184 600741 
Huayu Automotive Systems Company 
Limited 
Manufacturing 
185 600743 Hua Yuan Property Co., Ltd Real estate 
186 600750 Jiangzhong Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
187 600761 Anhui Heli Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
188 600787 CMST Development Co., Ltd Transportation 
189 600802 Fujian Cement Inc. Manufacturing 
190 600816 Anxin Trust Co., Ltd Finance 
191 600824 
Shanghai Yimin Commerce Group Co., 
Ltd 
Wholesale and retail 
192 600829 
HPGC Renmintongtai Pharmaceutical 
Corporation 
Wholesale and retail 
193 600835 
Shanghai Mechanical and Electrical 
Industry Co., Ltd 
Manufacturing 
194 600836 
Shanghai Jielong Industry Group 
Corporation Limited 
Media 
195 600837 Haitong Securities Company Ltd Business support 
196 600839 Sichuan Changhong Electric Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
197 600858 Silver Plaza Group Co., Ltd Wholesale and retail 
198 600867 
Tonghua Dongbao Pharmaceutical Co., 
Ltd 
Manufacturing 
199 600872 
Jonjee Hi-tech Industrial and 
Commercial Holding Co., Ltd 
Manufacturing 
200 600875 Dongfang Electric Corporation Limited Manufacturing 
201 600900 China Yangtze Power Co., Ltd Utilities 
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202 600970 
Sinoma International Engineering Co., 
Ltd 
Manufacturing 
203 600979 Sichuan Guangan AAA Public Co., Ltd Utilities 
204 600987 Zhejiang Hangmin Co., Ltd Textile 
205 601000 Tangshan Port Group Co., Ltd Transportation 
206 601098 
China South Publishing and Media 
Group Co., Ltd 
Media 
207 601099 The Pacific Securities Co., Ltd Business support 
208 601107 Sichuan Expressway Company Limited Transportation 
209 601139 Shenzhen Gas Corporation Ltd Utilities 
210 601168 Western Mining Co., Ltd Mining 
211 601169 Bank of Beijing Co., Ltd Finance 
212 601186 
China Railway Construction Corporation 
Limited 
Construction 
213 601238 Guangzhou Automobile Group Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
214 601288 Agricultural Bank of China Limited Finance 
215 601299 China Beiche Co., Ltd Manufacturing 
216 601328 Bank of Communications Co., Ltd Finance 
217 601339 Bros Eastern Co., Ltd Textile 
218 601377 Industrial Securities Co., Ltd Business support 
219 601515 Shantou Dongfeng Printing Co., Ltd Media 
220 601555 Soochow Securities Co., Ltd Business support 
221 601588 Beijing North Star Company Limited Real estate 
222 601633 Great Wall Motor Company Limited Manufacturing 
223 601688 Huatai Securities Co., Ltd Business support 
224 601699 
Shanxi Lu'an Environmental Energy 
Development Co., Ltd 
Mining 
225 601717 
Zhengzhou Coal Mining Machinery 
Group Co., Ltd 
Manufacturing 
226 601727 
Shanghai Electric Group Company 
Limited 
Manufacturing 
227 601788 Everbright Securities Company Limited Finance 
228 601800 
China Communications Construction 
Company Limited 
Construction 
229 601808 China Oilfield Services Limited Mining 
230 601818 
China Everbright Bank Company 
Limited 
Finance 
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231 601899 Zijin Mining Group Co., Ltd Mining 
232 601901 Founder Securities Co., Ltd Finance 
233 601988 Bank of China Limited Finance 
234 601991 
Datang International Power Generation 
Co., Ltd 
Utilities 
235 601992 BBMG Corporation Manufacturing 
236 601998 China CITIC Bank Corporation Limited Finance 
237 603123 Beijing Cuiwei Tower Co., Ltd Wholesale and retail 
238 603993 China Molybdenum Co., Ltd Mining 
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Industry classifications by the Chinese security commission 
Sector name Sub-sector name No. of companies 
Agriculture Agriculture 5 
 Forestry 4 
 Animal husbandry 10 
 Fishery 7 
 Agriculture services 1 
Total  27 
Mining Coal mining and dressing 7 
 Petroleum and natural gas 
extraction 
1 
 Ferrous metals mining and 
dressing 
4 
 Nonferrous metals mining 
and dressing 
7 
 Mining support activities 7 
Total  26 
Manufacturing Agricultural and sideline 
products processing 
30 
 Food manufacturing 14 
 Wine, beverage and refined 
tea manufacturing 
16 
 Textiles 26 
 Textile garments and clothing 20 
 Leather, fur, down and related 
products, and shoes 
3 
 Timber processing, bamboo, 
cane, palm fibre, and straw 
products  
6 
 Furniture manufacturing 3 
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 Papermaking and paper 
products 
15 
 Printing and record medium 
preproduction  
5 
 Cultural, educational and 
sports article manufacturing 
10 
 Petroleum processing, coking 
and nuclear fuel processing 
8 
 Raw chemical materials and 
chemical product 
manufacturing  
119 
 Pharmaceutical 
manufacturing 
89 
 Chemical fibre 
manufacturing 
17 
 Rubber and plastic products 40 
 Nonmetal mineral products 44 
 Smelting and pressing of 
ferrous metals 
10 
 Smelting and pressing of 
nonferrous metals 
32 
 Metal products 35 
 General-purpose machinery 
manufacturing 
81 
 Special-purpose machinery 
manufacturing 
98 
 Automobile manufacturing 49 
 Railway, shipping, aerospace 
and other transport equipment 
manufacturing 
14 
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 Electrical machinery and 
equipment manufacturing 
119 
 Computers, communication 
equipment, and other 
electronic equipment 
manufacturing 
166 
 Instrument and apparatus 
manufacturing 
23 
 Other manufacturing 14 
 Comprehensive utilisation of 
waste 
1 
Total  1107 
Construction Housing industry 1 
 Civil engineering 
construction 
22 
 Building installation 1 
 Building fitting and 
decoration and other 
construction 
10 
Total  34 
Wholesale and retail Wholesale 28 
 Retail  34 
Total   62 
Transportation Highway transportation 9 
 Water transportation 7 
 Air transportation 3 
 Load and unload, and 
transportation agency 
1 
 Storage 6 
Total  26 
Hotels and catering Lodging  6 
 Catering services 4 
Total   10 
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IT Telecommunications, radio 
and television and satellite 
transmission service 
6 
 Internet and other related 
services 
11 
 Software and information 
technology services 
90 
Total   107 
Finance Monetary and financial 
services 
2 
 Capital market services 8 
 Other financial services 1 
Total   11 
Real estate Real estate 68 
Total   68 
Business support Lease 1 
 Business services 14 
Total   15 
Research and development Research and experimental 
development 
1 
 Professional technical 
services 
10 
Total  11 
Environmental protection Ecological protection and 
environmental governance 
8 
 Public facilities management  12 
Total   20 
Public health Health  2 
Total   2 
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Media News and publishing  4 
 Production of radio, 
television, film, audio and 
video 
7 
 Culture and art  2 
Total   13 
Conglomerates Conglomerates 7 
Total   7 
Utilities Electric power, steam and 
hot water production and 
supply 
62 
 Gas production and supply 10 
 Tap water production and 
supply 
14 
Total  86 
   
   
   
 
